Civil-Military Cooperation and Its Impact on Human Security – Chances and Limits

The Example of the Australian Defence Forces in East Timor (1999 and 2006)

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Abstract

Drawing on the examples of the Australian Defence Forces’ (ADF) interventions in East Timor (1999 and 2006) this desk study is the first to analyze the significance and impact of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) on levels of “Human Security” during peacekeeping operations. This analysis is based on a critical assessment of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and the “Human Security” concept, as well as of the main actors involved in CIMIC - Humanitarian organizations, the military and the soldier. Additionally, the Australian government’s motivation for the military intervention in East Timor is discussed as motivation plays a vital role for the success of an intervention and its impact on “Human Security”. Following von Clausewitz, the impact of CIMIC on “Human Security” was measured for a better illustration on three different levels (politics, strategy and tactics). The study argues that CIMIC, interpreted as a strategic instrument of the military to achieve military goals, on first sight cannot contribute to Human Security. Nevertheless, this study makes the case for CIMIC as a potent useful tool, especially in multinational peacekeeping forces and in non-combat operations. Here, if interpreted as a mechanism which is designed to minimize casualties, it has a positive impact on Human Security as it helps to create an environment in which security can be granted.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>Apodeti</td>
<td>Associação Popular Democrática Timorense</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CHE</td>
<td>Complex Humanitarian Emergency</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-military Operation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>F/FDTL</td>
<td>Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</td>
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<td>FREITLIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>H1N1</td>
<td>(Influenza A virus subtype)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>PMC</td>
<td>Private Military Company</td>
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<td>POLRI</td>
<td>Indonesian Police Force</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesian National Military</td>
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<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timor Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNHOC</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Operations Centre</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration</td>
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<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USGET</td>
<td>United States Assistance Group in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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1. Introduction

The aim of this work is to analyse to what extent the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) approach, applied by the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) in the 1999 (International Force East Timor, INTERFET/United Nations Transitional Administration, UNTAET) and 2006 (Operation Astute) military interventions in East Timor, had an impact on the level of Human Security of the East Timorese people.

When talking about civil-military relations or cooperation, it is not referred to the classical discussion on who should lead a state’s armed forces, civilians or soldiers, (see Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960) but to the cooperation of both entities during a military mission. Such an analysis is relevant due to the growing contact between the military and civilian organizations, not only in missions during armed conflict but also in its aftermath. CIMIC shifted into focus of policy makers and politicians as the number of peacekeeping missions increased considerably during the 1990s. However, even if the number of mission grew, it soon became clear that traditional peacekeeping missions could often only cease the fighting, but had little possibilities to contribute to a long-lasting and sustainable peace. In order to improve the outcome of traditional peacekeeping- and peace enforcement missions, new methods and policies were started to be discussed – CIMIC was one of them.

To show what CIMIC means from a military point of view, how it developed, what purpose it has in traditional military operations, and under which conditions it eventually can be interpreted as a peacebuilding tool, is one of the core aims of this work. This can only be achieved by an analysis of the military, its tasks and strategies, as well as its main instrument: the soldier. Another important factor for the understanding of a potential transformation of a previously purely military tool to a peacebuilding one is the normative and geopolitical context in which this development took place. This context included the creation of such concepts like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Human Security, with the latter being the second main focal point of this work. To be able to analyse CIMIC’s effects on Human Security, it is not only important to understand the concept of Human Security and its strengths and weaknesses. As both concepts had an impact on the reanalysis of peacekeeping in general, and hence indirectly also on CIMIC, it is also necessary to show how they emerged and what political developments enabled their evolution.

During the 1990s and through the alteration of some nation’s security policies, especially of the United States and Russia, the nature of international peacekeeping missions changed and the evolution of new political concepts, such as the concept of Human Security, set in. While international and hence national security during the Cold War were mainly determined by the leading world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union and their political interests, the concept of security needed to be redeveloped after a change of perception of dangers due to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of a bi-polar world. Mathews stated already in 1989 that “global developments now suggest the need for another […] broadening definition of national security” (Mathews 1989, p. 162). Such a new definition of security became necessary as threats could not only be reduced to single events that affected a special population on a determined territory.

Moreover, mankind in a globalized world became vulnerable to the same problems as dangers are not only linked to a nation’s territory anymore. Recent events like the rising food prices on the world market which led to hunger and famine in different parts of the world, the world’s banking and economic crisis which increased unemployment and poverty in every continent, the H1N1 virus which affected people globally, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic etc. are several examples for threats which do not stop at the border of states but endanger humanity in total. Traditional definitions of security which are focussing on state security in terms of accumulation of economic, political and military power to be able to defend the country militarily against external dangers therefore were not comprehensive enough anymore. The changing nature of threats to the people, when mirrored on today’s military conflicts, can be described as a shift from threats deriving from collective mass destruction by a possible nuclear war or a military invasion by an outside aggressor, to phenomena like intrastate armed conflicts which are affecting more and more civilians. This change can especially be observed since the end of the Cold War which marked a new era for international politics and the human being per se as object of security. As a reaction to all these new developments, new legal and political concepts like the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and ‘Human Security’ were designed to be able to protect individuals more effectively. Both concepts were discussed by international policy makers and scholars and influenced world politics where they helped defining new conflict resolution mechanisms, necessary to react to a
new reality. With a new definition of security as it is undertaken in the ‘Human Security’ concept, two main conceptual shifts were thereby achieved. Firstly, it was taken into account that in today’s globalized world countries, societies, and economies are intrinsically linked. It therefore often cannot clearly be defined anymore when peoples’ economic and physical security is endangered, and whether this is caused by internal or external reasons. Secondly, a focus on the individual in contrast to the former focus on the collective entity ‘state’ was achieved by which the individual became the main object of security.

The traditional distinction of external and internal security was further blurred as the new object of security, the individual, often does not only get threatened by external actors and developments like the above mentioned, but also by internal non-state and state actors. These actors even include governments which are directly endangering their own population, or which indirectly are not able to grant security due to what is described by academia as a failure of state.¹ As a result, mechanisms had to be discussed which would help to bring security even to those individuals who are endangered by their own governments. These mechanisms included inter alia the question about whether humanitarian interventions² could be a solution and thereby directly tackled the concept of international peacekeeping and indirectly the concept of CIMIC.

How CIMIC, Human Security, and peacekeeping are interrelated and what the impact of CIMIC on Human Security can be will be shown using the example of the CIMIC approach by the ADF as it was applied in the military interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 2006. Thereby, an overview of the Australian defence policy is given as well as an overview about the incidents, which led to both interventions. This is necessary in order to understand the motivation behind the ADF’s engagement what helps to explain the organization of the mission, as well as certain outcomes of the armed forces’ activities. The structuring of the description of the concrete effects of CIMIC on Human Security in East Timor is based on an extended terminology by Clausewitz (2003 [1832]) who divides the conduct of war in the three important areas ‘politics’, ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’.

As this work is based on a desk study, it is limited in its capacity to describe the concrete impact of CIMIC activities on the East Timorese people. This limitation is further aggravated through the Australian Defence Forces inability or unwillingness to provide necessary and detailed information on all non-combat related activities they conducted in the relevant periods. The analysis therefore is primarily based on a qualitative methodology. Information was gathered by an extensive literature study and by reports of the Australian government, international institutions and non-governmental organizations working in the area. CIMIC related information about the ADF is mainly based on personal interviews with four members of the Australian armed forces who have been deployed to East Timor or are currently working on civil-military relations within the ADF.

2. International politics after 1989

Until the year 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, international politics were dominated by the two existing superpowers United States of America (USA) and Soviet Union (USSR). Ideological differences between both states led to a struggle for power in order to be able to defend own interests against the opponent. To achieve such power, proxy wars were fought around the world and a massive arms race began, finally bringing the world close to nuclear destruction. State security by that time was mainly interpreted as military security – necessary to safeguard the external borders against foreign invasion, and to protect societies in the state’s territory. To achieve such security nearly every state strongly invested in its military or decided to bandwagon with one of both sides in order to benefit from the protectors capacities. States were the main actors in this so-called Westphalian system, which was dominating international relations.

¹ “State failure refers to the complete or partial collapse of state authority, such as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. Failed states have governments with little political authority or ability to impose the rule of law. They are usually associated with widespread crime, violent conflict, or severe humanitarian crisis, and they may threaten the stability of neighbouring countries” (King/Zheng: 2001, pp. 623-658).

² For Holzgrefe (2003, p. 18) a Humanitarian Intervention is “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”
The Westphalian system, which was established after the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, aimed at regulating and containing the use of violence between states. It was furthermore supposed to safeguard civilians by granting the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to the nation states. Such a monopoly of violence meant an important attribute of the modern nation state how Weber defines it (Weber 1980, p. 29) and could additionally be interpreted as an important prerequisite for the following development of International Humanitarian Law (Cassese 2007, pp. 22-25.), which was designed to regulate modern warfare and - inter alia - to bring security to civilians. The Westphalian system furthermore was aimed to bring peace and stability to the nations by guaranteeing them sovereignty and by affirming their right of non-interference in national affairs – a concept which was equally challenged with the end of the Cold War as was the state’s monopoly of violence.

With the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, hope came up that democracy and wealth were on their way to conquer the world and to bring peace to everybody. “The end of history” was announced, meaning the end of ideological struggles and the arrival of the final form of human government (see Fukuyama 1992). But it soon turned out that this wish was not to come true – instead the number of conflicts grew and their nature changed. Some scholars argue that the number of conflicts grew as some old conflicts, which had been ‘frozen’ during the Cold War, now became hot conflicts again. Others emerged as a result of the breakdown of financial and military aid by the formerly competing world powers USA and USSR what gave room for new struggles over power. The breakdown of the Soviet Union meant the end of the bi-polar world order, leaving a power vacuum in certain regions which now was filled by new military actors. During the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, this lack of power furthermore resulted in a breakdown of governmental institutions and structures in several countries where it promoted a failing of states. The monopoly of violence did not exist anymore and military power was partly privatized. New private actors who, equally due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, often had no difficulties to achieve larger amounts of cheap and modern weaponry, started asymmetric wars, fighting for political, religious and economic goals.

In ‘Wars of the third kind’ (see van Crefeld 1991) or ‘New Wars’ (see Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2004) traditional war strategies were not exercised anymore: Traditional national armies did not meet in the battlefield, combatants no longer were distinguishable from non-combatants and humanitarian law was not accepted. The result of those asymmetric wars, which often require “constant activity and movement” by the weaker part (Zedong 2000 [1961], p. 59), was a large increase of the number of civilian victims. Examples for such armed conflicts were Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia and East Timor. Holsti noticed in the mid-1990s that most conflicts at the time were based on internal problems and not so much related to problems in relations between states (Holsti 1996, p. 37). Those conflicts strongly challenged the international community and had a huge impact on the redefinition of the security arena.

To confront those developments and new threats to individual, national and international security, United Nations (UN) peace-operations became a widely used tool. Those operations were authorized to intervene in armed conflicts in order to bring peace and stability. As the superpowers before 1989 were not willing or able to intervene, the numbers of jointly undertaken peacekeeping operations grew considerably from then on. This can best be seen in the fact that between 1948 and 1988 (see Yilmaz 2005) only 13 peacekeeping operations were conducted, while some 50 additional operations have been set up since then.

As mentioned above, the new design of these operations was strongly influenced by two rather new concepts: The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the ‘Human Security’ concept. These concepts, which were going to challenge traditional ones like state security and sovereignty, shall be explained in the following two chapters, as they are parts of the conceptual and moral principles of today’s peacekeeping operations and their peacebuilding approaches which also include CIMIC.

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3 This theory applies especially for conflicts in the region of the former Soviet Union.
4 Between 1946-1989 the Soviet Union exercised 118 vetos in the Security Council, the USA 70 (See Malone 2004 and Oudenaren 2009).
2.1 The Responsibility to Protect

The fall of the Soviet Union brought a unipolar international system which was dominated by the superpower USA. Its unique power meant liberal hegemony in world affairs, making market-economy, democracy and the western concept of human rights raw models for the countries of the world. The end of the Cold War and hence the end of the danger of nuclear destruction, at the same time resulted in a change of the perception of danger within western societies. A change of society values was provoked, shifting from former materialistic values to post-materialistic ones, such as self-determination, non-violence and pacifism (see Wiesendahl 1990).

Together with the parallel revolution in information technology and the advancing globalization, these developments resulted in a world-wide increase of solidarity within humanity and an increase of organizations working in the field of humanitarian action (Rieff 2002, p. 111). These new organizations did not only put their emphasis on helping people affected by natural disasters or international armed conflicts, but, under the banner of the human rights movement, also pledged the world to intervene even where governments were not caring for their people or where internal armed conflicts were going on.

This new sense of global solidarity was not only reflected in societies and their growing number of humanitarian organizations but also in their representation bodies. These were namely the western governments and the United Nations Security Council, which by that time was largely influenced by the former. Due to those political and societal changes, a policy change was undertaken to be able to deal with a new political reality and partly new kinds of conflicts which were concurrently emerging and causing more and more deaths, especially within the civilian population. Only from the 1980s to the 1990s the ratio of civilian to military deaths rose almost three times following Kaldor (Kaldor 1999, p. 9).

To be able to protect the civilian population, United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 formulated the “Agenda for Peace”, in which he called – inter alia – for the mobilization of political, military and humanitarian aid assets to build peace and security (Macrae/Leader 2000, Introduction). To end a conflict and safeguard societies and individuals, it was not perceived as enough anymore to only stop warring factions from fighting. Instead, it became clear that the inclusion of an analysis of conflicts’ root causes, and their solution was of higher importance. The analysis of root causes therefore was suggested to be broadened to additionally include social, economic and environmental factors. Those new factors were not only perceived as possible reasons for the outbreak of conflicts but also as compulsory factors to be taken into account when trying to end them sustainably.

The latter UNSG Kofi Annan underlined this position when he stated in 1999 that “when fighting stops, the international commitment to peace must be just as strong as was the commitment to war” (Annan 1999). In the same article he furthermore divided the concept of sovereignty into state- and individual sovereignty and thereby urged the nation states to redefine their national, foreign and security policies. These policies should be adjusted to a new political reality in which the individual should be the central point of political attention (ibid.). Annans’ utterances were made as a result to the international communities’ reaction to the different humanitarian crisis in e.g. Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor. The cases of non-intervention (Rwanda) and intervention (Kosovo) drew the focus on the question whether or not humanitarian intervention by military means into a sovereign state was legitimate in order to stop gross and systematic violations of human rights. State security, based on the principle of sovereignty as it was developed in the Peace of Westphalia from 1648, thereby was strongly questioned.

Because of the international community’s reaction to the different humanitarian crisis, and in particular to those by UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it became apparent that there was a need for a broader political discussion. This political discussion was aimed at defining a common and accepted policy and strategy regarding the questions on how to deal with the so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’, of state sovereignty and the security of individuals. The controversial question on whether or not a “right of humanitarian intervention” (Greenwood 1993) was existing, was going to be analysed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This Commission was established by the Canadian government which announced its formation at the General Assembly in September 2000 in order to discuss one of the most controversial questions of international relations by that time. Supporting this group, the UNSG urged the international community to reconcile the principle of state sovereignty and the protection of individuals.
2.2 R2P – critiques and achievements

The result of ICISS’ work, which eventually was presented to the public in December 2001, became known as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) paradigm. Its main idea is that:

“sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS 2001).  

R2P consists of three main pillars, which underline the need to 1. prevent, 2. react, and 3. rebuild. 

These mechanisms seemed more important than ever since prior measures designed to protect the individual from crimes failed. Even if the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 were designed to protect the individual (Thakur/Weiss 2009), those crimes still were openly committed and, due to the primacy of state sovereignty, could hardly be stopped by third parties. In order to not totally dismantle the concept of state sovereignty which e.g., in Asia is a cornerstone of regional cooperation, and which especially for weaker states means a tool for self-protection against outside interference, R2P defines sovereignty as a responsibility. ICISS stated that it is firstly the state’s responsibility to protect its own citizens whereby a shift from a ‘right to intervene’ to a ‘responsibility to protect’ was achieved. Only if the state is unwilling or unable to bear the responsibility to protect its citizens or if it even violates their rights (ibid., p. 202), it is the international community which, ideally acting through the Security Council, should take care of the situation (ibid., p. 203). The responsibility to protect thereby is a twofold concept: Firstly, it is the responsibility of the concerning state, and secondly, only in case of its inactivity, the one of the international community (see Kuperman 2009).

While the concept is meant to bring security to suffering societies, its critics argue that it opens the door for military intervention. As there is no globally accepted institution or body to define the “just cause” and “right intention” the ICISS report demands for in order to allow such intervention, the decision on whether or not to intervene becomes subjective. Thus, developing countries fear that R2P could become a tool for “more powerful international actors seeking to promote their own economic and political interests” (Evans 2008, p. 21). The fact that terms like ‘just cause’ (‘causa iusta’, by Augustine of Hippo) and ‘right intention’ (‘intentio recta’, by Thomas Aquinas), are based in Christian religious philosophy, and were formerly used to justify wars against ‘unbelievers’ in the name of god, is additionally seen critical by non-Christian believers and contributes to a negative perception of the R2P in several parts of the world.

Those states arguing against R2P, therefore strongly insist on the right of non-intervention. This norm, which gives primacy to the state, is assured in the first part of Art. 2 §7 of the UN Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. Thereby, the fear of misuse of R2P should be dispelled. That at the same time measures are already available under the UN Charter to penalize actions that under the R2P doctrine would require a reaction by the international community (see: Art. 39/Art. 41/Art.42 of the UN Charter), should further reduce scepticism.

That it still is a long way until R2P will become accepted international law, can be seen in Zwitters article “Menschliche Sicherheit, humanitäre Intervention und ihre völkerrechtlichen Perspektiven”. He states that in order to become a binding international law, the still emerging principle of humanitarian intervention would not only have to be based on state practice, but a change of the Security Council and, resulting from this, the UN Charter would also be necessary (Zwitter 2007, p. 236) – a currently unrealistic scenario as veto powers will not give up their extraordinary position due to own political and power interests.

But even if the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is not able to legally protect societies and thereby individuals from mass atrocities yet, it contributed positively to the development of new important political achievements:

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6 For a discussion of the paradigm “sovereignty as responsibility” see also: F.M. Deng et al. (1996).
7 This is especially the case after the USA declared the war against terrorism which is seen by many states as a threat to their own sovereignty, and therefore interpreted as an argument against R2P.
8 For a detailed overview see: Weiss 2003, pp. 147-161.
One of its most important achievements can be seen in the fact that it managed to direct the attention to “where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance” (ICISS 2001, p. 15). In this context it explicitly refers to the concept of Human Security which also focuses on the individual, and herein especially on its security. The development and content of this rather new concept of security and its relation to state sovereignty will be discussed in the following chapter.

3. Human Security

3.1 The individual and the state

The discussion about state sovereignty and state responsibilities, and the rights of the individual as it was discussed in the realm of the design of the R2P concept is as old as politics itself. Ever since political philosophers started to analyse the question on how security and the best development of the human being could be granted, security has been linked to the state or state like constructions. While Aristotle for example defined the role of the state in the accumulation of benefits for its citizens in order to enable them to live a “good life” (Debiel/Franke 2008, p. 69), political philosophers tended to describe the role of the state in early and late modern history as the role of a guarantor of a legal framework in which the individual could live peacefully and realize individual goals.

In addition to this, realist philosopher Hobbes related the role of the state in his “Leviathan” directly to the question of security. He argues that a state is of primary importance for the security of people as to:

“defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contently”. (Hobbes 1952, p. 100)

Locke follows this idea to some extent and underlines that the reason for the existence of states lays in “the mutual preservation of their [citizens’] lives, liberties and estates. (...) The great chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property” (quoted after Sommermann 1997, p. 31). Such uniting in political bodies is necessary following Locke, as the aforementioned goods are unsafe and insecure in a state of nature.

Following these philosophers, the sovereign state thus plays an important role for the establishment of security which can lead to a positive development of the individual. Sovereignty in this concept is of crucial importance. In a modern, bipolar world, this concept was leading the discussions and actions of political actors. It was argued from a realist point of view that the structure of the international system was anarchic (see Bull 1977). This means that, following the realist thinking, there is not any higher institution or instance to control the adherence to international law, or to guarantee the states territorial integrity. States therefore felt like they were in danger of external threats, which were perceived as the main reason for insecurity. Thus, the main threat for the individual’s security was directly and almost exclusively linked to the security of a country’s external borders – and hence to the state’s security. States were the main actor in international relations and thereby, with respect to the individual’s security, perceived as the guarantors of security.

With the end of the Cold War and with the decline of importance of the realistic and neo-realistic theory in international politics, a shift from a focus on states to a focus on the individual was achieved when it came to discuss security.9 Until then, it was assumed that in order to be able to live in a certain level of security, people had to organize in states. The shift in the discussion followed the new political reality after the fall of the Berlin Wall. What afore was perceived as the guarantor of security now paradoxically was perceived by many to be responsible for peoples’ insecurity – their own state.

Inherent in the relationship between the individual and the state is the conflict between the freedom of the individual and the authority of the state. Especially where states were not able to fulfil their main objectives anymore – to safeguard social order (internal security) and group defence (external security) – the state resulted to be not the cure of “the disease” but part of its causes. But this relationship not only becomes critical when, as

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9 For a detailed overview about the discussions on security see: Krause 1998 and Hough 2004.
explained above, states become threats for their citizens as for example in Sudan or Afghanistan or East Timor. In the context of the failing of governments to safeguard their own citizens from insecurity, or in the context of violent and repressive governments, it becomes clear that the classical definition of security, with the state as its guarantor, is not unrestricted valid and sufficient anymore. Therefore, scholars and practitioners started to develop a new concept of security that unites the quasi symbiotic connection between the individual and the state, and overcomes the former’s definition of security as it was formulated during the last centuries. The individual became the main focus and direct objective of security regardless where it is living and where the threat is coming from. This development was not only caused by changes in the relationship between state and citizen but also by changes in international politics. Ullman stated in 1989 that:

“The trade-off between liberty and security is one of the crucial issues of our era. In virtually every society, individuals and groups seek security against the state, just as they ask the state to protect them against harm from other states. Human rights and state security are thus intimately related” (Ullman 1983, pp. 130-131).

But this statement did not only describe the relationship between human rights and state security anymore. In the future, it could also be applied to the relationship between human security, as it was defined later on, and the state and accordingly the international community. As shown in the following chapter, the new concept of security, human security, was not thought to replace the traditional state-centred concept but to complement it (International Commission on Human Security 2003, p. 2).

3.2 The development of the Human Security concept

The development of the concept of human security was, amongst other things, the result of an increase in intra-state conflicts after 1989 and, related to this, a growing number of civilian deaths, internally displaced people and refugees. The need for new mechanisms to confront those humanitarian crises crystallized, and awareness grew that military interventions had to be complemented by an active political effort. Nevertheless, this idea was not “something radically new” as some authors noted, but in fact, its core arguments can be traced back into the 19th century and the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Already the ICRC underlined the responsibility of the international community to help protect individuals from violent threats and injuries (Osler Hampson 2002, p. 17).

Further cornerstones of the Human Security concept can be found in Franklin Roosevelt's announcement of the “Four Freedoms”. In 1941, United States president Roosevelt named in his Annual Address to the Congress four freedoms to be granted to everybody:

“The first is freedom of speech and expression – everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want – which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour – anywhere in the world.”

Especially the last two freedoms mentioned, the “freedom from fear” and the “freedom from want” found their way into the modern formulation of human security and were later used as benchmark for the distinction of the ‘narrow’ and the ‘broad’ interpretation of human security.10

The modern term ‘Human Security’ was explicitly mentioned for the first time in Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” in 1992. The herein developed idea of a comprehensive concept of security, including more aspects of the human life but the effects of external military threats, was supported by a growing number of civil society

10 “Freedom from fear”, the ‘narrow’ concept of human security which was elaborated by the Human Security Report, focuses on violent threats to individuals. Nevertheless it recognizes that those violent threats can be related to “poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity.” “Freedom from want” as the ‘broad’ concept of human security, instead should, following its proponents, also include hunger, disease and natural disasters. In its broadest sense aspects like economic insecurity and even ‘threats to human dignity’ are included (Human Security report 2005).
organizations. Especially human rights- and humanitarian organizations were asking for a change and directed the focus on the (civilian) victims of military conflicts. Furthermore, the new concept was supported from the beginning by development organizations and agencies. They did not only direct their programmes to a fight against poverty, but also came to the conclusion that development without individual security was impossible – people can only enjoy the benefits the concept of ‘Human Development’ creates, if their environment is stable and safe. Concurrently, there is no chance for security in the broader sense of the Human Security concept, if there is no development.

Hence both concepts, Human Development and Human Security, are strongly interrelated. The definition of Human Security by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), undertaken in the Human Development Report from 1994, as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (HDR Report 1994, p. 23) clearly reflects the position that human development is not possible without human security. The same Human Development Report defined for the first time concrete aspects of the concept and underlined its universality by stating that all people in a globalized world are affected by the same threats. By stating that Human Security is “easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention”, it furthermore underlined the strong interrelation to R2P.

Even if aspects of it were developed far before its publication, one of the main achievements of the report can be seen in the declaration that Human Security is people-centered. Individual security thereby was unlocked from the collective approach that prior security theories used by linking it to the state. Instead of only focussing on military security, the human security approach formulated by UNDP widened the aspects and fields of security to seven areas covering most parts of human life. These are (HDR Report 1994, pp. 24-25):

- Economic security, endangered by poverty and unemployment;
- Food security, which includes the necessity for access to sufficient food;
- Health security, meaning protection from illness and access to adequate health systems;
- Environmental security, endangered by contamination of air, water and earth;
- Personal security, endangered by physical violence;
- Community security, meaning safety from discrimination and disintegration of traditional community forms;
- Political security, meaning the protection from human rights violations and torture.

Jorge Nef undertook a similar categorization and identified five sources of insecurity with a potential to threaten human security. These sources derive from: 1. environmental insecurity, 2. economic insecurity, 3. social insecurity, 4. political insecurity and 5. cultural insecurity (see Nef 1999). Other authors like for example Ogata and Sen even include tasks like fair trade and the development of efficient patent rights in their list of actions that should be undertaken in order to achieve a higher level of human security (Ogata/Sen 2003, p. 133). The “Human Security Now” report, which was presented by Ogata and Sen in 2003 as a result of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan’s urge at the “United Nations Millennium Summit” in 2000 to advance the fight for “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”, finally presented a definition which has been used since then by several organizations and UN agencies, as the “United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (UNTFHS). In the “Human Security Now” report human security was defined as:

“To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms — freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Ogata/Sen 2003, p. 4).

These broad definitions guarantee a possible inclusion of a wide range of threats for human security.

11 The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be “vital”—what they consider to be “of the essence of life” and “crucially important”—varies across individuals and societies (Ogata/Sen 2003, p. 4).
Other concepts of human security use a more narrow definition, focusing for example only on violent threats to individuals. Why these different approaches are used and what their application means in the practical political world, and what problems arise from them, will be discussed in the following section.

3.3 Human Security – a critique

Apart from noticing that the Human Security concept is far from being as revolutionary as it is claimed by its advocates, the lack of a clear definition is criticized. Especially where it comes to the inclusion of nearly all aspects possibly meaning a threat for human beings, the theory becomes almost useless for academic research. As a reaction to broad definitions of Human Security like the HDRs one, authors like Paris ask: “if human security is all these things, what is it not?” (Paris 2001, p. 92). Deudney points out that the term loses its analytical usefulness if all things reducing well-being are named security threats – it only becomes a synonym of “bad” (Deudney 1990, p. 465). Paris follows this critique and even expresses the assumption that a vague definition was chosen intentionally by the proponents of Human Security, since such a vague definition can hold together a “jumbled coalition of ‘middle power’ states, development agencies, and NGOs” (Paris 2001, p. 88) all having their own interests which can be integrated in such an “effective campaign slogan” (ibid.). Only the affiliation of those states in transnational networks like e.g. in the “Human Security Network” gives them the possibility to influence the institutional design of the international system (Jäger et al. 2007, p. 29), and thereby it becomes a mean by itself. Newman also doubts the analytical value of a broad definition but states that it might be useful for the normative development of the concept (Newman 2004, p. 358). Unsurprisingly, such broad definitions rarely served as basis for research programmes (Mack 2005, p. 8). The rather difficult task to clearly define what human security is and how it can be best measured, makes it rather difficult to analyse complex settings. The idea to introduce the category “vital core” as the centre of what Human Security should focus on, in order to make Human Security more workable, did not solve this problem either. Instead, other problems arose since it varies from culture to culture how this “essence of life” is defined. Critics raise the question how it still can be called “vital core” if it varies from place to place, and what happens if there are differing or even opposing opinions in a society about what the “vital core” is all about (Krause 2006, p. 68).

The universality of the concept and its failure to provide concrete guidance for political practitioners (Khong 2001, p. 233), making it hard to translate it into concrete political action when it comes to questions regarding state policies on international security (see King/Murray 2002), additionally leaves doubts about its practical usefulness. Moreover, a missing prioritization could lead to a “Human Security à la carte”, where policy makers choose convenient parts of Human Security while not addressing others.

It is also deemed to be problematic that even if states are perceived as being part of the problem for human security, strengthening governmental institutions and their resources is often seen as a possible solution in order to enhance Human Security. This is especially the case when it comes to post conflict reconstruction and Security Sector Reform (SSR) as part of peacebuilding (Krause 2008, p. 47). Nevertheless, this is not surprising since several authors still give primacy to the state, even when it comes to Human Security. Buzan for example argues that, as individuals are not able to claim for their own security on an international level, and as security can only be guaranteed by a group or state, the state should have primacy when it comes to analyse international security (see Buzan et al. 1998). Following this, Buzan concludes that if the object of Human Security is not seen as individual but as “collective”, security could better be granted in form of “societal security”12 (Buzan 2004, p. 369). Khong criticises the interpretation of Human Security as security of the individual human being as by “making all individuals a priority none actually benefits” (Khong 2001, p. 233) Buzan states that by connecting Human Security to the “individual” or “people” there would not be a difference between Human Security and human rights law.

3.4 Human Security – its strengths and achievements

One of the simplest but at the same time most important achievements of Human Security is the contest of concepts and ideas which formerly seemed to be carved in stone. Especially the questioning of the concepts of

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12 Societal security is a concept developed by the Copenhagen School of security studies that refers to “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (see Waever 1993).
sovereignty and security led to a brought discussion on the international level bringing the problems of those being most in need on top of political agendas. Political leaders, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations participated in this discussion and thereby, contributed not only to an academic discourse but to the development of new policies and projects on national and international level. These developments included incentives which led to the creation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), various international laws on the right of women and children, and the ban of certain arms and ammunition. All these achievements were stimulated by the discussion on Human Security and advocated by its supporters. They led to an improvement of the attention given to individuals in need, and established international networks that aim at guaranteeing sustainability and a further engagement of states and organizations in their efforts. The cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations for the cause of Human Security is another positive achievement which came along with the discussion about the concept. The realization that traditional conflict resolution approaches like for example UNs’ peacekeeping operations were not very successful on a long range, resulted in a paradigm change.

The role of civil society was more and more perceived as crucial for the establishment of a lasting peace in conflict prone countries; as it was in the fight for the improvement of the human rights situation of suppressed minorities in the world; or in the stimulation of legal improvements regarding the fight against environmental degradation etc. The cooperation of such different actors, not only active on the traditional political arena, but on the grassroots level of political participation, underlines one of the core ideas of Human Security: The individual should always be in the focus, involved and empowered in order to establish self-help mechanisms – the inclusion of people in the definition of the “vital core” goes in line with these ideas. As the HDR Report from 1994 puts it:

“The concept of human security stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living. This will set them free and help ensure that they can make a full contribution to development – their own development and that of their communities, their countries and the world, Human security is a critical ingredient of participatory development” (HDR 1994, p. 24).

Since Human Security cannot be reached by traditional actors like states, militaries or diplomats alone, but needs the support of civil society, new political actors like civil-society- and women organizations became active in the fight for peace and safety for the individual.

To what extent this new political praxis really resulted in an improvement in peacekeeping has to be analysed case by case. It is at least questionable, whether state practices have really changed. Nevertheless, aspects like Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and SSR etc. found their way into peacekeeping mandates. This signifies a clear improvement to prior experiences.

Even if critics condemn a missing prioritization of problems by Human Security, such a prioritization automatically sets in when it comes to the implementation of policies and projects. Anand and Sen point out that institutional constraints and scarcity of resources make such a prioritization necessary when it comes to make policy choices (Anand/Sen 2000, p. 23). It nevertheless is crucial to make those directly participate who are addressed by the concept. Only if needs of victims and beneficiaries are addressed and all eventual actions by all actors involved are analysed properly to prevent them from being harmful for the individual, human security can be achieved (Alkire 2002, p. 3).

To be able to guarantee the security of the individual, it is important to identify the threats it faces. Human Security with its holistic and comprehensive approach and its tendency to incorporate all areas that could eventually mean a threat for the individual is a tool that provides the practitioner with important ideas on what these threats are. The strategies on how to get to the final result – the prevention of a materialization of a threat – can vary. Human Security can be interpreted as a process which includes a large variety of actors, including the military and governments. The incorporation of governmental organizations and states to enhance peoples’ security therefore is not a weakness, as critics argue, but a necessary action – even where those bodies are the reason for human suffering. In contrast to prior policies though, a difference is made when addressing those entities. A transfer of western ideas and technologies on institutions of organized violence and other governmental bodies, as practiced in the period of post-colonialism to introduce the newly independent states into the western political system, is not aimed at anymore. Human security and its more cultural sensitive
approach can be seen as a reaction to these politics and their often negative outcomes which were reflected in the misuse of the newly achieved economic, military and political power by the new political elites (Krause 2008, p. 42). Especially the focus on legal and institutional reforms by human security and its goals to create “political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Ogata/Sen 2003, pp. 11-12) reflect this position.

To be able to achieve those goals, protection has to be institutionalized. Therefore it is important to keep on advocating Human Security on all different levels, including all actors who could potentially have an influence on the security of the individual. Alkire underlines that the means by which human security can be granted are very broad and have to be based on a complex assessment. One possible mean to contribute to a positive environment in which security can be granted in a post-conflict situation, and in which the individual can develop itself, its community and country, is CIMIC. What CIMIC exactly is, how it developed, how it is interpreted by the different actors involved, and finally, what its impact on human security can be, will be shown in the following chapter.

4. Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The civilian part of CIMIC can consist of a very broad variety of actors which can include governments, religious groups, private sector organizations, single individuals, and international and national non-governmental organizations. Due to the focus of this analysis and the limited space it can be developed on, as well as the scope of available resources on the cooperation between the Australian Defence Forces and their civilian counterparts, this chapter will focus on the cooperation between the military and humanitarian organizations.

The number of occasions in which the military and humanitarian organizations have to interact in the realm of operations has grown considerably during recent years. This happened, inter alia, due to a change of the international power system. This change resulted in political and societal transformations which strongly affected the humanitarian field and created closer links between militaries and humanitarians. These links are relevant on different levels of their work and necessitate a stronger cooperation between both entities on different stages of their cooperation. CIMIC can take place in combat operations (including peace enforcement operations evoked under chapter VII of the UN charter), during natural disasters, and during peace-support operations. The scope and kind of cooperation will vary according to the operation it takes place in. Every scenario requires a different kind of CIMIC and has different implications on the actors involved regarding e.g. key humanitarian principles like neutrality and impartiality.

CIMIC gains parts of its importance through cultural and normative differences of both of the main actors involved. These differences bare the potential to cause severe problems, which can endanger the success of an operation. This is to be avoided and differences at least have to be balanced when it comes to a contact between both actors e.g. in peacekeeping missions. It therefore is important to understand how both sides – the military and the humanitarian – interpret CIMIC, and how a possible ideal scenario could look like.

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13 Military in this context will be defined as regular national and international armed forces with a clear mandate, not depending on whether they are a conflicting party or not. For a more detailed discussion of military in civil-military relations see: Inter-Agency Standing Committee: Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies – An IASC Reference Paper, 28 June 2004. UNHCR Reliefworld, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4289ea8c4.html [Accessed January 31, 2013].
14 Humanitarians in this context will be defined as national and international governmental and non-governmental organizations that are working on “the protection of life, health, subsistence and physical security of people before, during and in the aftermath of disasters” (See AusAID 2005).
15 Peace (or peace support) operations is the generic term used to describe the deployment of external military personnel in a region of conflict to promote the maintenance of order and security (International Alert 2002).
4.1 The military

In order to be able to understand the military’s perspective on CIMIC it is important to understand its’ raison d’être, structure and current development.

4.1.1 Tasks and purposes

When talking about ‘the military’ in the context of CIMIC, distinctions have to be made regarding the concrete armed forces referred to, as armies can be divided for example in regular\footnote{Regular armies are those military organizations constituted by legal governments with the purpose to grant security within the country and to safeguard the country’s borders etc.} – and irregular armies.\footnote{Irregular armies are those military organizations, which act without any constitutional basis and thereby without any governmental legitimation. This group includes e.g. guerrilla troops, paramilitary organizations, private military companies (PMCs), rebels, insurgents, dissident members of the national army, and freedom fighters.} These armies can additionally be distinguished by their mandate (UN mandate/NATO mandate/no mandate), its operational goals (to defeat an antagonistic army/to build peace/to enforce peace/to bring humanitarian relief) and its composition (multinational force/national force). In the context of this analysis, military is defined as a regular army which was built up by a state and its government mainly in order to protect the states’ boundaries and to engage in international peacekeeping operations. Irregular troops, i.e. military units which are not set up under constitutional law and which operate without state legitimacy, are not considered. Such irregular troops include units which are set up by parts of the population of a state for anti-regime fighting; for the realization or preservation of economic interests; or for the unlawful fight against dissidents, or paramilitary units. Private military companies are also not taken into account.

Depending on every country, tasks and purposes of the military differ considerable. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe several similarities and core purposes which are inherent in each military. The military is a helping agent of the state and presents the part of a state’s instrument of violence, which is directed towards the outside.\footnote{The opposite of the military is the second part of the state’s instrument of violence, the police, which is responsible for security and order within the country.} Its main task includes the defence of the state’s territory against external threats. This can be reached by deterrence or by the use of force. The ability to apply organized violence is a unique right which characterizes the military. Following Clausewitz the armed forces give the state the possibility for “a mere continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz 2003 [1832], p. 30). In order to be able to apply force a state needs – additionally to the already mentioned defensive means – offensive capacities, which at least in theory all armies possess. To what extent single states need those strategic capacities or use them, depends on how far the state perceives itself as being exposed to a concrete threat by another state or entity, to its geographic position and nature, and on the values and cultural stance of the society. And even the persisting political system can indicate the chances of deployment of the military by its governments.

The military is a dynamic organization and able to change itself or its purposes if this is required. Following von Bredow and Kümmel the need of change depends on both the national reasons which can be found in cultural, economic, social and political structures, and the international system (von Bredow/Kümmel 2000, p. 5). Such a transformation of the military set in with the end of the Cold War through a transformation of both, the national and the international system. From now on new tasks became more and more relevant for the military. Besides the above-mentioned defensive, deterrent, and offensive tasks, modern military engages increasingly in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement missions, and post conflict peace-/state building (Kümmel 2005, p. 52). When analysing military missions after the first gulf war of 1991, a transformation regarding western democracies’ military purposes can be observed. Haltiner states that nowadays the military is mostly used for missions with a policing character, either for classic peacekeeping missions, humanitarian interventions, for robust peacekeeping operations, or police-support missions. Following Haltiner, soldiers prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts, enforce law, secure terror-endangered buildings and conferences, reinstall public order, protect ethnic minorities, substitute public sector employees who are on...
strike, help in natural disasters, accompany local police, and finally help to reconstruct war-affected infrastructure and societal and political institutions (Haltiner 2003, p. 159). But the organization of the military cannot be analysed without taking a look at its main component – the soldier. The transformation of the organization of the military set in together with the simultaneously change of the role of the soldier.

4.1.2 The soldier

The profession ‘soldier’ changed considerably throughout history why the organization ‘military’ is constantly changing too. Military work in ancient times primarily consisted in the expansion of a kingdom’s territory and the conquest of further space or goods. This main task changed, when the industrial revolution set in and substituted the acquisition function for the defence of borders and territory. With the appearance of new technologies and the development of nuclear weapons, the task changed again – this time into a more abstract role of deterrence. This change became necessary, as a consequent realization of the military’s potentials for the protection of a state’s territorial integrity, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons, would have resulted in the likely destruction of its own territory, i.e., through nuclear retribution (Lippert/Wachtler 1983, p. 264).

But the change of definition continues even after the end of the East-West conflict. With the start of the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (Gray 1997, p. 50), the profession ‘soldier’ again had to readjust to new developments. The modernization of the army, and newly introduced technologies, as well as a change in the kind of conflicts, and the appearance of a ‘new’ kind of threat to international security in form of terrorism, lead to further transformation of the profession soldier and its tasks. These new threats require a faster and more flexible intervention by the military which, coupled with new technologies that are more and more substituting traditional heavy weaponry, lead to a decline of mass armies in favour of smaller high-tech armies.

Nevertheless, the newly achieved advanced professionalism in the military is not only due to the more important technical and technological knowledge of the soldier but also due to new exigencies of the modern soldier’s duty regarding so-called ‘soft skills’. They include not only social- and leadership qualities, but cultural, linguistic and diplomatic competencies. They are mainly needed in multicultural combat operations or in the so-called ‘operations other than war’ (OOTW). In these operations, which are often accomplished by multi-national forces, and which are aimed at keeping peace by e.g., controlling cease fires, or in which military units engage in humanitarian action and reconstruction tasks etc., remarkably new competences of the soldier are required.

Von Bredow talks about “Multikulturelle Sozialarbeiter mit Spezialbewaffnung” – the “multi-cultural social worker with special armament” (von Bredow 2001, p. 1). This provocative description probably exaggerates, but it clearly indicates the direction of these recent developments within the military. CIMIC is one area in which those soft-skills are of primary importance. In CIMIC, members of the armed forces have to interact with civilian entities which are often taking up an opposing stance over the military’s position. These entities can consist of civilians from other cultures, idiomatic backgrounds, and countries. What CIMIC means from a military perspective and where it comes from will be shown in the following.

4.2 CIMIC – The military’s perspective and reasons for involvement

CIMIC can be traced back in history to the counter-insurgency efforts of the British army during the 1950s to the 1970s in countries like Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, and Oman (Zaalberg 2008, p. 11). Back then, military planners noticed the importance of getting support by the civil society in the fight against insurgence movements. Only if this support was achieved, guerrilla movements and other insurgence groups could be defeated. What was designed in the middle of the 20th century as part of a counter-insurgency strategy is seen by the military as a tool to achieve military goals until today. The military engages in CIMIC with a strict prioritization of military tasks in order to support the military mission. Taking this concept into account, it becomes apparent that civilian purposes, and more concretely the cooperation with humanitarian organizations, are subordinated to military objectives. Hence, the military does not perceive CIMIC as cooperation between equal parties but interprets it as a tool to achieve own objectives. The reasons why the military engages in CIMIC, and in humanitarian-, or reconstruction tasks are diverse.

Following Gordon, the increased engagement of the military in humanitarian assistance is both “demand pulled” and “supply pushed” (Gordon 2006, p. 43). Demanded by political pressure to become active in humanitarian
crises in order to respond to public pressure, and thereby, eventually gaining public approval for controversial deployments. Only if such approval is given, troops will be sent, as governments are not taking decisions which are against their primary political aim – to retain political power (Moravcsik 1993, pp. 15-17). When referring to a stronger engagement in humanitarian actions which is “supply pushed”, Gordon refers to military inherent reasons: CIMIC can be seen as a so-called ‘force multiplier’. As such, it enhances the effectiveness of the military by adding further capabilities to the army which enable it to accomplish its objectives more easily. CIMIC in such a context can be used in information operations, i.e. gathered information through the cooperation with civilians and especially humanitarian organizations which are often working closely with the local population even in hostile environments can be used to identify targets and to plan the operation. Information sharing and cooperation, which originally is thought to be a benefit for the people in need thereby can be instrumentalised by commanders and misused in favour of a more effective combat operation.

Such information gathering becomes even more important in times of modern warfare. In order to be able to fight a “surgical warfare”, based on modern technology that is invented to diminish collateral damages and own losses, information on possible targets is essential. If such ‘Effects Based Operations’, which originally derive from air power theory, are transferred from targeting strategically important buildings and infrastructure to targeting “behavioural and functional relationships” holding societies together (Vego 2006, p. 53), information provided by civilians and humanitarian organizations can become even more important.

A second reason for the military’s engagement in CIMIC and humanitarian assistance can be seen in what is called ‘force protection’. Force protection aims at securing members of the armed forces and their families, and at defending military facilities and resources. All actions contributing to this objective can be interpreted as such, irrespective whether or not they derive from combat actions.

The concept of ‘winning hearts and minds’, which became especially important in the US’s war against terror after the terror attacks of 9/11, can be interpreted as one of the more important force protection actions. The military strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ originally derives from British experiences in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and aims at bringing a subjugated population on one’s side. This is necessary in so-called asymmetric conflicts in order to be able to defeat a guerrilla movement which needs the support of the population for its survival. Hearts and minds operations consist of e.g. reconstruction efforts and humanitarian assistance. By engaging in such actions, that can include CIMIC, an underlying objective – the force protection – can be reached too. A positive opinion on the side of the host population about armed forces can reduce the number of casualties, as attacks on the troops diminish the higher their standing and prestige within the host society is. The high importance of a low number of casualties within the military ranks can be seen in the context of “casualty shyness” (Kümmel/Leonhard 2005, pp. 514-515) – only if the number of victims stays small, society will be willing to support the military engagement and not endanger the mission. Furthermore, the question of motivation is a reason for a growing military engagement of the military in humanitarian action. Harris/Segal found out in their analysis with the title “Observations from the Sinai: The Boredom Factor” that deployed peacekeeper claimed a state of boredom after a while which derived from: (1) underutilization, (2) cultural deprivation, (3) lack of privacy, and (4) isolation (see Harris/Segal 1985). Such a boredom factor has a negative impact on the cohesion of military units and thereby on their morale and combat effectiveness, or respectively on the fulfilment of their duty in peacekeeping operations (see Bartone/Adler 1999).

In order to keep their personnel motivated, military commanders keep their units occupied and try to give them the feeling to contribute to “something good” by engaging in e.g. relief operations. By doing so, they interact with civilians and often with humanitarian organizations too. This interconnection is not a modern phenomenon but because of a growing number of humanitarian organizations, and a change in the kind of cooperation between both entities, this cooperation had to be readjusted. This is of special importance since the humanitarian actors’ view on how CIMIC should look like is rather different from the militaries’ interpretation.

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20 This strategy derives from air power and is intended to diminish civil damage by only attacking military targets (see Shultz, Jr., et al. 1992).
4.3 The civilian counterpart

After having defined the first party of CIMIC, the military, it is attempted to define the second party of CIMIC, the civilian part. CIMIC can proceed between the military and e.g. civilian populations, civilian authorities, international and national organizations, or international and national non-governmental organizations etc. For the purpose of this paper, to show the possible impact of CIMIC on Human Security, it makes sense to lower the term “civil” down to fewer actors to be able to draw a clearer picture of possible problems in CIMIC. Therefore, the focus of this section will be on humanitarian actors, and respectively humanitarian organizations, as most problems of CIMIC arise from the relationship of the military and the actors from this sector. Nevertheless, a broader definition of the ‘civil’ part of CIMIC has to be used when it comes to the concrete example of the ADF’s CIMIC approach in East Timor, due to the scarce information on the cooperation of the Australian Defence Forces with those organizations in East Timor.

International Law, with its distinction between combatants and non-combatants, for decades built the ground for a clear separation of military personnel and civilians during conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs). The emergence of new challenges for both sides in such CHEs, today sometimes seem to blur the line between militaries and civilians. As the military engages more and more in OOTW, it starts occupying parts of the humanitarian space, which is no longer exclusively the humanitarian organizations’ business anymore. The establishment of a humanitarian space however is crucial for humanitarian actors in order to be able to effectively execute their work. Such a humanitarian space consists of “establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment” (Guidelines 2003). The main actors in the humanitarian space, next to the above mentioned militaries, are humanitarian actors. As most interactions between militaries and civilians are taking place in such a humanitarian space, and as humanitarian actors are the most prominent ones in this context, for the purpose of this contribution they are interpreted as the civilian counterpart of the armed forces in CIMIC. The humanitarian organizations’ view on CIMIC is rather different from the military’s view. The position of these organizations on CIMIC, however is largely depending on their traditional background.

4.3.1 Types of humanitarian organizations

Following Abby Stoddard, humanitarian organizations can be divided in three different categories (see Stoddard 2003). Each category follows a different approach towards the cooperation with the military. The division is due to the different tradition of each type. Following Stoddard, these categories of humanitarian organizations are:

1) Humanitarian organizations with a religious humanitarian tradition. These organizations are based on core Christian ideas like compassion and charity.

2) Humanitarian organizations with a ‘Dunantist’ tradition. These organizations are named after the founder of the Red Cross, Henri Dunant. For the ‘Dunantist’ humanitarian organizations the respect of the humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence) as defined by the ICRC is of prime importance for their work.

3) Humanitarian organizations with a ‘Wilsonian’ tradition. Those humanitarian organizations, which are named after former US president Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), are often trying to bring Western values and ideas to the world and are therefore not independent as they often directly cooperate with their national governments for example.

\[21\] A complex humanitarian emergency following the Inter-Agency Standing Committee IASC can be defined as: “A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme” (See: IASC 2004, p. 5).

\[22\] Given the high number of religious organizations which are based on different believes, these cannot be summarized in one single category and hence cannot be analysed here.

\[23\] Humanitarian principles build the foundation of relief agencies’ work and help them to get and maintain access to the people in need, in both, natural disaster and armed conflict. The number of principles may differ following the various organizations and their values.
Studer states that especially the ‘Dunantist organizations’, which “rely on the primacy of the humanitarian imperative to guide their actions” (Studer 2007, p. 13) consider conflict resolution or peacebuilding only as positive side effects of their work. This is why they do not support humanitarian interventions. Dunantists additionally disapprove the support of their actions by the military and accept such help only in case of urgency and only if there is no other alternative. As they prefer to minimize the cooperation with the military in the field, they are said to follow a ‘minimalist approach’.

In contrast to these organizations, ‘Wilsonian organizations’ tend to accept a close cooperation with the military and sometimes even encourage it. The spread of democracy for example is a primary goal of those organizations. Therefore, they perceive military interventions in form of peacebuilding or conflict resolution missions as necessary and important, and support the military in executing them. These organizations are said to follow a ‘maximalist approach’ and are mostly found in the USA.

Further distinctions of humanitarian organizations derive e.g., from the grade of attachment to governmental bodies, or from the geographic ‘home’ of the organization (local/international). Regardless these categorizations, no restrictions are made when it comes to define what kind of organization can provide humanitarian assistance (Slim 2001, p. 3). Nevertheless, the importance of cooperation of the humanitarian side with the military can be observed in history.

Ever since the Battle of Solferino in 1859 and the following creation of the Red Cross by the initiative of Henri Dunant (1828-1910) in 1863, humanitarians and the military are strongly connected with each other. Since then the humanitarians played an important role in the direct reduction of human suffering during war by e.g., medical treatment, and by designing International Humanitarian Law (IHL). With their constant and reflected pressure on the military and its governments, humanitarians managed to strongly influence the conduct of war and thereby brought alleviation to the victims of the fighting. In order to influence IHL, humanitarians needed a good and strong relationship with the military in order to be able to understand and influence it for the benefit of the most vulnerable. Thus, it was, and still is, necessary not only to bring direct help to the victims of armed conflicts, but also to cooperate with armies during military operations in order to e.g. be able to control and monitor the observance of existing national and international law.

But since the kind and number of incidences of cooperation between military and humanitarian organizations have changed and grown considerably during the last twenty years, new problems arose from such cooperation and new concepts on how to deal with these problems had to be developed.

4.3.2 The impact of CIMIC on humanitarian organizations

One of the main problems within CIMIC derives from differing principles which are guiding both actors – the military and humanitarian organizations. As seen above, most humanitarian actors provide their assistance following the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Aid should be delivered based on the need of the people, and in order to alleviate human suffering. These values though are not compatible with the objectives of a military which is being used by the government to achieve political goals.

In order to not categorically neglect a cooperation with the military, which perceives CIMIC as a support function to realize its objectives, humanitarian actors are discussing to what extent military cooperation in humanitarian interventions can be defined as a purpose of its own (Zaalberg 2008, p. 5).

In this context humanitarians criticize that the military is blurring the line between the military- and the humanitarian space. This endangers aid workers as, depending on the way the armed forces are executing their programmes, beneficiaries are not able to distinguish between the partial military and the impartial and neutral humanitarian organizations anymore. Humanitarian organizations thereby can lose their credibility24 and thus the access to affected regions. This can impede their work and in the worst case even turn them into military targets themselves as it was the case with the United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Iraq. Additionally, military assistance, as for instance reconstruction of infrastructure, is in general planned and executed in order to achieve short term military objectives (‘quick impact’) and political

24 See the example of the Colombian Armed Forces using the symbol of the Red Cross in its successful intent to free the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) hostage Betancourt in 2008.
goals. Thereby, armed forces’ assistance is going against the humanitarians, and even more development agencies’, credo of impartiality and sustainability. Aspects of local ownership are often as little taken into account when it comes to direct assistance delivered by the military, as anthropological and cultural characteristics of the population or region where the military is active. A lack of expertise in the ranks, and a lack of interest in long term achievements of their programmes and projects can result in a poor or sometimes even negative outcome for the targeted population. The fact that armed forces additionally apply for public funding for their CIMIC projects reduces the chances of civil agencies to receive enough money for their programmes and creates further tension. It furthermore creates a tendency in which long term, sustainable and on local ownership focussed civil development projects have to step back for military organized “quick impact” projects which are based on political and security interests.

Additionally, humanitarian organizations risk the erosion of their ethical basis if they are forced to cooperate with the military in a context in which aid is perceived more and more as politicized. Organizations feel as if they are only agents of Western states that only get active in those areas of the world where strategic political and economic interests are at stake. The branding of all kind of actions with the label ‘humanitarian’ thereby contains a large risk for humanitarian organizations as these highly depend on a positive perception by beneficiaries and neutral donors. NATO may have carried this practice to an extreme when it labelled its 1999 campaign in Kosovo a ‘humanitarian war’. Critics refer to the contradiction of the terms ‘humanitarian’ and ‘war’ when condemning this concept, since all wars cause deaths and suffering (Rieff 2002, p. 120). Nevertheless, in the realm of humanitarian assistance or in peacekeeping, CIMIC is a positive development which can contribute to a more effective and sustainable peacebuilding as elaborated in the section below.

4.4 CIMIC in peacekeeping

Cooperation in form of CIMIC plays a special role in peacekeeping operations. This is even more the case since these operations changed considerably regarding their mandates and their number during the last two decades. Due to a change of the international power system at the end of the 1980s, United Nations (UN) peace-operations became a widely used tool in international relations to intervene in armed conflicts in order to bring peace and stability. Until then the superpowers were not able or willing to intervene, but the number of jointly undertaken peacekeeping operations grew remarkably from then on.

Not only had the number of executed peacekeeping missions grown. Also the kind of the operations changed considerably. Until the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations mostly had traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates and no direct peacebuilding responsibilities. Since then ‘Blue Helmets’ are also engaged in different tasks, like e.g. the supervision of elections or peacebuilding operations.

The growing number and the new character of peacekeeping missions signify a more frequent contact between humanitarian actors and the military, as does the growing number of regional organizations which are currently willing to engage in peacekeeping operations.

Additionally, this growing number of contacts was desired by the UN and its new peacekeeping concept which was developed as a reaction to the rather poor outcome of UN peacekeeping operations during the 1990s. The principles enshrined in the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’, which determines the organization of all planned future peacekeeping operations, aim at bringing more coherence and a better cooperation to the interventions. Of course, such a better cooperation shall also be achieved for civil-military relations in order to enhance the positive effects of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian programmes.

Besides the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), only to name the strongest and most important actors, are getting more and more involved in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, those organizations partly claim extraterritorial interventions in order to

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25 Between 1946-2002 Soviet Union and Russia exercised a 119 vetos in the Security Council, the USA 76 (see Malone 2004).
prevent or solve humanitarian crisis as part of their own strategy. Such interventions in humanitarian crises by military organizations enhance the need for well-functioning CIMIC and furthermore underline its growing importance.

All above mentioned organizations do have different cultural backgrounds and different military and political goals. This results in different principles on how to cooperate with other actors – including humanitarian actors who are working on the same disasters. Being aware of the importance of civilian actors to be able to overcome crisis situations and end armed conflicts, several of the abovementioned organizations installed agencies in recent years which are specialized in civil-military relations.

In the realm of its new strategy of ‘integrated missions’, especially the UN aim to institutionalize civil-military coordination which forms part of a comprehensive approach of confronting crisis situations. United Nations efforts regarding this new theoretical framework include the development of different guidelines during the last years in order to organize an efficient and ethical correct cooperation between humanitarian and military actors for the benefit of the people, and in order to enhance Human Security. This is to help to diminish controversies between both actors and thereby enhance the success of the mission.

The most important outcome of those ‘integrated missions’ can be seen in the focus on peacebuilding rather than on peacekeeping or even peace-enforcement. The term peacebuilding was introduced by the former General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” in 1992. Peacebuilding is focussing on the creation of an environment in which violent conflict is not to break out again. It thereby is not only focussing on one specific actor or field, but addresses a broad variety of causes of conflicts and actors who possibly could be involved in it. Peacebuilding thus can be interpreted as a process in contrast to a single folded action directed only on one specific issue or actor. International Alert defines peacebuilding as:

“The employment of measures which consolidate peaceful relations and societal institutions in order to contribute to the creation of an environment which deters the emergence or the escalation of tensions which may lead to violent conflicts.” (International Alert 1999, p. 29)

In peacebuilding it thus is not sufficient to only aim for institutional change, but behavioural changes on a grassroots level have to be addressed as well. As history shows, conflicts cannot be solved only by actors from the outside, it is important to make use of the peacemaking potential of the affected society itself (Curle 1994, p. 96). Only if all actors of conflicting societies are involved in the process of peacebuilding, dissolution of enmities can be achieved. In peacekeeping operations armed forces can guarantee physical security and thereby a secure environment in which the CIMIC counterpart, e.g. humanitarian organizations can support civil society and foster stability. Additionally, CIMIC can play an important role in peacekeeping by bringing one of the main actors within armed conflicts, the military, closer to civil society. CIMIC can contribute to a better understanding of each other and thereby generate trust and diminish conflict potential. In post-conflict peacebuilding phases the military furthermore can help to:

“Promote confidence in the peace by overseeing the organization and verification of cease fires, the cantonment of troops, disarmament, demobilization, and initial efforts to integrate the new army.” (Sriram 2003, p. 57)

These actions are two important aspects for peace and Human Security which are nowadays almost always included in peacekeeping operations: SSR and DDR. Due to its high capacities in engineering the military also

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28 The term “civil-military coordination” is used within the United Nations and defined in the following way: “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training”. See: http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Civil-Military%20Coordination%20Officer%20Field%20Handbook%20vol.1.pdf [Accessed January 31, 2013].

identifies the reconstruction of infrastructure as one of its main areas of engagement. Rothchild stresses the importance of third party incentives in the rebuilding of the administration and social infrastructure as well as the generation for economic opportunities in post-conflict societies in order to secure a positive development of society by diminishing public frustration (see Rothchild 2002). Furthermore, the armed forces, humanitarian- and development organizations can contribute to the empowerment of societies, and make them help to help themselves. How the ADF’s CIMIC strategy is contributing to this in the realm of peacekeeping missions, and how it developed, is going to be discussed in the following section.

4.5 The Australian Defence Forces

Given the different ways national armies define their relationship with civilian counterparts in the realm of CIMIC, it is important to understand the factors and strategic reasons that underlay the ADF approach on how to design and implement CIMIC.

4.5.1 Australian Defence Policy and its impact on the ADF

Due to Australia’s size, its sparse population and its richness in fertile agricultural land and natural resources, Australians historically felt vulnerable to military occupation. This was especially the case when the continent, by then still being a British colony, depended mostly on the British military to grant its security (Millar 1978, pp. 11-22). The question of how this problem should be handled was widely discussed. Two main lines of argumentation developed during the twentieth century describing the contradictive approaches to be discussed.

The first, favoured by the ‘Australianists’ was called ‘Fortress Australia’ and was aiming at an independent Australia which should be able to defend itself against possible invaders. Even if smaller offensive deployments outside of Australia were included in this strategy, it was mainly focussing on defensive weapons and strategies. This approach went so far that the Australian government during the 1950s and 1960s intended to achieve nuclear weapons – even if only for deterrence. The second approach was favoured by the so-called ‘Imperialists’ who opted for a ‘forward defence’. Such a ‘forward defence’ would include military operations in the Australian neighbourhood as well as in other parts of the world where Australian interest was at stake (Horner 1997, pp. 74-77).

Especially after the Japanese threat to invade the country during World War II, it became apparent that Australia needed its own military capacities. As a result, it was opted for the ‘forward defence’ policy, and in the following years Australia fought in various wars against the ‘communist threat’ in Asia, supporting British troops in Malaysia and Borneo, and US troops in Korea and Vietnam.

It was during the Vietnam War that Australia had considerable CIMIC capacities. United States military structures and the British ‘hearts and minds’ approach from Malaysia were copied and a focus was set on education and reconstruction (Interview 2, Greet). Following the end of the war and the return home of the troops, those capacities however were dismantled and no “lessons learnt” were drawn (ibid.). Not until the 1990s and the growing involvement of the Australian Defence Forces in peacekeeping missions, the need for civil-military capacities was again perceived as being vital for the armed forces. This need became most obvious in the areas of coordination and liaison. Therefore, the ADF started to deploy staff for civil-military tasks, but choosing people not only because of their skills, but also because “they were not useful elsewhere” (Interview 2, Greet). These soldiers, who were going to work on CIMIC, did not get any special training either. Unsurprisingly, results were relatively poor. Only little by little improvements were made but only with their engagement in East Timor the ADF started to institutionalize CIMIC structures within their ranks again (Interview 3, Jeffrey).

4.5.2 The Australian Defence Forces and CIMIC

The fact that neither an invasion of Australia by a foreign power has been really realistic, nor that Australia does have expansionistic geopolitical aspirations, means that it is not militarily engaged in many combat operations but mostly in peacekeeping- and emergency response operations. These characteristics leave space for the Australian armed forces to specialize in other capacities which are of special importance in such operations.
They especially include so-called soft capacities. As Australia perceives itself as a peaceful power, it engages in the development of new mechanisms and policies which are directed towards the promotion of peace in the region and worldwide. This can be seen for example in its contributing efforts to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine and in several peaceful interventions in its neighbouring countries. Even if Australia started to develop its soft capacities in form of CIMIC comparatively late, it today is aiming at becoming a role model for CIMIC and is respected internationally for its efforts to promote peace. Currently, it is investing considerable resources in the improvement of its civil-military capacities and in research on CIMIC, based on its own experiences, trying to set trends in the region and even worldwide.

Since its engagement in CIMIC in 1999, the Australian Defence Forces developed its own CIMIC doctrine which is based on NATO’s definition that refers to:

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and the civil dimension, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies” (Scott et al. 2003, p. 1).

Civil-military operations include:

“Any measures, activities, or planning undertaken by the military which both facilitates the conduct of military operations, and builds support, legitimacy and consent, within the civil population in furtherance of the mission” (ibid.).

As this definition is primarily focussing on the realization of military objectives, it is questionable, whether it contributes to a positive outcome for civilians affected by war or not. Whether CIMIC, as defined by the Australian Defence Forces, can contribute to an increase of human security of people affected by violence, and where a connection between both concepts can be, will be discussed in the following section.

4.6 CIMIC and Human Security

CIMIC, interpreted as a strategic instrument of the military to achieve military goals, on first sight cannot contribute to Human Security as it is part of a military operation which in general is directed towards the destruction of an enemy. Being part of such an offensive and violent mechanism, CIMIC is part of an event which is causing casualties. This cannot be justified from a humanitarian point of view; even so it may contribute to a positive overall development of e.g. the human rights situation or the physical security of a population in danger.

CIMIC nevertheless can be seen as a tool for the achievement of Human Security under certain circumstances: If it is interpreted as a mechanism which was designed to minimize casualties and which has the purpose to protect civilians and military personnel from physical damage. CIMIC can contribute to a less violent conflict or a timely end of the direct fighting, and thereby to Human Security.

Especially as part of peacekeeping operations, and here even more in third generation peacekeeping which can be interpreted as “a component of a broader and emancipatory theoretical framework centred on the idea of collective Human Security” (Ramsbotham 2005, p. 147), CIMIC can be interpreted as a part of peacebuilding efforts contributing to Human Security. Or as Knight puts it: “CIMIC can be considered an operational tool that can advance Human Security” (Knight 2007, p. 20). In a time, when it was noticed that Human Security cannot only be granted by states and their militaries, but requires the support of a variety of actors, including civilian- and peoples’ organizations etc., the door was opened for civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and ‘new’ strategies and mechanisms which were thought to contribute to Human Security. This

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30 Soft capacities can be defined as soldiers’ capacities which are not directly related to fighting skills.

31 Following Peck the UN distinguishes three different kinds of peacekeeping: “1. First generation peacekeeping: Traditional peacekeeping by the UN to allow the conflict to cool off by assisting the parties in monitoring a cease-fire and by enabling negotiations towards a settlement to the conflict. 2. Second generation: A more comprehensive form of peacemaking whereby the peacekeepers support the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, recently achieved. 3. Third generation: Peacekeeping with a ‘humanitarian mandate’ which takes place during ongoing hostilities.” (Peck 1996).
was when the concept of CIMIC received support by policy makers and lead organizations. CIMIC has the power to bridge two of the main components of Human Security: The humanitarians’ strengths to contribute to “freedom from want” and the military’s strength to contribute to “freedom from fear” and thus can be interpreted as a peacebuilding tool.

The needs standing behind those two freedoms can be translated in two fundamental prerequisites for human development: The need for empowerment of people in order to enable them to guarantee their own well-being; and the need for protection. The military is able to provide endangered societies with such protection. It is part of one of the main international actors, the states, which often possess the economic and military means to do so. Empowerment though, requires the cooperation of the people. As peace cannot be installed in a top-down approach from the outside but has to grow in society in a kind of bottom-up approach, CIMIC can be understood as a positive tool to bridge the gaps between security and humanitarian assistance, between governmental bodies and civil society.

As mentioned before, the means by which Human Security can be granted are broad and can include the ending of violent conflict, the protection of people from physical danger, the reconstruction of infrastructure, capacity building and the empowerment of people, the granting of humanitarian assistance, the repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), institution building, the granting of justice, and the re-establishment of society structures, only to name some of many possibilities.

It is important to take into consideration that all activities shall not have any negative implication on the targeted population. It also has to be assured that all measures undertaken will be institutionalized to guarantee sustainability in favour of short term wins. CIMIC ideally contributes to the achievement of these goals, as it is a participative approach, including all relevant actors while trying to empower them. CIMIC normally is an institutionalized process, aiming at bringing peace, building it, and preventing conflict. It thereby can contribute to Human Security, and might even be interpreted as a possibility to bring robustness to the concepts of Human Security and Responsibility to Protect.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to exactly measure the influence of CIMIC on Human Security as normally no excluding, clear, and casual connection between both concepts exists. CIMIC can contribute only partially, and it is doubtful if there are cases in which a single CIMIC related activity always leads automatically to the same desired improvement regarding Human Security. Therefore, all examples which will be named in the following chapter can only indicate what the positive outcome of CIMIC on Human Security could be, or what was missing in order to bring an improvement of the level of Human Security of the people.

The Australian Defence Forces CIMIC approach as it was used in the interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 2006 will serve as example here. Since the ADF are not able or willing to provide a detailed list of activities they carried out during their times in East Timor, and since I have not had the chance to go to East Timor in the realm of my research, the following examples can only provide a limited view on what was really done on the ground and what the effects of these activities were. Taken these limitations into account, a broader timeframe for the analysis will be used in order to give a more representative overview on the ADF’s activities and their possible impact on Human Security. Sources are from both sides – humanitarian actors and the military (through personal interviews conducted in Australia) – to provide a balanced and neutral overview.

5. The Australian Defence Forces and East Timor

Since the reasons for an intervention of the ADF in East Timor are multiple and had an influence on its scope and design, these reasons are going to be explained in the following.

5.1 The path to independence

Timor, whose division is going back to the 17th century when the Dutch occupied the western part of Timor only some years after the Portuguese had founded their first settlements in the eastern part of the island, has a long history of violent and neglecting colonialism. Neither the Portuguese (1586-1975 with interruptions) nor the
Indonesians (1975-1999) who were colonial powers in East Timor, were interested in the development of the island. Therefore, it became one of the poorest and least-developed countries in the world when it gained independence in 2002. Moreover, East Timor frequently and strongly suffered from violence as in the time of the Japanese occupation in World War II, and during the Indonesian occupation period. For example it is estimated that some seventy thousand natives were killed by the Japanese troops (1942-1945) as a reaction to the Timorese resistance that was supported by Australian troops in the aftermaths of ADF’s departure from the island in 1943 (Eliot 1996, p. 782).

Only in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal the chance for independence suddenly appeared. By that time, East Timor was divided in several oppositional parties. These parties could not agree on a common position regarding East Timor’s future. Conflicting positions finally culminated in internal violence. When one of the parties, the “Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor” (FREITLIN), unilaterally declared independence in late 1975, Indonesia decided to invade and annexed the eastern part of the island Timor. The reasons for the Indonesian intervention can be seen in its struggle for nationhood and the wish for territorial expansion as well as the wish for territorial integrity. To what extent Cold War politics also played a role is questionable. The result was a 20 year long liberation fight of the Timorese against Indonesia which left 90,000 to 114,000, of a total population of around 600,000, dead (see Benetech 2006). The UN never recognized the integration of East Timor but demanded Indonesia’s withdrawal (Chawla 2001, p. 2292).

In the direct aftermath of the invasion, Portugal brought the case to the UN. The Security Council (SC) issued SC Resolution 384 (1975) which underlined East Timor’s right to self-determination, Portugal’s rights as administrating state, and called for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. Only four months later, a second SC Resolution (No. 389) reiterated this position. Until 1981 the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the right of Timor for self-determination on a regular basis. Nevertheless, Cold War politics made direct interventions by the United Nations impossible. Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the blockade of the United Nations by either one of the superpowers, the United States or the Soviet Union, possibilities emerged for an active involvement in East Timor’s politics. Especially after the so-called Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 in which the Indonesian military killed hundreds of civilians, the UN activities increased again – even if at first, with little success (Turack 2000, p. 60).

With the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and its dire impact on Indonesia’s economy which culminated in the downfall of President Suharto in 1998, chances for an improvement of East Timor’s situation grew as Indonesia became more vulnerable to external pressure. As Indonesia was depending on financial help by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the new Indonesian president Habibie started looking for a solution of the East Timor problem. But he had to oppose the Indonesian army which believed “that holding on to East Timor was vital to maintaining Indonesia’s territorial integrity” (Schulze 2001, p. 79). As a reaction to a witholding of financial help by the IMF due to violence in East Timor, Habibie had to drawback (Turack 2000, p. 60).

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53 The most important of these were the “Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor” (FREITLIN), the “Timorese Democratic Peoples Association” (Apodeti), and the “Timor Democratic Union” (UDT).
54 As FREITLIN had a certain socialist potential, President Suharto (1967-1998) who was a strong anti-communist and who already followed an anti-leftist policy in Indonesia, saw the chance to continue his fight against Communism. The fact that there was a meeting with U.S. president Ford and President Suharto right before the 1975 invasion of East Timor clearly indicates that the U.S. administration at least was informed about the military coup (Ballard 2008, p. 9). Other authors, like Wheeler/Dunne and Simpson also underline the role of the West and especially the U.S. which gave the ‘green light’ for Indonesian’s invasion of East Timor (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, p. 806). Fear of a communist East Timor in the neighbourhood of an important regional ally, which was Indonesia at that time, was perceived by the U.S. as dangerous for the security in the region (Simpson 2005, pp. 291-297).
55 The U.S. abstained during the voting for UNSCR 389, which indicates indirect approval on Indonesia’s actions in East Timor (see Maley 2000).
57 For an overview of the UN’s involvement in the question of East Timor, see Maley 2000.
p. 73). He proposed a limited autonomy for East Timor and the following talks resulted in an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, signed in New York on May 5, 1999. It was aimed to conduct UN-administered popular consultation of the East Timorese on the proposed autonomy. In fact, a rejection of the proposed autonomy would signify a vote for independence.

The ‘consultation’ was to be organized by the United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET), while Indonesia was responsible for the security in East Timor. UNAMET managed to prepare and execute the elections even under constant pressure by pro-Indonesian paramilitary troops which intimidated the East Timorese, hoping to guarantee a pro-autonomy result of the ballot. Nevertheless, 98.6% of all registered voters participated and 78.5% rejected the autonomy proposal, opting for independence (Smith/Dee 2003, p. 18).

As a result violence broke out and neither pro Indonesian militias nor Indonesian National Military (TNI) nor the Indonesian Police Force (POLRI) undertook any effective measure to stop it. More than 1,000 people were killed, 70% of the country were totally destroyed, and 250,000 people were displaced to West Timor.

Consequently, a multinational force, the “International Force East Timor” (INTERFET), was established on the 15th September 1999 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1264. The Australian-led multinational peacekeeping force of 11,000 soldiers from 22 different countries was deployed in September 1999. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and authorized to use all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor, the 5,521 Australian troops deployed among the others had the mission to end the violence (Kelly et al. 2001, p. 103). But the restoration of peace was not the only task of the peacekeeping forces. INTERFET additionally was to provide humanitarian support within force capabilities.


In May 2005, the last peacekeeping troops left the country. But since the economic and social situation of East Timor did not improve in a way people had hoped it after independence, violence broke out again. In 2006, a group of some hundred members of the Timorese Armed Forces (F/FDTL) resigned from service due to bad working conditions and started to demonstrate for their rights in the streets of the capital Dili. When unemployed and frustrated young men came and joined this group to express their anger, the situation escalated. Five people died, dozens of houses burned down and more than 20,000 people fled the city while the riots continued for weeks.

In order to be able to restore order, East Timor finally asked for international military support. An International Stabilization Force (ISF), with the participation of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Portugal and the United Nation Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) was set up. Again, Australia played a leading role, sending more than 2000 soldiers to its neighbouring country in the realm of the “Operation Astute”.

5.2 Australia’s reasons for engagement

The reasons for the ADF’s engagement in East Timor have been widely discussed during the last decade. A clear and final argument for its will to lead the peacekeeping forces INTERFET and for the deployment in 2006 cannot be given easily. Instead, a mixture of several geopolitical and economic reasons played an important role and led to the decision to intervene.
The reasons for the different interventions would have to be analysed separately due to a change in International Politics after the events from 9/11 and the beginning of the ‘War on Terror’. Nevertheless, as some reasons have influenced both interventions and since political developments only changed already existing priorities, such a separation will not be intensively undertaken here. The reasons for the 2006 intervention will rather be named briefly at the end of the chapter.

Until World War II, Australia was surrounded by neighbouring states ran by European countries such as England, the Netherlands, Germany, France, or Portugal. With the end of Western hegemony in the region, Australia had to develop its own security strategies. As a basis for the development of such strategies the idea of “concentric circles” was designed. Defence priorities were defined based on geographical proximity meaning that what happens closest to the Australian coastline is most important (Dibb 2001, p. 13). When talking about its neighbours, the term “arc of instability” is widely used. This is related to the chronic instability and conflictive society structures in countries like Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, East Timor etc.

To be able to guarantee security and democratic values in the region, Australia is playing a leading role in the relation with these countries due to its economic and military power. Especially after 9/11, stability in the region is a leading goal of Australian foreign policy in order to prevent terrorism and radicalization within the region. Instability in the region is perceived by Australia as a danger to its own security as it could spill over to Australia. A growing number of refugees, aiming to reach Australian territory in case of conflict in the region, is part of this scenario.

Furthermore, to take side of the independence movement in East Timor was perceived as dangerous by the Australian government as it was likely that it could stimulate opposition movements throughout Indonesia to fight for independence, especially in Jaya and Aceh (Chalk 2001, p. 40). Regarding its relationship with Indonesia, the country with the biggest Muslim population in the world, stability and good relations were always of primary importance. From a political point of view, independence of East Timor therefore was not favoured by the Australian government.

From an economic point of view, Indonesia, as one of the most important markets in the region, and as a contract partner of Australia in several oil treaties signed between both countries in the 1989 “Timor Gap Treaty” administering around 700 million barrels of oil (Cotton 2004, p. 17), always played an important role in the latter’s regional policy during the last 40 years. Economic interests even made Australia acknowledge Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor in 1978 in order to be able to negotiate about natural resources found in the Timor Sea (see Head 2000). To venture these benefits for an independent Timor was perceived as too risky by Australia.

The development of a democratic movement within Indonesia, which was promising a political change for the first time in decades, was used as another argument for not advocating the Timor cause. A clear statement by Australia in favour of East Timor could have endangered such a movement, what was not in the Australian government’s interest. Therefore, it was important to have a good relationship with the Indonesian Defence Forces (IDF) in order to prevent a military coup and thus the end of the so-called ‘reformasi’.

Additionally, for Australian policymakers an independent East Timor did not seem to be viable due to economic reasons. This is why autonomy was favoured by Canberra until a certain economic level was reached, and a potentially necessary but unwanted long term engagement by Australia was feared. Moreover, it was doubted that Australian support of East Timorese independence could make a difference and priority was given to maintain good relations with Indonesia (White 2008, p. 70).

When explaining the anti-independence position of Australia, critics refer to a communiqué sent home by the Australian ambassador to Indonesia. In his letter he stated that a Timor Gap Treaty “could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia than with Portugal [as administrating country] or independent Portuguese Timor” (see Head 2000). Nevertheless, that the military involvement finally did not turn out to be negative for Australia’s interests as was assumed before, can be seen in follow up contracts Australia signed with UNTAET and the East Timorese government (ibid.).

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42 For a detailed discussion see: Rumley 2006/Dobell 2007.
The fact that the Australian government received approximately one billion dollars in taxes from oil fields which are located in East Timorese territory clearly shows that economic interests played an important role for the Australian engagement which already gave a good financial return (see Kehi 2004). The rather unexpected support of the East Timor case by Australia was partly the result of a sudden opening of a “window of opportunity”, due to the apparent unwillingness of the USA to intervene, and due to internal pressure and national and international political interests of the Australian government.

The Australians were, unlike their government, strongly in favour of the idea of an East Timorese independence. This was given a common history which both countries, East Timor and Australia, share and which binds their societies together and creates a deep interest about East Timor within Australia’s society. This relationship has its roots in the events of World War II when the East Timorese fought alongside the Australian troops. The killing of five young TV journalists, two of whom were Australians, during the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, was another binding factor, which still is very much present in Australian society until today. These events caused a rather high number of Australian non-governmental organizations fighting for an independent East Timor since the 1970s.

The media coverage in 1999 was very high and demanded action (Wheeler/Dunne 2001, pp. 805-827), and public pressure pushed the government to act in favour of the Timorese cause. It additionally was recognised by politicians that the Australian government would gain credit for advocating a Timorese independence, not mattering what Indonesia’s response would look like (White 2008, p. 72). The chance to present Australia as a democratic regional power, willing to fight for ‘a just cause’ and engage in an international peacekeeping mission to bring justice to East Timor, was an interesting aspect for Australia.

Such public diplomacy is important to enhance a state’s capacity to react politically and economically in the international political system (Grolig et al. 2007, p. 554), and therefore it would have a positive outcome for Australia, too. Nevertheless, Australia did not take its decision regarding the intervention deliberately. In fact, the Australian government lost the initiative on the developments regarding East Timor in the very moment when Indonesia’s president Habibie unexpectedly offered East Timor a referendum on a proposed constitutional framework for a Timorese autonomy within Indonesia.

White states about the Australian government’s decision-making that:

“This from a strategic policy perspective, it lost the initiative and never regained it, right up to the decision to deploy INTERFET. Even that decision was to a significant extent out of the government’s hands: the violence that followed the ballot had so galvanised Australian public opinion that by the time the decision was made the government seemed to feel that it simply had no choice, whatever the costs and risks” (White 2008, p. 86).

In order to maintain the power, the primary goal of a government (Moravcsik 1993, pp. 15-17), and reconsidering the abovementioned reasons in favour of an intervention, the Australian government under president Howard finally decided to intervene in East Timor and engage militarily under the mandate of the UN. Such a mandate was vital for Australia, as with such a mandate the relationship with Indonesia, which had agreed to the use of international troops to restore order in East Timor (Ballard 2008, p. 69), could at least be saved partially.

Even if the Australian government claimed that its decision to intervene was based on humanitarian reasons and that the country played an important role in the liberation of East Timor, it can be stated that various agendas stood behind this decision. To opt for a “humanitarian intervention” was partly going along with Australian foreign policy, and definitely was not only conducted out of altruistic reasons (Burford 2005, p. 25).

43 Dobell states that: “The deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer, said the ‘truth’ was that Washington “could not have been weaker in its initial response to Australia’s request assistance with East Timor during September 1999.” (Dobell 2000, p. 265).
The reasons for Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 2006 are largely the same reasons like the aforementioned ones. Nevertheless, a stronger responsibility for the situation in the neighbouring country since the first invasion, and the engagement in the ‘War on Terror’, were further arguments.

5.3 The ADF’s CIMIC approach in East Timor and its impact on Human Security

In this chapter the concrete activities, undertaken by the ADF and its CIMIC capabilities in East Timor during their interventions which started in 1999 and 2006, will be analysed regarding their possible impact on Human Security. Due to the fact that the Australian Defence Forces were not willing or able to provide detailed information on their CIMIC activities in the abovementioned periods, the given examples will be anecdotal and do not claim to be complete. As a clear casual and exclusive connection between a CIMIC activity and the improvement of Human Security cannot be drawn, the named examples will only describe possible effects on such an improvement or underline where insufficiencies existed. Human Security will be defined in this context as “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”. Such a broad definition is chosen in order to be able to give a more comprehensive overview about the effects of CIMIC on Human Security in the defined context.

For a clearer description of the activities, they will be categorized in three groups, politics, strategy and tactics, using a broadened division of war undertaken by Carl von Clausewitz. This will help to structure and present the impact of CIMIC on Human Security by bringing the analysis from a broader level (politics) to the planning level (strategies) and finally to the level of implementation of CIMIC (tactics).

5.3.1 Politics

For Clausewitz war is “a mere continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz 2003 [1832], p. 30). As diplomacy, war aims at the resettlement of conflicts. In war this is undertaken through the enforcement of one’s own will. The overall objective of war herein is the achievement of a peace which is compatible with national interests. As wars do not start from simple enmities, but are declared by the political class which also conducts it, this political class is of primary importance in the planning and conducting phase of wars. Before a war or an “operation other than war” starts, it is politics in its special form ‘government’, where all state capacities are joined and where general conditions of the operation are defined. It is the political class which decides on the structure of the army, its numbers and its weaponry. Therefore the political class is playing a crucial role when it comes to define general conditions and actions as well as the military’s capacity to act.

In the realm of this analysis, it is referred to ‘politics’ when it comes to an analysis of the negotiation, establishment, and equipment of peacekeeping forces and their CIMIC units. In the context of democracies, the above mentioned activities in general are undertaken by the government and its representatives in coordination with the military leaders. Furthermore ‘politics’ in this chapter is addressed when it comes to describe the cooperation between military CIMIC units and their governmental - or institutional counterparts like for example the UNOCHA or the UN Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

As Clausewitz shows, the reasons for governments to opt for military engagement are of primary importance for the analysis of a deployment of troops. This is the case as these reasons indicate the intervening troop’s objectives and thus give a hint at the strategy which is going to be used to accomplish them. The Australian government, as seen above, originally was not in favour of an independent East Timor. Instead of independence, political and economic interests made it opt for the status quo, or at most for an autonomous East Timor within the Indonesian State when it came to discuss the 1999 intervention. Altruistic reasons clearly fell behind geopolitical interests, and an intervention in the sense of the Responsibility to Protect theory, which by the time was still under development, was not considered to be relevant. When it came to define Australia’s national interests regarding East Timor, it was even stated that it should be avoided to send troops to the small island in the north (White 2008, p. 75). Even if the Howard government was being informed about Indonesian support of

44 The Australian fear of terrorism in its neighborhood, which could hit Australia in a way like in the 2002 “Bali Bombing”, and the troop intensive engagement of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, which by that time reduced the US will to also lead an intervention in East Timor, made Australia become more interested in security aspects in East Timor than in 1999.
violent paramilitary units in East Timor, Australia did not act properly to stop it. The Australian government furthermore did not take the initiative when it came to determine the rules of engagement with international partners (White 2008, p. 85), and therefore was not able to prevent the outbreak of violence in East Timor.

As humanitarian reasons for an engagement were only secondary and as the Australian government was not sufficiently able to influence decision making on a political level, mission planning was insufficient and CIMIC was not considered as being important. Therefore, it’s funding and staffing was limited. In case of an earlier intervention physical security of the East Timorese could have been secured in a more efficient way.

The deployment of a non-UN component by the US (US Assistance Group in East Timor/USGET) further complicated the already difficult mission planning as another partner had to be consulted (Smith 2003). By not being attached to INTERFET, USGET created overheads and lowered the missions cost efficiency.

Porro also noticed a number of inefficiencies in the field of humanitarian assistance resulting from a lack of pre-mission planning. One example is civil society organizations’ unwillingness to make use of the military’s Civil-military Operation Centre (CMOC) due to its proximity to INTERFET (Porro 2007, p. 16). Elmquist underlines this problem by stating that a meeting between the Force Commander and the Humanitarian Coordinator prior to the start of the mission was missing what led to uncertainties regarding INTERFETs mandate as stated in the SC resolution (Elmquist 2003, p. 7).

Both failures led to a deficient implementation of CIMIC. While the defence forces admitted this critique with regard to one of the most important actors during the operation, OCHA, (Smith 2003) the ADF in general interpreted cooperation on a political level as positive (Interview 1, Doggett). This was especially the case in the cooperation between the armed forces CIMIC unit and UNHCR (ibid.).

However, with regard to the 2006 intervention it was stated by NGO representatives that errors were repeated: Due to a lack of pre-mission planning, the military was slow in developing CIMIC capabilities within its forces, and military assets were not used effectively concerning humanitarian needs (Austcare 2007, p. 14). On the level of political and military planning, Human Security thus was not directly fostered and the success of CIMIC was very limited.

Additionally, as the Australian government did not want to engage militarily in East Timor at an early point of the developments which finally led to the country’s independence, troops were not sufficiently staffed and equipped regarding a successful civil-military operational readiness. The ADF lacked civil-military specialists (Cotton 2004, p. 132) and CIMIC personnel was either chosen due to personal skills or because “they were not useful elsewhere” (Interview 2, Greet 2009). Moreover, civil-military capabilities by the time were only force elements in the reserve but not within the troops itself. Therefore, no special training on civil-military issues was given for the deployed soldiers (Interview 2, Greet 2009).

For the Australian government it was important to keep the costs of the engagement low and it became a means by itself to leave East Timor as soon as possible. This finally reduced the mission’s success. This was most apparently the case when it came to the transition of the mission to UNTAET.

A stronger cooperation with UNAMET officials, who were present at the time of the intervention and later assumed executive, legal and administrative responsibility under UNTAET for East Timor, would have been a benefit for the mission. However, due to a lack of staff the transition process from INTERFET to UNTAET was inefficient and ultimately slowed down progress (Smith/Dee 2003).

The direct involvement of Australian politicians in the execution of humanitarian aid projects led to inefficiency, too. Greet named the example of some parliamentarians who decided for political and publicity reasons that the ADF had to carry containers of shoes to Timorese beneficiaries. These got collected through private initiative and were finally brought to East Timor using military transport which was extremely expensive and cost inefficient.

In contrast to this, cooperation with local and regional governments proved to be successful. The grade of success however was very much depending on personal contacts and thus on individuals, and was not generally inherent in CIMIC itself.

While pre-deployment planning, staffing, and equipping of civil-military units was insufficient and therefore did not contribute to an enhancement of Human Security in East Timor, the cooperation with local government staff
was perceived as positive. To what extent this cooperation was intended, and what the direct outcome regarding the improvement of Human Security in East Timor could have been, will be discussed in the following chapter as it was part of the ADF’s strategy.

5.3.2 Strategy

Following Clausewitz’ trias, the term ‘strategy’ will be explained now. Strategy is the means by which politics try to accomplish their objectives during war. Strategy defines the objectives and purposes of the war, and arranges it following these objectives and purposes. Following a definition coming from economics, strategies plan and direct the mission and require long-term goals, encompassing all means leading to accomplish them (Welge et al. 2001, p. 4). In the context of this paper, ‘strategy’ is going to be defined as all policies, guidelines, and plans designed by CIMIC staff, aimed at helping to accomplish a mission’s objective – meaning peace.

In the realm of this analysis CIMIC was defined as a peacebuilding tool which can contribute to the achievement of Human Security. This is the case if CIMIC is interpreted as a mechanism which was designed to minimize casualties and which has the goal to protect civilians and military personnel from physical damage. Furthermore, “freedom from fear”, and hence the protection from physical violence have been defined as crucial aspects of Human Security. Security in the case of East Timor was achieved by the ADF and allied forces shortly after the intervention started. This was partly due to the technical and tactical superiority of Australian troops over the enemy (Interview 3, Jeffrey). To prevent the recurrence of violence and to contribute to a peacebuilding process, different strategies were applied.

It was perceived as important by the military to clearly determine who was responsible for what specific task in the undertaking to bring peace and enhance Timorese peoples’ Human Security. Brahimi notices that in order to get to such an agreement upon the different actors, it is important to install effective coordination at all levels to define “(…) which player has, in a given situation, the comparative advantage to take on a particular job” (Brahimi 2006, p. 8). This requires a formalized process in which all sources are cooperating in order to reduce redundancy and to unify assets to be able to guarantee maximum success.

Therefore, the ADF installed a Civil-military Operation Centre (CMOC) which was thought to organize and coordinate the armed forces’ activities with civilian entities. As a result, it was agreed to give NGOs the humanitarian space they needed. In the end, NGOs were able to conduct their work based on humanitarian principles while the military only acted supportively where it was needed. The installation of CMOC was also intended to guarantee the institutionalization of cooperation in favour of the beneficiaries – exactly as Alkire demands it.

Such institutionalization of coordination with civilian entities was furthermore important for another CIMIC inherent strategy which was also applied by the Australians – a participatory approach. Since colonial times the Timorese fought against authorities and thereby established a kind of ongoing struggle which is called “funu” in local language. As these “embedded cultures and economies of violence provide more formidable barriers to constructive intervention” (Ramsbotham 2005, p. 215), a comprehensive approach was required in order to build sustainable peace. Therefore, it was intended by the military to make use of local capacities by involving them in peacebuilding related activities. No activity regarding e.g., reconstruction was undertaken without asking the local government for authorization (Smith 2003). This reduced the chance of committing errors due to the military’s “quick fix” mentality which sometimes hinders long term success (Ankerson 2004, p. 87). Furthermore, by using a participatory approach where applicable, the will of the beneficiaries was taken into account – a key demand by supporters of the Human Security concept. Thereby, local people were empowered, too and, ideally enabled to guarantee their own security on a long term – another key aim of Human Security. Local empowerment had another positive side effect aimed for by the military. By building local capacities like for example through the training of local police forces, it was tried to prevent the creation of dependencies (Smith/Dee 2006, p. 417).

Regarding Human Security’s’ priority of “freedom from want”, the Australian Defence Forces’ CIMIC approach in East Timor contributed to humanitarian action in line with its mandate and within force capabilities (Smith 2003). But even if humanitarian assistance was part of the mandate, force protection continued being the commanders’ primary objective, with CIMIC only being a secondary goal, aimed at supporting the troop’s...
mission to grant security (Interview 3, Jeffrey). Therefore, the ADF opted for a minimalist approach when it came to the question of engagement in humanitarian action and nation building (Smith 2003). Smith nevertheless underlined that all those decisions have to be seen in the context of the East Timorese situation since the choice of an appropriate strategy to reach a mission’s overall objective always depends on the environment troops are operating in, and thus can hardly be generalized.

Strategies like participation and empowerment, chosen by the ADF in 1999, have been in line with key requirements for the improvement of Human Security as these were defined by its supporters. Therefore, it can be stated that the CIMIC approach of the armed forces on a strategic level had the capacity to contribute to an improvement of Human Security of the East Timorese people.

To what extent strategies and theoretical guidelines however really led to an improvement of the level of Human Security can only be clarified in the context of an analysis of the activities conducted by the troops on a tactical level.

5.3.3 Tactics

Strategy is, following Clausewitz, the science of using the battle for the objectives of the war, and serves politics as instrument to accomplish its plans. Strategy makes use of the battles and defines, next to the place and time they will take place, the weaponry and strength of participating units and their support units. Tactics though, makes use of the units and defines their actions and their strength in the battle. In the context of this analysis, tactics will be defined as all concrete actions by military units which are directly related to CIMIC.

INTERFET’s mandate was one of the strongest worded ever given by the UN. The mandate which fell under chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowed the intervening troops to make use of force where required. Therefore, and due to the military superiority of the coalition forces, security was achieved promptly after the start of the mission. Physical security was also achieved by the activities undertaken by the ADF’s medical staff which operated and treated a large number of civilians during the time of being in East Timor (see Chambers 2004).

CIMIC in the context of physical protection played an important role as the information gathered by the troops helped to identify targets and thereby contributed to a faster end of the fighting. Furthermore, the interaction of the military with the local population contributed to a positive perception of the troops by the latter, and thereby improved the troops’ security. As a result no casualties had to be claimed by INTERFET’s coalition forces (Interview 2, Greet).

As the involvement of the armed forces in combat reduced after a while, capacities were available to engage in other tasks. These included humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, the former being part of the mandate, too. Such an engagement requires the installation of structures which enable the adequate management of civil-military affairs. However, the ADF by the time of the 1999 intervention were lacking solid experience in CIMIC. The employed staff had not received special training in CIMIC prior to the employment, and cultural or idiomatic knowledge on East Timor was only given in very few cases (Interview 1, Doggett). CIMIC activities therefore started on an “ad hoc” basis. Not earlier but ten days after the start of the intervention the Civil-military Operation Center was installed by the ADF. Due to a missing pre-mission planning in coordination with the head of the humanitarian arm of the UNTAET mission, the UN by the time of the installation of CMOC already installed the “United Nations Humanitarian Operations Centre” (UNHOC). UNTAET was an important partner of the ADF and embraced three different pillars: (1) civil administration, including police capacities and all elements of government; (2) humanitarian assistance; and (3) the military, including some 8,000 troops and 200 military observers (Smith 2003).

Besides the already named humanitarian assistance component, the armed forces furthermore had to deal with UNTAET’s headquarter and the civil administration component it included. Due to its closeness to INTERFET headquarters, and the relatively late installation of CMOC, NGOs did not make much use of the centre but met in UNHOC in order to be able to maintain their independence and distance to the military. To react to the fact that CMOC never really became a reference point for civil society organizations and international NGOs etc., INTERFET CIMIC staffs’ attended the daily meetings at the UNHOC. This flexibility and uncomplicated attitude of CIMIC staff was an important gesture helping to install good relationships with relevant actors of the humanitarian sector.
The example of a briefing which was classified “INTERFET Eyes Only”, but in which the presence of a civilian UN staff member was allowed (Elmquist 2003, p. 4), can serve as proof of this uncomplicated attitude. The result was a positive cooperation between the military and civilian representatives – at least on an upper management level. On a lower level, cultural differences and misunderstanding between both entities were more frequent. Elmquist states that INTERFET CIMIC personnel called civilian entities working on humanitarian assistance “the humans” leaving a negative impression within this group (Elmquist 2003, p. 6).

A lack of understanding of the counterpart’s work, additionally lead to frustration within both groups. The humanitarians for example were unhappy about logistical procedures regarding e.g., the procurement of military escorts. These had to be applied for, at least 48 hours before they were needed, what was extremely unpractical as humanitarian agencies were often not able to plan so far ahead (ibid.). Humanitarians furthermore felt bothered when they were not permitted to enter certain regions due to security issues (Smith/Dee 2006, p. 417). The military on the other hand was “constantly frustrated by the lack of prioritisation and slow pace of civil reconstruction” (Smith 2003). This lack of mutual understanding led to a decreasing will to cooperate and lowered the outcome of the projects, with a negative impact for the beneficiaries’ Human Security.

Additionally, it was concluded by the ADF that there was a considerable lack of understanding of local cultural and political habits of the Timorese society by the military (Interview 3, Jeffrey). This led to misunderstandings and made it more difficult for the armed forces to be effective and efficient in the execution of projects which were related to all kinds of reconstruction.

Following Hamre and Sullivan (Hamre/Sullivan 2002, p. 91), such reconstruction is crucial for successful peacebuilding and encompasses an improvement in the following areas:

- Security (meaning public safety and the development of legitimate and effective security institutions etc.).
- Justice and reconciliation (meaning an impartial and functioning judicial system, an effective law enforcement mechanism etc.).
- Social and economic well-being (meaning emergency aid, development programmes and the building of a stable economic system, restoring of essential services etc.).
- Governance and Participation (meaning the creation of legitimate political and administrative institutions and the construction of an active and participating civil society etc.).

While ADF’s primary focus laid on the ‘reconstruction’ of the first category, of course, they only got very superficially involved in the second one. Due to scarce resources and the missions’ focus on its military tasks, the Australian Force Commander Major General Peter Cosgrove decided to engage only superficially in the reconstruction of justice and reconciliation, knowing that these tasks were not the troops’ strengths either. Nevertheless, the ADF built up a detention centre and helped to collect evidence regarding human rights violations but neglected to get involved in civil policing or judicial proceedings. At the same time, contact to the UN police component was “cordial; but planning and coordination were underdeveloped” (Smith/Dee 2006, p. 420). A factor that did not contribute to an improvement of Human Security for the East Timorese and which is surprising, as such coordination and planning would have definitely contributed to an improvement in the ADF core operational area: Physical security. The development of clear Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the armed forces, and a focus on the adherence of IHL at least helped not to further erode the already unstable and fragile legal – and security situation.

The peacekeeping forces’ contribution to an improvement in the area of social and economic well-being, the third category, however cannot be underestimated. During the first weeks of the intervention the ADF were responsible for nearly all logistics in East Timor. Thereby, they were responsible for the whole supply of the soon independent country. All goods aimed at improving the situation of the people, had to enter East Timor via the airport which was controlled by the military. Hence, all humanitarian organizations were depending on the ADF. Therefore, their will to cooperate with humanitarian agencies and private organizations was vital for an improvement of the level of Human Security of the East Timorese.

Following Elmquist (Elmquist 2003, p. 5) INTERFET’s support was outstanding. As the security situation improved soon after the arrival of troops, goods could be transported to where they were needed most. Only
occasionally the ADF organized such deliveries of humanitarian aid by themselves. Only if the need of beneficiaries and the security situation did not leave any other options, the military acted by itself. Moreover, in one occasion, the armed forces however even decided not to act after an intervention by UNOCHA. In this case, this attitude by the military’s CIMIC personnel resulted in the acceptance of a civilian leadership in this otherwise completely military driven operation. The use of a civilian expert improved the quality of the activity by adding further expertise to the already existing military capacities. The physical reconstruction of transport -, water -, electricity -, and communication infrastructure, undertaken by the armed forces, indirectly led to an improvement of the economic situation of people in the direct aftermath of the conflict. By the involvement of local personnel and local government members in the planning and execution of these projects, local ownership was achieved and temporary income was generated. Nevertheless, this approach could have been used more intensively as Thakur/De Conning state. They underline that “foreign contractors did most of the reconstruction because East Timor could not provide a sufficient number of skilled labourers, and the potential of training and the transfer of knowledge and skills was not utilized” (Thakur/De Conning 2007, p. 74). This example clearly shows the negative long term effects of short term oriented recovering projects undertaken by the military. Instead of focussing on the empowerment of the local people here, priority was given to a fast reconstruction of the infrastructure due to strategic military interests. To what extent these projects in general have been driven by altruistic reasons is questionable as well. Since there was a lack of pre-mission planning, there was no assessment of the possible impact of such reconstruction efforts. If, or to what extent, they had an impact on the growing rivalry between the eastern and western parts of the country cannot be analysed here. Since such an analysis of possible negative results regarding the peoples’ situation has not been undertaken, at least a theoretical risk for the Human Security of the Timorese existed. Regarding the social well-being of the Timorese, the ADF contributed largely by building refugee camps and by helping to return refugees and IDPs safely to their home regions. In the case of the 2006 intervention, the ADF nevertheless admitted that the military was able to build camps but that they did not have any plans, and probably no knowledge either, on how to rebuild communities (Cox 2008, p. 253). However, a good cooperation with humanitarian organizations like UNHCR and International Labour Organisation (ILO) at the time made the return of IDPs a success story. Through the involvement of local people within the decision making and in the execution of the projects, a participatory approach was practiced by the Australian CIMIC team. In the long run, this could have contributed to the creation of an active and participating civil society, the fourth of Hamre and Sullivan’s categories. CIMIC additionally contributed as a mediator when it came to lower local expectations which rose considerably after the liberation of East Timor by the international forces. Starting frustration within the local society could have led to a rejection of the peacekeepers. Through the mediation of CIMIC personnel the potential of civil unrest was at least partially diminished. As a result it can be stated that CIMIC on a tactical level contributed to an increase of Human Security on the side of the East Timorese people. However, the success of the activities was only partly due to the mission planning. Success in the often ad-hoc CIMIC operations was mainly due to the individual skills and capacities of the soldiers involved in it. As Greet puts it: “It was more a question of luck but of good planning that it worked out so well” (Interview 2, Greet).

6. Conclusion

This analysis underlined the importance of a re-development of the concept of security as it was used by almost all states until 1989. The change of the kind of warfare which resulted out of the end of the bipolar world order and the newly arising power vacuum in several parts of the world, as well as out of the growing trade of small arms and light weapons coming from former USSR arms stocks etc. caused a rising number of civilian victims in military conflicts. Therefore, and due to an increasing globalization and a revolution in information technology etc., a redefinition of the concept of security was required as today’s threats are more and more affecting the whole human race (see e.g. HIV/AIDS, economic crisis), and are less bound to territories or caused by external military threats.
By discussing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and the design of the Human Security concept, the focus of security was drawn on the individual. Furthermore, it was unlocked from limited territories, and the international community was given more responsibility, additionally to every state’s responsibility for the Human Security situation of its own people. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping missions grew considerably as a result, inter alia, of the increased responsibility of the international community towards the well-being of people in the whole world. Since the number of humanitarian organizations also grew strongly during the 1990s, methods needed to be found which held the power to improve the interaction between civilian and military entities in order to improve the outcome of those missions. At the beginning, this outcome was rather poor in a long run, why peacekeeping missions became more and more comprehensive regarding their way of confronting the causes and results of violent conflicts.

CIMIC was brought into the focus of attention, and through its power to have a positive impact on the execution of projects in a shared humanitarian space it was used as a peacebuilding tool. As it was shown in this paper, CIMIC used as a peacebuilding tool has the power to increase the level of Human Security of people in general. Additionally, it can be stated that it had a positive impact on the level of Human Security of the East Timorese, too.

It has to be stated though that chances for a positive impact of CIMIC are less likely in combat missions or peace-enforcement missions like those in East Timor in 1999 and 2006. This results from a changing perception of CIMIC by the military in those missions. The ADF for example made clear that in both military missions civil-military had to follow the “first principle”: Mission first (Interview 3, Jeffrey). This means that CIMIC from the armed forces point of view still primarily was perceived as a military tool which was used to achieve the mission’s main purpose – to defeat the enemy. In a combat mission, like in the beginning of both Australian lead interventions in East Timor, CIMIC can only be seen as positive for the improvement of Human Security if it is interpreted as a mechanism which was designed to minimize casualties and which has the purpose to protect civilians and military personnel from physical damage. Nevertheless, such a definition is still critical as every military intervention causes casualties and therefore endangers the well-being of people – a fact, which is not in sync with the core ideas of Human Security.

Still, when defining Human Security as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” as it was done in this study, several positive outcomes of CIMIC, especially in the aftermath of an armed conflict and in the context of peacekeeping missions can be named.

In the realm of this analysis it became evident though that such a positive outcome depends, besides the mission’s mandate, largely on the governments’ willingness to staff, train, and equip CIMIC units. If, like in the case of the Australian government in the 1999 intervention in East Timor, the political level is not willing or able to sufficiently invest in CIMIC units, the result of civil-military activities is automatically reduced. Therefore, the planning of the mission is of vital importance for the outcome of the civil-military unit’s success.

In the concrete case of the ADF in East Timor, this success can primarily be found in the area of communication between the military and its civilian parts. In this area, CIMIC helped to diminish misunderstandings between the two counterparts, and thereby contributed to a more successful division of tasks. This led to a more successful programme execution.

Where the militaries’ main capacities were of special value, e.g., in the granting of physical security and the granting of a secure environment in which humanitarian agencies were able to deliver their services, success was outstanding. Nevertheless, it also became apparent that the traditional critique of the military’s work in the area of humanitarian assistance remained legitimate in the case of ADF in East Timor, too: Many projects were aiming to improve the situation of the people within a short time in order to achieve a relatively stable environment soon after the start of the intervention. However, main ideas of the Human Security concept, sustainability and the prior analysis of eventual long term damages were not taken into account in East Timor.

CIMIC thus can be an important peacebuilding tool which has the potential to enhance Human Security if applied correctly. Nevertheless, it is not only the correct structural design of the mission which is of importance. Additionally, it depends much on the training of CIMIC staff, which needs to be sensitized for humanitarian concerns. As the ADF’s case in East Timor has shown, the success of CIMIC depends largely on personal skills and hence on capable individuals. Therefore, the CIMIC outcome of the ADF’s activities can be called a success.
regarding their effects on the level of Human Security of the East Timorese people, even if pre-mission planning and staffing/equipping of the civil-military activities and units was insufficient.

For the future it is important that these deficits are going to be removed. The ADF learnt their lessons from their experiences made in both interventions. As a reaction to these, the Australian Government decided to install the Asia-Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation which is cooperating closely with the Australian NGO community, aiming at raising awareness on civil-military topics. It additionally aims at improving cooperation of all involved entities on both, the strategic and operational level. Furthermore, a curriculum was designed which shall improve the level of training of staff to be deployed as CIMIC personnel.

Finally it should be questioned, if in times of a growing militarization of peacebuilding efforts, a real need exists to attach civil-military units to the military component of missions. Especially in the context of peacekeeping, where no national agendas should be in existence by the participating military contingents, civil-military units should be attached to the humanitarian component of the mission instead. Thereby, the military would get a higher acceptance for its’ aims by humanitarian organizations what would result in a better outcome of the projects – for the good of the beneficiaries.

If a CIMIC component is always helpful and necessary should be assessed prior to the start of each mission. Especially as the installation of CIMIC units e.g., could also follow certain pressure by the military, aiming for more control, contributing to an institutional mimicry, and supporting personal interests, which would drastically reduce the benefits of CIMIC. Following Lipson, success often is measured in terms of organizational mimicry rather than by analysing the sense and outcome of a concrete measure that has been undertaken by the institution. This can lead to a situation in which the “standardization of suboptimal practices that acquire the status of ‘best practices’ for reasons of legitimacy rather than performance” (Lipson 2003, p. 15) is repeated even if its outcome is not as high as it should be or could have been.

Therefore, a detailed analysis of the concrete impact and outcome of CIMIC is of importance for future research. To what extent the concept of Human Security is an adequate indicator to measure CIMICs’ importance is questionable. Instead, the concept of Human Security itself should be revised and improved in order to make it more usable for academic research and the implementation and design of related policies.

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