Ready to Change Perspective?

How a Changed Perspective on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) Can Tackle the Weakness of Development Assistance in Protracted Crises

Lara Horstmann
Ready to Change Perspective?

How a Changed Perspective on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) Can Tackle the Weakness of Development Assistance in Protracted Crises

Lara Horstmann

NOHA Master of Arts (M.A.) in International Humanitarian Action
Contact: lara.horstmann@web.de

Abstract

How can a changed perspective on the concept of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? Even though there is agreement on the fact that LRRD should be implemented exactly in protracted crises in order to create longer term perspectives, it is unclear how this can be done successfully. Within this study a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises is developed, where the status of emergency is permanent and development measures are hardly implemented. It shows that through adding objectives and measures typically associated with the rehabilitation and development phases to relief operations where possible, LRRD can tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises. Yet, certain conditions have to be present as calmer areas and periods within the crisis, or functioning sustainable markets that people can access.

Key words: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), Humanitarian Assistance, Development Assistance, Protracted Crises, South Sudan, Welthungerhilfe
Ready to Change Perspective?

How a Changed Perspective on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) Can Tackle the Weakness of Development Assistance in Protracted Crises

Content

List of Acronyms..................................................................................................................IV
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... V

1  Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Research Objectives ...................................................................................................... 2
   1.2 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 2
   1.3 Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 3

2  Literature Review .............................................................................................................. 5
   2.1 Protracted Crises - The New Normal ........................................................................... 6
      2.1.1 Food insecurity: are protracted crises different? ....................................................... 7
      2.1.2 Forced displacement ............................................................................................... 8
      2.1.3 The weakness of development assistance in protracted crises .......................... 9
      2.1.4 Engaging in protracted crises ................................................................................. 11
   2.2 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) ....................................... 15
      2.2.1 What is LRRD? ....................................................................................................... 15
      2.2.2 The development of LRRD: Continuum vs. Contiguum ....................................... 16
      2.2.3 How organizations view and work with LRRD ..................................................... 19
      2.2.4 Criticism towards LRRD ..................................................................................... 20
      2.2.5 Challenges for the implementation of LRRD ....................................................... 20
      2.2.6 Recommendations for the implementation of LRRD ........................................... 24

3  Case Study: The Republic of South Sudan ................................................................... 28
   3.1 South Sudan past and present .................................................................................... 28
   3.2 Armed conflicts and food insecurity .......................................................................... 30
3.3 UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) ........................................ 31
3.4 Humanitarian assistance and poor governance ........................................ 32
3.5 Infrastructure and humanitarian logistics ........................................ 33
3.6 Type of protracted crisis ........................................................................ 33
3.7 Welthungerhilfe’s engagement in South Sudan ........................................ 34
3.8 Learning from South Sudan: What works in a protracted crisis? .......... 35

4 Discussion: A changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises .... 37
4.1 Changing perspective on LRRD .............................................................. 38
4.2 How the changed perspective on LRRD can benefit in protracted crises... 44

5 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 50
Glossary ....................................................................................................... 53
References .................................................................................................... 56
Annex ........................................................................................................... 62
List of Acronyms

BMZ  German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CTP  Cash Transfer Programming
DEVCO EU Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
EC   European Commission
ECHO EU Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EU   European Union
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs Internally displaced persons
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières
NFI  Non-Food Item
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA  Official Development Assistance
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PoCs Protection of Civilian sites
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SPLA/M Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/ Movement
SSD  South Sudan
UN   United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP  World Food Programme
WHH  Deutsche Welthungerhilfe/ German Agro Action
WHS  World Humanitarian Summit
List of Figures

Figure 1: Food insecurity in protracted crises compared to all developing countries .......... 8
Figure 2: Protracted crises situations by duration in 2015 ............................................. 9
Figure 3: Relation humanitarian assistance/total ODA in protracted crises .................. 10
Figure 4: Multi-year humanitarian appeals between 2010 and 2015 ............................. 12
Figure 5: Definitions of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development co-operation .... 16
Figure 6: Differences between classic and new humanitarianism .................................. 17
Figure 7: The contiguum model .................................................................................... 18
Figure 8: When disaster strikes in a linear development process .................................. 21
Figure 9: Counties of the Republic of South Sudan ....................................................... 29
Figure 10: Events of armed conflict in 2013-2015 and projected food insecurity in SSD . 31
Figure 11: An aerial view of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Bentiu, South Sudan, January 26, 2016 .......................................................... 32
Figure 12: WFP food airdrops in South Sudan ............................................................... 33
Figure 13: Definitions of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development co-operation . 38
Figure 14: Protracted crises (part one) .......................................................................... 40
Figure 15: Protracted crises (part two) .......................................................................... 41
Figure 16: Changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises ....................................... 42
Figure 17: Key knowledge on protracted crises ............................................................. 44
Figure 18: Key knowledge on LRRD .............................................................................. 45
Figure 19: Overlap between action points in protracted crises and LRRD ................. 48
I Introduction

It’s the old alliance between the fireman and the architect: when you have a fire you need someone to put it out, and then you have to rebuild to make sure (that) if there is another catastrophe we can be better prepared and more resilient. (Badré in Redvers, 2015b)

Fires have occurred in the past, are occurring today and will occur in the future. However, not every fire has the same result. Some cost human lives, others damage property and again others do not cause any harm at all. But how come? How come the same kind of fire can have such different results? Because some people and the context they live in possess varying abilities to respond than others. Additionally, dry areas are more prone to reoccurring fire outbreaks; in others the fire brigade might have quit their job as salary payments were overdue for months. As a result, people become more and more vulnerable to the impacts of fires.

The same scenario can be applied to situations of humanitarian crises. Armed conflicts or extreme weather events have been there in the past, are there today and will be there in the future. However, not every armed conflict or extreme weather event causes the same result. Contexts which have experienced those events and their consequences in reoccurring patterns might develop into protracted crises. Development actors are frequently absent in those contexts as they often avoid areas of higher risk and ongoing conflict. Even though people in protracted crises rely on the continuity of development infrastructure and basic services, development investments and agencies only have an inconsistent and limited presence or are even totally absent (ICRC, 2016, p.20). Donor governments prefer humanitarian assistance as they aim to avoid the engagement with states that are perceived as being repressive or undemocratic, part of an active conflict or involved in high-scale corruption. The redirection of funds initially planned for a protracted crisis and then used for another need weakens development initiatives further. Eventually, development assistance is often weak or even entirely absent in protracted crises. Discussions have been going on for decades on how to improve living conditions in those situations. One approach suggested is Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The underlying idea is to work on all ends of humanitarian and development needs at the same time in the same context. Theoretically endorsed, the implementation of LRRD has not written great success stories until today. Nevertheless, the concept still possesses a great potential to contribute to improved living conditions for people in protracted crises. But how to get there?

This study is focusing on the research question: How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? The hypothesis is that LRRD should be implemented exactly in protracted crises in order to build up (sustainable) structures for the future and to minimize the negative consequences for people living in protracted crises. The paper is divided into five chapters. First, the introduction provides an outline of the paper’s logic, research objectives, methods and limitations. Second, the literature review includes a section on protracted crises in Chapter 2.1: what are protracted crises? Why are special? Why is development assistance
often weak in protracted crises? What to take into consideration when engaging in protracted crises? The concept of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development is analyzed in Chapter 2.2. It includes an overview of the concept’s development, criticism, challenges and recommendations for its implementation. Third, the case study of South Sudan demonstrates what a protracted crisis looks like. It points out how the country developed and how armed conflicts are linked to food insecurity. The case exemplifies which role the UN mission, the country’s infrastructure and humanitarian logistics play. Additionally, the link between poor governance and humanitarian assistance is outlined. A look into practice is included by displaying what the German NGO Welthungerhilfe has been doing in South Sudan. In Chapter 4, the results of Chapters 2 and 3 are discussed. A changed perspective on the LRRD concept in protracted crises is developed and tested against criticism of and challenges for LRRD. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Chapter 5 including an answer to the research question. By means of the changed perspective on LRRD developed in Chapter 4, the LRRD concept is tailored to protracted crises. In the changed perspective the objectives and measures suggested are crucial. Especially through them, LRRD has the potential to tackle the absence of development assistance in protracted crises.

1.1 Research Objectives

The rationale underlying this study is identified in various research objectives. First, it is meant to help in understanding the concept of LRRD, why it often failed in the past, what points of criticism and challenges for its implementation are and what recommendations are given drawing on lessons learnt. A further objective is to place protracted crises at the center of attention. They often go unnoticed in Western daily media coverage and tend to be easily forgotten. Yet, they play a substantial role in humanitarian assistance. Using the example of South Sudan, a country that is repeatedly affected by periods of extreme violence and extreme weather events, this study aims to investigate whether and how LRRD can still work in such contexts. The paper concludes with a suggestion on how LRRD can contribute to tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises. Paying attention to this potential in research and while designing and implementing projects is utterly important.

1.2 Methodology

The paper is based on an extensive literature review which is complemented by two qualitative interviews. During the research process diverse sources were consolidated including academic books, academic papers published by various research institutes as the ODI and reports or studies conducted by INGOs or UN institutions including OCHA, WFP, FAO, Welthungerhilfe and UNHCR. Moreover, newspaper articles form Aljazeera and IRIN, relevant web pages, as well as reports or studies conducted by either an EU body or the German government were used for the analysis. Literature was read in English, German and Spanish. Points of interest regarding LRRD and protracted crises were derived from this literature. It was paid special attention to contradicting opinions by analyzing the differences and underlining various points of views on the same topics. The used literature was published within a timeframe of twenty years, during which the discussions on LRRD have experienced various degrees of intensity.
Those discussions were taken into consideration when analyzing the literature. The literature was mainly used in order to understand the development of, challenges for and criticism towards the LRRD concept and the characteristics of protracted crises.

Next to the literature research, the paper is complemented by empirical research. Two qualitative interviews were conducted with employees of the German NGO Welthungerhilfe on South Sudan. The interviews were semi-structured with a broadly defined interview guideline. The data analysis focused on the direct comparison and cross-checking of information collected during the interviews and previous literature analysis. Quotes were selected according to their usefulness supporting one argument previously introduced in the literature analysis or to develop a new point of view that symbolized insider knowledge from the field.

The two interviewees were Matthias Amling, who worked in South Sudan for three months in 2015, and Lena Voigt, who is the program coordinator of Welthungerhilfe in South Sudan since August 2015. The interview with Matthias Amling was conducted in English and in person at the Headquarter of Welthungerhilfe in Bonn on October 20, 2016. As he was in South Sudan from April until June 2015 working in Juba and Unity State, he could mainly report from his experiences during that time and in those places. However, as he actively stayed in touch with colleagues and is following the developments in South Sudan closely, he was able to give an overview of the situation also after his departure. The interview with Lena Voigt was conducted by phone on October 21, 2016. This interview was also conducted in English. She arrived in South Sudan in August 2015 and has been in the country since then, apart from two periods between July and October 2016 when she had to be temporarily evacuated. Her main duty station is the capital Juba, from where she has visited field sites of WHH in Unity State and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. The context analyzed from those two interviews is thus mainly the timeframe from mid-2015 until October 2016 and the geographical locations of Juba, Unity State and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Chapters 3.1 to 3.6 were written primarily based on multiple reports of INGOs and UN bodies. Knowledge acquired through the two interviews was added. Chapters 3.7 and 3.8 are exclusively based on the interviews. The case study was conducted in order to add practical examples from the field to the theoretical knowledge acquired before.

1.3 Limitations

Protracted crises have certain common features, yet are individual in the end. Therefore, the study cannot be fully generalized to the potential of LRRD in protracted crises, but focuses on the known context. Furthermore, field research was not possible due to the security situation in South Sudan. Thus, information for the study were obtained by interviewing people that work and worked in South Sudan, and by a thorough literature analysis. Besides, the empirical research could only be drawn from two interviews. The interviewees had gathered experience in the capital and two counties during a timeframe of 17 months. The timeframe and geographical context of analysis is thus limited. Furthermore, Chapter 2.2 includes a part on how organizations view and work with LRRD. It is lacking a counterpart on how beneficiaries view LRRD due to lacking information. However, the counterpart would be needed to deliver a comprehensive overview of the stakeholders’ perception of LRRD. Besides, the organizations’ view on
LRRD has a strong focus on European actors. More views of African, Asian or Latin American organizations would add more diversity.
2 Literature Review

The concept of LRRD has been subject to diverse research in the last two decades. It was especially during the 1990s and early 2000s, that the topic of LRRD was explored. During that time focus was put on the shift from the continuum to the contiguum model. Researchers such as Karlos Pérez de Armiño (2002) analyzed why and how this shift occurred. The delivery of aid was not longer understood as a chronological succession of all three phases of relief, rehabilitation and development, known as the continuum model. Instead, the delivery of aid was understood as a simultaneous combination and implementation of all three phases, the contiguum model. Researchers and practitioners were enthusiastic about the new approach. Thus, it became a prominent subject to research in the new early millennium. However, as it was hardly implemented successfully, a shift was taken towards the concept of resilience, which focuses on making people less vulnerable to the effects of a crisis. Resilience regards people as right holders aiming to improve their characteristic of being resilient towards hazards. For about a decade most research from the mid 2000s focused on resilience. The EU remained the greatest advocate of LRRD and published the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid in 2007 confirming its commitment to LRRD and did the same in a policy briefing on LRRD in 2012 (European Parliament, 2012). In the meantime, researchers such as Addis & Dijkzeul (2013) investigated in a comparison of LRRD, early recovery and resilience, three concepts focusing on enhancing people’s living conditions who are prone to crises. They identified technical differences between the concepts and varying levels of prominence and support by donors. After not having received much attention for about a decade, LRRD was taken up again on researchers’ agendas. One of the new articles was the ODI Article ‘Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ by Mosel & Levine (2014). It focuses on how LRRD can become a practically useful concept to assistance in difficult places. Through newly published research and lessons learnt from practitioners in the field, the perception grew that LRRD should especially be applied in protracted or complex crises. An influential NGO that has committed itself over years to the concept of LRRD is the German NGO Welthungerhilfe. Their contribution is therefore of high value to research. The practical implications from South Sudan add greatly to the discussion.

Many reports and studies have been published regarding protracted crises. INGOs and UN agencies, government bodies and research institutes are well aware of the complexity and difficulties of intervening in such situations. The ICRC (2016) published a study on ‘Protracted conflict and humanitarian action’ and OCHA (2015) one on the role of multi-year planning in meeting and reducing humanitarian needs in protracted crises. Besides, Bennett (2015) released a working paper together with the ODI with the title ‘Fit for protracted crises?’ All three of them identify common characteristics of protracted crises as severe food insecurity and displacement, and suggest measures that work in protracted crises. The ICRC (2016) focuses on working with two timelines, OCHA (2015) promotes multi-year planning and Bennett (2015) analyses the role of donors.

Despite numerous research conducted, it is still not clearly identified how LRRD can be operationalized successfully in protracted crises. This research paper fills the
above described research gap. It builds on a mixture of literature on LRRD, reports of humanitarian organizations working in the field, and practical knowledge from the engagement of Welthungerhilfe in South Sudan. Especially, the latter allows for drawing lessons learnt from applying LRRD under extreme conditions with reoccurring periods of extreme violence and weather events.

2.1 Protracted Crises - The New Normal

Somalia, the Central African Republic and South Sudan are among those countries that have been in a state of crisis for years, even decades. Sometimes they appear in international media, but most times they seem to be forgotten. Yet, the situation on the ground is horrific. FAO (2010, pp.12-13) defines protracted crises as countries reporting a food crisis for eight years or more, receiving more than 10% of foreign assistance as humanitarian relief, and being on FAO’s list of Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries. More broadly, the Humanitarian Coalition (2016) uses the following definition: ‘Protracted crises are situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods’. State authorities are often unable or unwilling to adequately protect the population from these threats (Harmer & Macrae, 2004, p. 11). According to OCHA (2015, p.5) four types of protracted crises can be identified. The first type is crises in contexts affected by recurrent or cyclical slow-onset natural hazards, which may be combined with low-intensity conflict, chronic vulnerability and elements of state fragility. Examples are parts of the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. They second type of protracted crises are contexts affected by low-frequency but high-intensity natural hazards in contexts of pre-existing chronic vulnerabilities which are compounded by environmental degradation, epidemics and displacement. An example is Haiti. A third possibility is crises in states that suffer from medium-to-high-intensity conflict and large amounts of internal and/or external displacement and thereby require a political solution. Examples include Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The last type are crises in middle-income states hosting large influxes of forcibly displaced people from neighboring countries with relatively strong capacity and substantial domestic resources to manage crises. Examples include Jordan, Turkey, Iran and Lebanon. Thus, protracted crises are not limited to one region in the world. In 2015, 366 million people were affected by protracted crises worldwide, mainly living in Africa and the Middle East (FAO, 2015).

Keeping in mind that each protracted crisis is distinct, complex and does not easily fit generalizations, the FAO (2010, p.12) nevertheless identified five common characteristics. Those are long duration, conflict, weak governance or public administration, unsustainable livelihood systems and poor food security outcomes, as well as the breakdown of local institutions. While protracted conflicts are historically not new as such, today’s protracted conflicts have some novel features that are specific to our time. They often take place in urban settings and affect middle-income countries as much as poorer countries. Furthermore, new forms of technology influence tactics and communications differently, a significantly larger humanitarian sector is engaged, and media coverage is provided globally 24/7 (ICRC, 2016, p.9). Some protracted crises are not affecting an entire country, but only particular areas. Even though humanitarian crises are mostly predictable, both in contexts of natural hazards and conflicts (OCHA,
protracted crises overwhelm the capacity of people and institutions to cope. Their previous experience, the skills they have acquired and the resources established to deal with such situations are inadequate (BMZ, 2013). Some protracted crises are developing into complex emergencies, which are ‘humanitarian crises in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program’ (IASC, 1994). Drawing a definitional line between complex emergencies, fragile states and protracted crises might seem to be difficult as they have common features. However, the classification of the situation is essential for policy and programming. For example, identifying a situation as a complex emergency puts humanitarian issues at the center and often leads to a response of the international community with an emphasis on emergency food assistance. Yet, an intervention into a fragile state aims at developing the state’s capacity to deliver services to its citizens. Interventions in protracted crises emphasize the understanding and addressing of longer-term issues, and multiple causes underlying the prolonged situations (Alinovi et al., 2008).

As during any humanitarian intervention, dependency of beneficiaries on humanitarian assistance shall be avoided, local capacities supported and participation of beneficiaries encouraged when intervening in a protracted crisis. The crises’ characteristics, as longevity of the conflict and unsustainable livelihood systems, make the goal of avoiding dependency of beneficiaries on humanitarian assistance extremely difficult. Being supported becomes the norm, hope decreases that the situation will change any time soon and often there are no incentives for beneficiaries to change anything about their situation when having received assistance for years.

In 2013, 78% of humanitarian funding went to countries with high levels of poverty, low government spending and limited domestic capacities (Bennett et al., 2016, p.35). It is expected that by 2030, two-thirds of the world’s poor will be living in fragile and conflict-affected states, where the prospects for, and records of, poverty reduction are the weakest (Chandy et al., 2013). Not only do those crises cause immense human suffering, but also undermine sustainable development. For the conflict in Syria the World Bank estimates regional losses close to $35 billion (Ianchovichina, 2014). Those trends contribute to protracted crises, where extreme, widespread and unpredictable needs exist together with long-term structural vulnerabilities, and the existence of emergency needs over multiple years (Bennett et al., 2016, p.35). In 2014, more than 90% of countries with annual humanitarian appeals had issued such appeals for three or more years, and 60% for more than eight years. An immense danger for protracted crises lasting for years or decades is that they become forgotten crises. ECHO defines a forgotten crisis as a ‘severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situation where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is no political commitment to solve the crisis, due in part to a lack of media interest’ (ECHO, 2016).

### 2.1.1 Food insecurity: are protracted crises different?

Countries in protracted crises usually report high levels of food insecurity. WFP (2016) considers people as food secure when they have available access at all times to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. In contrast, food insecurity exists
when people do not have adequate physical, social or economic access to food (FAO, 2003). ‘Food insecurity is the most common manifestation of protracted crises,’ underline Pingali and Alinovi, working for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and FAO respectively (IRIN, 2011). About 20 per cent of the world’s undernourished people live in regions affected by protracted crises (IRIN, 2011). Figure 1 demonstrates the significant differences between protracted crises and other developing countries in terms of food insecurity.

**Figure 1: Food insecurity in protracted crises compared to all developing countries**

![Graph showing food insecurity in protracted crises compared to all developing countries](source: FAO, 2015)

The average undernourishment rate is nearly three times as high in protracted crises as in comparison to other developing countries. Displacement, loss of resources and economic decline cause a severely diminished ability of people to support themselves (Humanitarian Coalition, 2016).

### 2.1.2 Forced displacement

Protractedness is also a common feature of forced displacement. Less than one in 40 refugee crises are resolved within three years, but most of them last for decades. The average length of displacement period is 17 years placing people in a situation of neither being able to return home, nor having durable solutions elsewhere (UNDP, 2016). UNHCR (2015, p.20) estimated that about 6.7 million refugees were in a protracted situation by the end of 2015. These refugees were living in 27 host countries, constituting 32 protracted situations. By the end of 2015, the average duration of the 32 protracted refugee situations was estimated at about 26 years, most of these (23) having lasted more than 20 years already (UNHCR, 2015, p.20). Those 32 are further distinguished by their duration in Figure 2.
2.1.3 The weakness of development assistance in protracted crises

Development actors usually do not work in areas with higher risks and ongoing conflicts. Even though people in protracted crises rely on the continuity of development infrastructure and basic services, development investments and agencies only have an inconsistent and limited presence, or are even totally absent (ICRC, 2016, p.20). Thus, regions in protracted crises commonly receive a substantially higher proportion of humanitarian aid compared to development assistance. On a global scale, only about 10 per cent of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) is transferred in form of humanitarian assistance. However, in protracted crises the share is generally far higher. In Somalia and Sudan humanitarian aid symbolizes up to two-thirds of ODA. Macrae and Harmer (2004, p.3) argue that the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance was not made based on managerial differences, but due to political interest. Relief was channeled to many protracted crises because donor governments aimed at avoiding the engagement with states that were perceived as being repressive or undemocratic, part of an active conflict or involved in high-scale corruption. Figure 3 displays the proportion of humanitarian aid in relation to the overall ODA devoted to protracted crises. On a definitional note, today’s South Sudan was still part of Sudan by 2008.
A further problem is the redirection of funds that were originally planned for much needed interventions in protracted crises, but then redirected to finance the responses to large-scale Level 3 emergencies. The UN uses the classification for the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises. In 2013, 30% of humanitarian funding initially planned for protracted crises was eventually used in L3 emergencies. An example is funding that was urgently needed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to finance primary healthcare, which was redirected to respond to acute needs in the Syrian crisis (Bennett, 2015, p.8).

Next to the extraordinary amount of humanitarian assistance in comparison to development assistance, protracted crises tend to receive lower amounts of aid in general than regional averages. A reason is the combined effect of conditionality or sanctions resulting in the hold back of development aid, perceptions of high risk and low absorptive capacity, low levels of trust and low strategic interest (Macrae & Harmer, 2004, p.3). As adequate government support is absent, and major barriers to increase development funding and activities exist, humanitarian activities have expanded into recovery and basic service provision in protracted crises. Examples are long-term health, nutrition, education, livelihood support and social protection measures (Bennett et al., 2016, p.35). On the one hand, situations like that become extremely problematic as they put major strains on humanitarian funding. On the other hand, they cause a mismatch between humanitarian mandates and coordination structures, and the long-term strategies needed to respond to protracted crises. Humanitarian approaches are simply neither set up to handle deep-rooted structural problems, nor do humanitarian organizations have the capacity to respond to fundamental problems of poverty, vulnerability and fragility that cause the crisis in the first place (Bennett, 2015, p. 8). As a
result, there are two negative effects. First, the increased involvement of humanitarian actors risks the diluting of resources available. Second, this kind of involvement fails to sufficiently address the challenges posed by long-term development issues (Bennett et al., 2016, p.35). Furthermore, by taking over such tasks, humanitarian actors subsidize the government, thus distancing themselves more and more from their humanitarian mandate. By subsidizing parts of the government, they are adding to the problems on the ground with a government that does not feel the need to take over sufficient responsibility for its people.

2.1.4 Engaging in protracted crises

The characteristics of protracted crises make them some of the most difficult contexts for the international aid community to intervene in. They are marked by high levels of uncertainty and unpredictability, and previously reached developments constantly go forward and backwards. In the end it seems like nothing actually changes. Those difficulties are linked to two major issues. First, the development community (still) perceives development as a linear process, a gradual improvement in the quality of life. This perception also influences the way in which the development community views protracted crises. In contrast to this linear process, the trend line of protracted crises fluctuates and is thus unpredictable. A second negative effect is the utilization of aid to respond to protracted crises is insufficient. Often enough, interventions in protracted crises are planned for short crises followed by a return to a certain degree of long-term improvement. However, this project design is clearly inadequate in reacting to protracted crises. Consequently, especially international engagement in protracted crises is not well matched to the problems encountered and the approach used is not flexible enough to adjust to changing realities (FAO, 2010, p.17). Commonly, the entire government body is undermined by a protracted crisis, leaving behind an institutional vacuum, as well as the urgent question about the priorities for engagement.

As in all other humanitarian crises, standards as the SPHERE handbook, the ‘Do no harm’ principle, the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality, as well as the Code of Conduct apply in protracted crises. However, especially in those contexts the adherence to standards and principles is extremely challenging. With this complexity and high levels of needs, what can be done for people living in protracted crises? Five building blocks for interventions in protracted crises are identified hereafter. They have proven to be measures that work in protracted crises.

i. In terms of timing, the International Committee of the Red Cross works with two timelines simultaneously - one that plans week to week, and another one that thinks two to five years ahead (ICRC, 2016, p.6). This approach allows for immediate answers to suddenly erupting crises on the one hand, while on the other they can also work more deeply regarding the various health, water, livelihood and protection systems that ensure people’s survival and dignity. The latter one focuses more on permanent problems that people experience living in protracted crises. Yet, the ICRC (2016) strongly underlines that this deeper long-term approach is always guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality. Overall, timing plays a crucial role during any intervention. The earlier humanitarian
actors provide assistance in protracted crises, the better the chances that food security and livelihoods can be protected (FAO, 2010, p. 20).

ii. The second building block focuses on programming and financing. During the last years, multi-year programming and financing has been suggested by various humanitarian actors as a response to protracted crises. As one Commitment to Action, multi-year, unmarked and flexible funding was agreed upon at the World Humanitarian Summit. The Summit was hold in Istanbul in 2016 and resulted in 32 commitments. Multi-year, unmarked and flexible funding is one of them (WHS, 2016, p.4). In his report on the outcomes of the WHS, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon underlines the crucial role of multi-year time frames in order to transcend the humanitarian-development divide (UNSG, 2016, p.11).

Flexible and unearmarked funding from diverse sources for protection and humanitarian assistance remains insufficient, creating an unacceptable gap. I urge that financial commitments be fulfilled and urge all Member States and other stakeholders to increase predictable, flexible and multi-year support to humanitarian appeals, the Central Emergency Response Fund and country-based pooled funds. (UNSG, 2016, p. 14.)

Multi-year planning has not only been an important topic at the WHS, but its importance is also underlined by the ICRC (2016) and OCHA (2015). In 2015, 15 consolidated appeals in protracted crises had adopted a strategy planning beyond the traditional one - year project length as demonstrated in Figure 4. Those numbers indicate that a shift to multi-year programming is already taking place.

Figure 4: Multi-year humanitarian appeals between 2010 and 2015

OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the World Bank and the Centre on International Cooperation underline that multi-year approaches cannot always be adopted right from the beginning of a crisis (OCHA et. al., 2016, p.8). Short-term
approaches are needed when a conflict is ranging and potentially escalating. Yet, in situations emerging from conflicts, protracted crises and situations of high-risk, a multi-year approach could be adopted from the outset on, and nearly always within six months of the crisis’ outbreak.

Advantages of multi-year planning in comparison to the usual one year planning in protracted crises are diverse (ICRC, 2016, p.35). First, strategic planning can be done better. Multi-year financing enables a clear project-management approach to be developed for programs that are currently vulnerable to short-term funding. Second, longer-planned programs are more cost-efficient as streamlined costs can be planned into a project if investment continuity is assured. Besides, unused funds can be wisely carried forward, and do not have to be spent rapidly. Third, multi-year planning allows for increased learning and gives more time and space to define future commitments. Fourth, greater trust and credibility is created between communities, local authorities and humanitarian organizations. Fifth, entries and exits are planned better as humanitarian actors can plan ahead, especially for a responsible exit. Sixth, skilled staff and volunteers are more likely to stay with the organization as they have more assurance about future work plans. For multi-year planning to work, three key steps need to be taken: a shared understanding of risk and context-specific analysis needs to be created, common outcomes with targets to meet and reduce the overall needs have to be agreed upon, and programming needs to strengthen local capacity to respond to future crises (OCHA, 2015, p.15).

Besides the six advantages, there are also risks and challenges attached to multi-year planning. For example, an implementing humanitarian organization might be pinned down to a location for a longer period of time, which may not remain relevant if the situation on the ground might change. Challenges are of diverse nature ranging from misunderstanding among key partners and NGOs, multiple single-year planning instead of truly multi-year action, over the remaining challenge of a flexible humanitarian response plan, donors’ reluctance and obstacles to providing multi-year funding, up to the unwillingness of the affected government to view the crisis as a longer-term issue (OCHA, 2015, pp.13-15). Overall, the greatest challenge is the translation of multi-year planning on a theoretical level to multi-year programming on a practical level. The final goal of multi-year planning shall be the gradual reduction of humanitarian caseload. Yet, this can only be done through a combined approach which aligns development, peace and security, governance and residual emergency relief strategic engagements (OCHA, 2015, p.21).

iii. A third measure that has proven to work in protracted crises is development oriented projects in calmer areas and times. It is the rare case that an entire territory of a country is threatened by the same intensity of armed conflict or affected to the same extent by a natural event. Those calmer areas and time frames are windows of opportunities. Amling working for Welthungerhilfe underlines that the crucial determining factor is if people stay, or if they are displaced (Amling, 2016, min. 22). As long as there is stability, people stay in their villages and can cultivate their fields. Thus, instead of food distribution, people can receive seeds and tools to be able to harvest their own food later. Yet, with the moment they are displaced, this possibility
is gone. If development activities are reduced or ended in those rather peaceful areas, it is not because of insecurity, but because of fragility (ICRC, 2016, p.21).

iv. In terms of food security, the FAO (2010, p.20) outlines three types of interventions responding to protracted crises. First, interventions provide livelihood with the objective to meet immediate basic needs and to protect people’s lives. Livelihood provision is the most common type of intervention and done through free food distribution, voucher systems or cash programs. The second type of intervention is the provision of livelihood protection. It aims at protecting and supporting people’s assets and to prevent the sale or destruction of productive resources. An example is the provision of life-saving support to donkeys in Darfur, Sudan, by FAO in 2005-2006. Donkeys were often the only livestock owned by IDPs and had an essential role in fetching water and collecting firewood, as well as a mode of transportation. Fodder and veterinary care were provided and space was organized in the camps where the animals could be kept (FAO, 2010, p.20). Third, livelihood promotion has the longest outlook in time. The objective is to improve livelihood strategies and assets. Besides, key policies and institutions that can boost livelihoods shall be supported. An example are programs that provide vocational training to IDPs aiming at enhancing their skill levels and thereby their employability after the crisis. Livelihood promotion is done rather rarely by humanitarian actors as they often require the engagement of local institutions and policies, and are regarded as long-term measures (FAO, 2010, p.21). Both livelihood protection and promotion require a comprehensive and coordinated approach in order to target causes and effects of people’s vulnerability.

v. The fifth measure is focusing on donors. A re-examination of their approaches is needed to create a common space for humanitarian and development actors to exist and tackle the whole range of problems. Bennett (2015, p.5) outlines eight requirements that the ‘donor aid agency of the future’ would have to fulfill in protracted crises to address specific needs. First, the donor would have to truly recognize that the purpose of aid in protracted crises is not to promote own national interest, but to end the cycle of vulnerability and stress for people and the institutions that support them. Second, the donor needs to be transparent about the interrelation between politics, security, economics and development when deciding about humanitarian priorities and funds. Besides, the donor should preserve the humanitarian space if needed and bring the full skills, capacities and weight of governments to endure protracted crises when coherence is called for. Third, the donor needs to bridge institutional divides within donor institutions and partners by aligning strategies, processes and tools with the problems that aid aims to tackle. Fourth, strategic and operational coherence across humanitarian and development departments is promoted by the donor. Fifth, the donor aligns performance and career incentives with coherent program objectives. Sixth, decision-making is decentralized further and action to enable more local responses to crises is supported. Seventh, the donor develops and promotes a combination of proactive and reactive funding and financing tools, as well as alternative types of financing including public, private and civil society actors. Last but not least, the donor needs to recognize that finding solutions to protracted crises is fundamentally a political, and not a
humanitarian issue, which requires the full extent of political will, courage, capacity and resources of donor governments. From the analyzed literature and conducted interviews it can be summed up that the five measures that work in protracted crises are to work with two timelines, multi-year programming and financing, development activities in rather calm areas and livelihood provision, protection or promotion to guarantee food security. Besides, a re-examination of donor approaches is needed.

2.2 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

2.2.1 What is LRRD?

When the concept of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development was introduced in the early 1990s, its main aim was to find ways to link different kinds of aid and to address the presumed gaps between them. Besides, the understanding grew that emergencies are costly, disrupting development and that they create demand for a long rehabilitation phase. Thus, the idea arose that better development has the potential to reduce the need for emergency relief, that better relief can contribute to development, and that better rehabilitation between the two phases can support the transition from one to another (Mosel & Levine, 2014). The idea of LRRD has become more sophisticated as it can be seen by the rising number of literature on the topic. However, it has only to a limited extent been implemented in the field. During the first decade of the new millennium the focus has been more on the idea of resilience as it received broader support among organizations, donors and beneficiaries. While LRRD can generally be seen more in terms of timing and planning projects, resilience focuses on making people less vulnerable to the effects of a crisis through a rights based approach.

Figure 5 shows the various components and definitions of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development co-operation as developed by the German NGO Welthungerhilfe. Those three components are the phases referred to within the LRRD concept. Instead of relief, Figure 5 refers to the emergency phase as emergency aid. On the first sight it seems quite logical to build up the three phases upon each other in a chronological order and to link them closely. Nevertheless, the different objectives, principles, organizational structures, budgets and timeframes of humanitarian and development assistance have resulted in two rather different and parallel running fields. Each of them has its own practices and rules, different actors are involved and they focus on different outcomes. Linkages between them have been institutionalized only to a very limited extent. Measures of the rehabilitation phase have been included sometimes in the relief, sometimes in the development phase. This depends on the focus of the implementing organization. Despite those underlying differences between humanitarian and development assistance, both often take place in the same contexts and interact with each other. In Chapter 4 it is explained why the clear-cut categorization of relief, rehabilitation and development, as demonstrated in Figure 5, is difficult and not applicable in certain contexts.
2.2.2 The development of LRRD: Continuum vs. Contiguum

The end of the Cold War not only brought about the end of a decades-long global conflict, but also changed the contexts of humanitarian interventions. Until the early 1990s the understanding of a possible application of LRRD was primarily focused on natural disasters. Underlying was the understanding of delivering aid in a chronological succession of all three phases of relief, rehabilitation and development, known as the continuum model. The process of development was regarded as the usual situation, whereas a crisis was classified as an outlier interrupting the normal process of development as displayed in Figure 4. The links between the phases were mainly exit strategies to prepare the intervention for the next aid phase (Mosel & Levine, 2014).

The exclusive intervention of humanitarian actors in contexts of natural disasters changed during the mid 1990s when the scope was broadened to areas of armed conflicts. Simultaneously, the perception of the potential of humanitarian aid became more optimistic. The idea that those interventions could not only alleviate direct suffering, but also address the promotion of future development; peace and protection of human rights became more popular. The reasoning for this was that through an integrated approach humanitarian aid could tackle root causes and thus prevent, or at least minimize, future crises. With the growing nature of contexts humanitarian actors

---

Figure 5: Definitions of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development co-operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency aid</th>
<th>Rehabilitation</th>
<th>Development Co-operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Precondition</strong></td>
<td>improved framework conditions:</td>
<td>favourable development-political conditions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acute emergency situation due to natural disaster or armed conflict.</td>
<td>■ cease-fire</td>
<td>■ stable economic-political conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian principles:</td>
<td>■ security situation</td>
<td>■ rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ impartiality</td>
<td>■ political will for reconstruction</td>
<td>■ development-oriented government actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Related terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short-term</strong></td>
<td>ensuring survival</td>
<td>Distribution of food, blankets and tents</td>
<td>Emergency relief aid, immediate aid, disaster response, survival aid, food aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium-term</strong></td>
<td>saving of human life</td>
<td>provision of drinking water</td>
<td>reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term</strong></td>
<td>restoration of political and social stability</td>
<td>medical provision, basic education and protection</td>
<td>development aid, development-cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>medium-term security of the livelihood of the population</td>
<td>building of institutional structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>repatriation of refugees and displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>treatment of war traumas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Welthungerhilfe, 2009, p. 6
intervened in, the perception of those interventions changed as well. Prior to the end of the Cold War, organizations were acting within the scope of what Pérez de Armiño (2002) calls *classic humanitarianism*. Until today organizations as MSF, the ICRC and a few others still understand relief in this strict sense. Those organizations are known as the *emergency humanitarians* (Barnett, 2011). Their main motivation to stick to classic humanitarianism is that they see a risk in broadening relief actions, as it might lead to the erosion of the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality (Macrae, 2000). In contrast, numerous humanitarian interventions were taking place under *new humanitarianism* from the end of the Cold War onwards. Those were conducted by organizations which are also aiming to address the root causes of suffering in addition to the alleviation of symptoms. Barnett (2011) calls those the *alchemical humanitarians*, which encompass the great majority of organizations by today. Examples are the UN, Welthungerhilfe or National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Figure 6 demonstrates the major differences between classic and new humanitarianism.

**Figure 6: Differences between classic and new humanitarianism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classic humanitarianism</th>
<th>New humanitarianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Limited and short term objectives</td>
<td>-Broad and long term objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Save lives and alleviate suffering</td>
<td>-Promote peace and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Provision of assistance for survival</td>
<td>-Broad objectives such as assistance, protection, defense of human rights, disaster preparedness, conflict prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Apolitical and independent</td>
<td>-Political and part of an integrated political strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Help victims</td>
<td>-Help support political and social processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Obligatory, victims right</td>
<td>-No longer obligatory nor is it a victims right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Based on humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence</td>
<td>-Based on political criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Unconditional</td>
<td>-Conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Independent</td>
<td>-More control by governments, partially militarised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pérez de Armiño, 2002, p.2

Caused by the changing contexts in which humanitarian assistance was delivered, doubts about a possible successful implementation of LRRD arose. Those doubts concerned the multiple risks, as not fully adhering to the humanitarian principles, connected with the implementation of LRRD in politically, socially and economically unstable environments (Pérez de Armiño, 2002).

Next to those doubts criticism about the idea of a linear continuum model of LRRD grew. Analysts as Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell (1994), Longhurst (1994) and Duffield (1994) regarded the model as inappropriate in lasting conflicts and complex political emergencies as it did not take into account reoccurring crises. Besides, the linearity displayed in the continuum model was criticized for being an oversimplification of the situation. The approach received criticism for aiming to restore the pre-crisis
situation and for failing to recognize the endogenous factors that contributed to the crisis. Additionally, it seemed to ignore the fact that lasting development also depends on geopolitical factors (Addis & Dijkzeul, 2013, p.4). Therefore, the continuum model was replaced by the second generation of LRRD approaches, the contiguum model. The contiguum model views LRRD as the simultaneous combination and implementation of all three phases as demonstrated in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: The contiguum model**

![Three-circle model with LRRD approach](source)

The contiguum approach underlines the need for an integrated and encompassing approach to link relief, rehabilitation and development, and foresees to carry them out simultaneously (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2009). Yet, even though the contiguum model was introduced, the term LRRD as such indirectly implies a one-directional linear sequence from one phase to another due to its name giving during its introduction phase.

With the contiguum model of LRRD the focus had shifted to a closer linkage between assistance and political, as well as security objectives in fragile states, stabilization and early recovery. Various donors introduced ‘whole of governments’ approaches involving numerous local governmental departments and those responsible for development and humanitarian policies. Those approaches gave rise to challenges regarding the implementation of LRRD and the application of the humanitarian principles when linking humanitarian and development assistance. Additionally, critics argued that with those ‘whole of governments’ approaches the distinction between security, foreign policy and aid was diminishing. By then the debate around LRRD had changed from how to better address needs in repeating crises to the political motivations behind aid allocations.
2.2.3 How organizations view and work with LRRD

The main drivers behind bringing more developmental approaches into relief were multi-mandated UN agencies and NGOs, as development actors are usually absent in conflict-affected environments (Macrae & Harmer, 2004). Today, predominantly European donors still use the term LRRD. In 2003, LRRD was adopted as one of 23 principles for Good Humanitarian Donorship by 16 donor governments as well as the European Commission, the OECD, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and academics. The 23 Principles and Good Practices defined by the group provide both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor accountability (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003).

The main actor of the repeated use of LRRD has been the European Union. In 2007 the European Parliament, European Council and European Commission agreed upon the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and reconfirmed their commitment to LRRD on European (donor) level (European Parliament, European Council and European Commission, 2007). However, a fundamental problem remained unsolved within the Consensus. The problem remained that development assistance is frequently too weak or even absent in protracted crises, so not offering an option to what relief should actually be linked to. Until 2011 ECHO referred to LRRD as the ‘Continuum strategy’ in its project proposal formats. This indicates that even though ECHO had declared the contrary, they still understood LRRD as a linear process (Addis & Dijkzeul, 2013).

In addition to the Commission, the European Parliament explicitly endorsed LRRD in a policy briefing in 2012. The document highlighted that humanitarian assistance should be provided in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, ensuring support to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development. Yet, the aim to transit from one phase to another again underlines the abandoned continuum mentality, instead of working with the contiguum approach. The policy briefing outlined that LRRD tries to harmonize short-term relief and long-term development through effective political and financial coordinating mechanisms (European Parliament, 2012). However, the institutional divide on EU level hinders the goal of harmonizing short-term relief and long-term development through effective political and financial coordination mechanisms. Development policies fall under the mandate of the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), and humanitarian assistance is assigned to ECHO. The institutional divide between DEVCO and ECHO is outlined by an ECHO official on the question of responsibility of making LRRD work: ‘We still believe that the main responsibilities [...] lie with the development side of the house’ (Addis & Dijkzeul, 2013, p. 6). On the global institutional level, no international body or convention is responsible for putting LRRD in place at a global or regional level. In fact, most donors have a similar setup as the EU and maintain separate structures for humanitarian and development aid. In sum, the institutionalized linkages between development and humanitarian organizations can be described as weak (Addis & Dijkzeul, 2013, pp.6-7).
2.2.4 Criticism towards LRRD

Criticism towards LRRD is mainly focused on its practicality in the application during a humanitarian crisis which was caused by armed conflict or a complex political emergency. In the occurrence of natural disasters, LRRD reached far better implementations. Since the introduction of LRRD in contexts of armed conflicts, the concept has been criticized for various reasons. Some of those are results of unmet challenges that were encountered in the implementation phase. Nine points of criticism are identified hereafter. Firstly, the simultaneous operationalization of LRRD and the coherence to the humanitarian principles has provoked immense critic. Opponents argue that through the politicization of aid, humanitarian principles get lost. Danger exists that if humanitarian aid and development are linked closer, humanitarian aid, like development, will become conditional. Secondly, development assistance has been criticized for being inapplicable in complex political emergencies. Actors implementing LRRD were often unable to apply and prepare development measures where crises are unexpected and take place in complex political emergencies (Pérez de Armiño, 2002). Thirdly, LRRD often fails in fragile states due to a lack of institutional capacities and of political recognition by donors. The absence of sovereignty and legitimacy prevent the transition from a status of relief to rehabilitation and development. Fourthly, donors fail to develop an appropriate global response to complex political contexts. Fifthly, NGOs are increasingly controlled by governments with the goal to reach tighter regulations between donors, governments and NGOs. Working freely and independently thus becomes harder for many NGOs aiming to implement LRRD. Sixthly, development is often promoted as a (neo) liberal model, as it is the underlying ideological approach of donors (Pérez de Armiño, 2002). Thereby, development carries a political message. Seventhly, there are generally too high expectations towards aid. In many cases people expect it to solve complex problems and rebuild societies. Eighthly, using aid as an instrument of peace is perceived as highly questionable. Again it needs to be taken into account that development assistance cannot resolve conflict. Last but not least, LRRD has been criticized for focusing on a one-directional linear sequence from one aid phase to another. Emphasis should be put on the fact that different ways of working may require movements into both directions and between different stages, thus not being a one-directional sequence of phases (Mosel & Levine, 2014, p.3).

2.2.5 Challenges for the implementation of LRRD

After shading light on criticism towards LRRD, focus is now put on the challenges the concept faced and still faces. Throughout the last two decades the debate around LRRD has mainly been driven by humanitarian actors. The concept has rather offered options for exit strategies of humanitarian organizations. The lack of involvement of development actors demonstrates LRRD’s one-way linearity. One of the reasons why linking humanitarian and development assistance has only worked to a limited extent is that LRRD was introduced to tackle the wrong problem. Crises were regarded as extraordinary situations not being the norm. In line with that, LRRD only made sense in a context where the apparently linear process of development was interrupted by a sudden, usually natural disaster (Macrae, 2012). The idea of this timeline is depicted in Figure 8, where the green timeline of development is suddenly disrupted by a disaster.
Relief is directly needed, which is followed by rehabilitation slowly preparing the context again for getting back on the pre-disaster development track- an example of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development as chronological succession of aid phases. However, this model can only work given the fact that no new disaster hits.

**Figure 8: When disaster strikes in a linear development process**

![Diagram showing the transition from disaster to development](source: Schmitz, 2015)

Despite this linear idea of LRRD, scholars had referred to ‘emergencies being the norm’ already during the rise of the concept in the 1990s (Maxwell, 1994). The linkages between deep structural inequalities in societies and vulnerability were not acknowledged. Simultaneously, disasters were looked upon as unfortunate events instead of being symptomatic of poverty and political crises (Macrae, 2012).

The implementation of LRRD has worked in some natural disaster contexts, yet hardly in armed conflicts. Gaps between theory and its implementation in practice have been reportedly observed. Theoretically endorsed, the implementation of LRRD was hindered by various circumstances. Seven overarching challenges are identified hereafter.

i. Described as the first challenge in the implementation of LRRD is the lack of an internationally recognized definition of the concept (Mosel & Levine, 2014, pp.6-7). What do we refer to when talking about LRRD? It has not been clarified which problems the concept is trying to address. Due to this definitional lack further questions arise. For instance, what are the three components relief, rehabilitation and development are trying to link? Does LRRD refer to a bridge between relief and development? The point which has not been clarified is whether the concept refers to a linear transition between the phases, or to a set of unpredictable, non-linear phases which overlap at one point in time. According to Steets (2011), LRRD usually meant one of the following three things. Either it was meant as the early application of development principles in emergency settings, or as a smooth transition from emergency aid and sustainable interventions on the ground, or as the integration of prevention and disaster risk reduction elements in development cooperation. Besides,
LRRD can be used as reference to bureaucratic or structural issues (e.g. funding mechanism), a programmatic mechanism (particular kind of program content), or a modality (e.g. an exit strategy or the way in which assistance is delivered) (Steets, 2011).

ii. Possibly the greatest challenge is the fundamental difference between humanitarian and development assistance. Bringing together the fundamentally different institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working of humanitarian and development assistance has been described as the most difficult aspect of operationalizing LRRD (Mosel & Levine, 2014, pp.6-7). Where does this gap come from? During the post-colonial time development assistance was primarily delivered through governments, and assistance was mainly aimed at strengthening them. This has not changed until today as development funding is governed by accords, such as the 2005 Paris Declaration, which stipulate that aid should go to governments in terms of developing capacity and helping to build institutions (Redvers, 2015a). Various crises during the 1990s demonstrated that governments were often unable or unwilling to provide for their citizens. Therefore, the international aid structure between humanitarian and development assistance grew further apart. The focus of humanitarian assistance was on saving lives of individuals, and organizations often had to work around governments. On the contrary, development assistance was still aimed at supporting systems and institutions, and it was often delivered and implemented through governments (Macrae, 2012). This fundamental difference of for whom the aid is planned for, and how it is delivered, still creates obstacles to changing the way how humanitarian and development assistance are carried out. This difference is mirrored in donor structures similarly. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development works on development assistance, while emergency relief is allocated within the German Federal Foreign Office. The same divide can be found on EU level between DEVCO and ECHO. The divisions might help to explain why the provision of development assistance in conflict settings is difficult as governmental structures are often missing.

iii. Financing different aid phases poses the third challenge. Institutions have been focused on closing the financial gap between relief and development projects rather than developing integrated strategies. In contrast, Steets (2011) argues that even though a funding gap between humanitarian and development interventions has been referred to as one of the major causes as to why LRRD in many contexts has not been implemented successfully, it has been proven untenable. She underlines that a funding gap has rather been identified for recovery activities. A further gap in relation to financing is the existence of separate budget lines for relief and development projects. The separation does not help to plan an integrated approach, but rather supports the isolation of each aid phase. Besides, the isolation of humanitarian and development aid often results in the work of NGOs being slowed down, which have insufficient funds themselves in most cases (Pérez de Armino, 2002). Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, Secretary General of the global civil society network CIVICUS and a member of the newly formed UN high-level panel on humanitarian financing, has an insight into both camps: ‘Sometimes sitting in discussions about humanitarian financing,
it does feel like I am learning about a totally different community. There is a different language and very different approach' (Redvers, 2015a). Next to the existence of separate budget lines, the tendency among donors to earmark funds not only for specific geographical areas but also for limited activities makes the implementation of LRRD difficult. The additional focus on bilateral rather than multilateral humanitarian aid did not help to implement LRRD successfully, but rather achieved the contrary (Pérez de Armino, 2002). Overall, the challenges around financial difficulties play a substantial role in the implementation of LRRD.

iv. There has been a substantial discussion on the question whether LRRD and humanitarian principles can be applied at the same time. Humanitarian actors mainly affiliated with classic humanitarianism still argue that working independently of state institutions is the best way to safeguard humanitarian principles in conflict situations. Opponents as Macrae (2012) insist that only by cooperating with state authorities humanitarian principles are not disregarded per se. Rather highly pragmatic, context-specific decisions have to be taken based on whether working with local institutions can be of help to fulfill the interest of people in need. The humanitarian space in which humanitarian actors are moving has always been deeply political, according to Collinson and Elhawary (2012). Analyzing the political arena and the context in which a humanitarian intervention was planned has played a crucial role in safeguarding exactly those humanitarian principles. Thus, in line with this reasoning, Mosel & Levine (2014, pp.6-7) argue that the concept of LRRD and the humanitarian principles do not exclude each other, but offer the potential of helping humanitarian and development actors to divide tasks between them and formulate decisions in a politically informed way.

v. Good, knowledgeable, well-trained staff is needed for the implementation of LRRD. Experts employed on a short-term basis for emergency aid must be supplemented by experts in rehabilitation and development programs at an early stage and in a smooth manner. Furthermore, for the contiguum model to work in the field, any humanitarian worker involved in the implementation must have an idea of the various contiguum methods and approaches (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2009, p.16).

vi. The failure to promote capacity development to local people is a shortfall in the implementation of LRRD. The enormous time pressure under which a project is planned in humanitarian crises has often been named as a reason. Nevertheless, capacity development is regarded as a preferred means of strengthening and empowering the local population. Including trainings for the beneficiaries in the emergency response is thus a topic which needs further exploration (Pérez de Armino, 2002).

vii. Last but not least, some donors have been open about the fact that they prefer to deliver aid in countries with a good policy record, a notable process of democratization and other objectives valued by the international community (Pérez de Armino, 2002). This tendency demonstrates a discrimination of aid allocations based on governance type, instead of working based on people’s needs. Accordingly, LRRD has often been carried out from a donor’s perspective, but not from the beneficiary’s view. The concept has been conducted in a way guided by the view of aid.
organizations: ‘How do we organize our aid?’, rather than focusing on the needs that the aid is supposed to meet (Mosel & Levine, 2014, pp.6-7). Even though a great extent of research has been conducted on LRRD, there remains a research gap on what LRRD implies for the addressees of aid and which role it plays from the beneficiaries’ side. Christoplos (2006) thus calls the approach that has been taken towards LRRD until today ‘our’ solutions contributing to ‘their’ LRRD.

To sum up, numerous challenges for the implementation of LRRD still exist. Some improvements have been made with regards to the delivery and conceptualization of relief, e.g. through cash transfers and a greater focus on exit strategies and sustainability. Nevertheless, major challenges remain especially in the way development assistance is provided and targeted in protracted crises.

2.2.6 Recommendations for the implementation of LRRD

From field observations and lessons learnt drawn, the NGO Welthungerhilfe (2009, p.15) has identified six criteria which projects and programs in emergency relief should fulfill in order to be able to implement LRRD successfully. The first criterion is that relief measures focus on future risk reduction by contributing towards disaster prevention and risk minimization. Second, the implementation of, and support for, the various project phases are not divided between actors, but are undertaken by one single body. In a scenario where this is not possible, coordination and cooperation is sought with other organizations working in a complementary manner. A third criterion is the participation of the target groups from the onset on in the project planning measures. Fourth, structures and capabilities for self-help are incorporated, reinforced and further developed in emergency and rehabilitation activities. The provision of aid through local partner organizations, where possible, is the fifth criteria. Besides, the projects contribute towards building links between participating organizations. Last but not least, no isolated single aid measures are implemented, but integrated programs with the aim of a comprehensive improvement of overall living conditions. Yet, it should be kept in mind that Welthungerhilfe’s approach is taken from an organization having a rather positive perception of LRRD in 2009. Those six criteria starting from the relief phase have a clear outlook towards the long-term development phase in mind. Mosel & Levine (2014) might counter-argue that applying those criteria, the actual problem in the application of LRRD today shifts from the ‘gap’ between aid phases which those six criteria aim to avoid, to the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises as such. A possible adaptation of those six criteria could be the inclusion of criteria specifying what development projects should fulfill in difficult places to enhance the overall living situation and thus decreasing the need for humanitarian assistance in the long run.

So how to make LRRD work then? Can it work at all after all the criticism? Yes, but things need to change. The following recommendations on how to implement the concept may help. The ideas underlying the concept of LRRD could be transformed by no longer trying to link different kinds of aid, but rather to provide holistic support across a broad spectrum of circumstances and needs (Mosel & Levine, 2014 p.1). The crucial issue about LRRD today is not to find a new mechanism, but rather to discover a different way of thinking about development assistance in protracted crises. What would
that imply? That development instruments become more flexible and able to adapt to situations of unpredictability and crises, as well as to changing needs of beneficiaries. In order to achieve this, a reinterpretation of LRRD is needed so that it does no longer facilitate thinking about how to link different kinds of assistance, but approaches of long-term engagement which can handle protracted and recurrent crises as normal business (Mosel & Levine, 2014, p.8). A ‘two-way LRRD’ concept is needed where overlaps, links and transitions are acknowledged- both at the relief and at the development end of the spectrum. Fundamentally, a holistic approach needs to be accepted in the daily business of actors providing support to the entire spectrum from short-term to long-term objectives. Humanitarian and development interventions have to be reformed in their ways of providing assistance, how programs are planned, as well as how they are managed and evaluated.

With those arguments in mind, what would a good LRRD program look like then? From evaluations we can learn that a successful LRRD program is less dependent on LRRD planning or specific LRRD approaches, though rather on a strong engagement with the local population and strong partnerships on the ground. In those scenarios short-and long-term goals were best matched in the past. Thus, a good LRRD program is first of all a good program (Goyder et al., 2006). Nevertheless, Mosel & Levine (2014, pp. 13-16) identified six key principles that influence the success rate of LRRD programs in particular. Those six are listed in the following.

i. The tools available for LRRD projects need to be more flexible and adaptable to changing contexts in order to integrate the uncertainty and unpredictability of crises into programming. While in the past the term ‘flexibility’ was often used as referring to funding mechanisms, real flexibility today demands that a change of how uncertainty and unpredictability are integrated into programming itself is incorporated. Besides, real flexibility for program content would support, and even demand, responsiveness to contextual changes, instead of disfavoring modification. Donors should take over the role of communicating with implementing partners and regularly demand feedback on how they adapted to changing contexts over time. Additionally, flexibility needs to be implemented on the impact level. This means that one explicit program objective is to prepare the beneficiaries for an unpredictable future by delivering aid items that are useful in many different scenarios and through the support of adaptive capacity (Ludi et al., 2012). Especially interesting for contexts of recurrent crises are program frameworks that are based on broader theories of change and higher-level objectives, thus allowing for more flexibility.

ii. The success rate of a LRRD program also depends on the willingness of project planers and implementers to take risks and be open to learning. On the ground that means that a program is accompanied by an extensive learning process and real-time monitoring. The goal is to assess the effects it has to identify a possibility to change certain aspects of the program, or, in the extreme case, to suggest to shut down the program if it does not achieve the desired goals.

iii. A program should always be based on, and be accompanied by, an extensive context and political analysis. Properly understanding the political economy, local power relations and the structural inequalities underpinning vulnerability and poverty can
be key to the program’s success. This analysis requires strong in-depth knowledge of
and good links with local institutions, organizations and of the people who the
program seeks to benefit. However, such an analysis is time-consuming and thus
often not thoroughly done. A change with regards to the time dedicated for the
analysis is needed.

iv. Assistance programs depend on cooperation with local institutions on the ground.
The engagement is too often limited to state actors or local NGOs, as both are ways to
channel international aid. Yet, in order for development assistance to work in
protracted crises, the spectrum of local institutions needs to be broadened to those
kinds of actors that are locally important and potentially useful. Local, regional or
mid-level bureaucrats at state level, formal and informal institutions as traditional
authorities or clan structures, or local civil society groups and businesses can be
important actors. A precondition for engaging with those actors is a good
understanding of local power relations. Before engaging in local partnerships, aid
organizations should have the following guiding questions in mind (Mosel & Levine,
2014, p.15). Does the newly intended partnership bring about positive changes for the
project’s beneficiaries on the long run? Are possible negative impacts of a new
partnership well understood and taken into consideration? Are monitoring and risk
mitigation tools in place? On the long run, are possible partner organizations able to
serve people in need? How do they legitimize their role? Will the new partnership
support the beneficiaries’ link to those institutions, if people regard it as important
and meaningful to them? (Mosel & Levine, 2014, p.15) Central to a possible new
partnership is the question whether the new cooperation with a selected local partner
will contribute to improving the beneficiaries’ lives and in what way. This context and
political analysis prior to any engagement in a new partnership must be assessed in
any case.

v. A joint analysis and planning of the required assistance between actors ranging from
academics to different parts of the government and people in need should be the
norm. Generally, a process of decentralization is regarded as good practice in LRRD
as staff will be closer to the actual implementation level. However, the
decentralization process can only work successfully if not only tasks are decentralized,
but also resources allocated for their financing and execution (manpower, mandate
e tc.).

vi. LRRD programs need more clarity and understanding about what they can achieve
realistically. Learning from the past, LRRD programs need to shift from focusing on
the bureaucracy of the aid industry to what mechanisms and structures affected
people have in place already. This realistic programming would include at least five
characteristics. A real constraint is identified and tackled with as few external
resources as possible, and without offering a substitution for local structures. Besides,
it would include the establishment of links between the program’s beneficiaries and
long-term self-sustaining formal or informal institutions, or state structures that
support building longer-term relationships. Additionally, people are supported to
adapt through providing information, skills or adaptive capacity. Pressing needs have
to be answered by a short-term intervention which is taking a long-term perspective.
Last but not least, synergies with other relief and development actors, state policies or
the private sector working in the same context should be encouraged (Mosel & Levine, 2014, p.16).

To sum up on the recommendations for the implementation of LRRD two main points should be remembered. First, the six criteria which projects and programs in emergency relief should fulfill in order to be able to implement LRRD successfully (Welthungerhilfe, 2009, p.15). Those help to implement LRRD from earlier stages on. Second, the six key principles that influence the success rate of LRRD programs in particular as identified by Mosel & Levine (2014, pp.13-16) should be taken into consideration while planning and implementing a LRRD program.
3 Case Study: The Republic of South Sudan

People easily find reasons to fight. Finding food is more difficult.
(Nuer Saying, quoted after Welthungerhilfe & Concern, 2015, p.17.)

3.1 South Sudan past and present

The Republic of South Sudan (SSD) possesses a great potential. Through its fertile soil in the country’s so called ‘breadbasket’ in the South it could produce sufficient food to feed the whole population. Natural resources, especially oil located in the north, make South Sudan a rich country. Nevertheless, the country has developed into one of today’s most complicated protracted crises (OCHA, 2016). How did this immense gap between the country’s potential on the one hand and its political and social insecurity on the other hand come about? In 1956 Sudan gained independence from Britain. Already having experienced violent periods before, the country slid into decades of repeated conflict after freeing itself from colonial control. As a consequence, more than 2.5 million people died and major parts of livelihood systems were destroyed. Between 1983 and 2005 government forces of the Republic of Sudan were fighting the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) during the North-South conflict. Main reasons for the civil war were the control of natural resources, as well as political autonomy and self-determination for SPLA/M in the South. Finally, political negotiations brought about a peace agreement in 2005 and later a referendum on the independence of South Sudan from Sudan. In 2011 South Sudan declared independence and is thus the youngest nation on earth (Welthungerhilfe & Concern, 2015, p. 15).

The new country was divided into three regions and subdivided into ten counties: Greater Upper Nile including Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity State, Bahr el Ghazal, including Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, as well as Warrap and Lakes, and Equatoria including the three counties of Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria. The capital Juba is located in Central Equatoria. In July 2016 President Salva Kiir declared a new division of South Sudan into 28 counties (Hakim Justin & De Vries, 2017; Amling, 2016, min. 9). Nevertheless, as most NGOs are still referring to the division into 10 counties, the same approach is adopted in this paper.
Many governments all over the globe put great hopes in the new independent state. Development projects were initiated and enthusiasm arose about the long-awaited peace agreement (Amling, 2016, min. 38). Yet, this peace was short-lived. Only two years later in December 2013, a split within the ruling SPLA/M led to a new era of conflict, which is going on until today. It was based on ethical divisions between Dinka, under the leadership of President Salva Kiir, and Nuer, who are led by Vice President Riek Machar. Both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar play a substantial, individual role in this conflict. Their personal thriving for power and resources is one of the conflict’s main triggers (Aljazeera, 2016; Amling, 2016, min. 01). After nearly two years of renewed intense fighting, a peace agreement was reached between Kiir and Machar in August 2015. Jointly they formed the transitional government of national unity. Yet, in July 2016 renewed fighting arose between the two separate armies in Juba, the government forces of Kiir and opposition forces of Machar. They should have been integrated into one joint army under the peace agreement, but that never happened. Both groups were involved in heavy fighting in the capital, so that many INGOs evacuated their staff (Voigt, 2016, min. 10). Fighting in Juba lasted for some days until another peace agreement was reached. Shortly afterwards an unprecedented attack on aid workers occurred in Juba leaving one local journalist dead and several female Western aid workers gang raped (The Guardian, 2016). Since then the situation has remained highly fragile. Lena Voigt, Program Coordinator of the NGO Welthungerhilfe in South Sudan, explains: ‘Before the attack and mass rape of aid workers my sense of security was: Ok, I might get robbed, but no one is after hurting me as an aid worker. That has changed’ (Voigt, 2016, min.12).
3.2 Armed conflicts and food insecurity

Apart from the capital, other areas of South Sudan experienced intense conflicts and their consequences. The counties which were most heavily affected were, and continue to be, mainly Upper Nile, Unity State, Jonglei, and to a certain extent Warrap and Lakes (Welthungerhilfe & Concern, 2015, p.15). Nevertheless, recently the conflict has also spread to the south of the country, including Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria, the ‘breadbasket’ of the country. The other two counties, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, have traditionally been calmer compared to the rest, yet emergencies have been declared in those areas as well. Those emergencies have not been declared due to conflict directly, but because of extreme food insecurity which is mainly caused by disrupted markets and extreme inflation of 600% (FAO, 2018; Voigt, 2016, min. 28). This vicious cycle of violence lasting for decades has brought about massacres of civilians, destruction of villages and fields which caused the collapse of markets and transport routes, and to complicate the situation even more, repeating floods and dry seasons year by year.

*Every year, literally every year, in the dry season crops will wither because there is not enough water to irrigate them. And at the same time during the rainy season there is so much water that the cultivated areas get flooded.* (Voigt, 2016, min. 13)

Various NGOs are constructing dikes to prevent flooding during the rainy season. However, those dikes are often poorly constructed as they are simple soil dikes which are hardly maintained (Voigt, 2016, min. 13). The capacity to handle natural events such as the dry and flooding seasons hardly exists in South Sudan. Challenges such as high inflation, droughts and floods make even the most basic food unaffordable. By today, food insecurity has reached its highest level since the conflict began in 2013. About 3.9 million people, or 34 per cent of the population, were subject to severe food insecurity in 2015, which is an 80 per cent increase from 2014. 2.8 million were even at acute risk of starvation. For the first time, catastrophic levels of food insecurity at the household level were reported for 40,000 people in the areas worst affected by fighting. Those areas pose immense challenges in terms of access for humanitarian workers (OCHA, 2016, p. 5; Welthungerhilfe & Concern, 2015, p.16). Figure 10 shows which region was hit by armed conflict and the expected food insecurity. This figure makes clear that those areas strongly hit by Armed Conflict Events were also reporting food security crises.
3.3 UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

When South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established by the Security Council Resolution 1996 in order to support the newly established country. The initially planned intervention period was one year, with the intention to extend the intervention period if necessary. UNMISS’ initial mandate included general support to the government in peace consolidation for which 7,000 military and 900 civilian police personnel were deployed. Yet, as renewed conflict broke out in 2013, UNMISS’ mandate was amplified to also ensure the protection of civilians, to monitor and investigate in human rights violations, and to create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In putting its mandate into practice, UNMISS is allowed to use ‘all necessary means to carry out its tasks’ as set forth under Security Council Resolution 2304 (UNMISS, 2016). UNMISS has set up various Protection of Civilian sites (PoCs) throughout South Sudan for physical protection of civilians. Around 184,000 civilians were seeking protection in one of the PoCs next to an UNMISS compound (OCHA, 2016, p.29). Even though people might not be fleeing directly from violence, they are going to the PoCs due to the provision of food, which is an enormous pull factor: ‘Even if there is no fighting, people go towards where NGOs are working, because they know they receive services’ (Voigt, 2016, min. 26). The majority of the IDPs have fled to the PoC in Bentiu in Northern Unity State. Figure 11 shows the PoC in Bentiu from the air.
By mid-2018 a total of 4.21 million South Sudanese were displaced. 1.74 million had moved internally (IDPs) and 2.47 million had fled to neighboring countries (OCHA, 2018). Of the IDPs, a total of 269,723 reside in Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, which are located in eight of the ten states of the country (IOM, 2018).

3.4 Humanitarian assistance and poor governance

In 2016 South Sudan received US $ 1.59 billion of net official development assistance (ODA), out of which about half was dedicated to humanitarian assistance (World Bank, 2018). South Sudan has a long history of receiving aid dating back at least to the 1980s. One of the negative effects is that those in power and being responsible for providing aid to their people, do not feel responsible for doing so. Matthias Amling, working for Welthungerhilfe, describes his experience and impressions of the South Sudanese government and its responsibility for taking care of the people: ‘Well, we have to take care about the security of the country. But food security, that is your [the NGO’s] job, you are the NGO’ (Amling, 2016, min. 15). This observed attitude is supported by the fact that the government’s budget of 2016 only planned for government salaries and the army. It did not account for infrastructure, roads, schools or health as reported by Lena Voigt based in Juba (Voigt, 2016, min. 2). This decade long history of receiving aid has created an enormous dependency. Regarding the question if NGOs playing a substituting role with regards to government activities, both interviewees Amling and Voigt stated that it is certainly problematic (Amling, 2016, min. 15; Voigt, 2016, min. 6).

The government knows that WFP will drop the food. There are health partners, who replace the necessary structures that the government has to provide. Then I do think, there is only so much NGOs can actually do. Developing infrastructure for this country, I think no NGO could actually stem that. But then again, partly UNOPS is rebuilding some roads. And there are foreign firms, Chinese and Japanese. [...] The government knows that, of course they do. (Voigt, 2016, min. 5-6)
The result is a dilemma for humanitarian assistance. On the one hand, some parts of the aid are probably prolonging the war by, e.g., feeding people who fight. Even though this is not done intentionally, fighters benefit from aid programs through their families or communities. On the other hand, there are people close to famine. If humanitarian organizations leave, those people are left to their own destiny, often ending deadly. In those situations, can humanitarian organizations do anything “right”? Amling (2016, min. 19) suggests to think about how to minimize the negative impacts of a project, such as prolonging the war, while maximizing the humanitarian mandate to save lives and reduce suffering of people before starting and while implementing a project.

3.5 Infrastructure and humanitarian logistics

South Sudan’s extremely poor logistical infrastructure poses immense challenges to the provision of assistance. There is one tarmac road which connects Juba to Uganda, the Juba Nimule road. Besides, some of the main roads are asphalted within Juba. All other connections from east to west, from north to south are dirt roads. During the rainy season they are flooded leading to a stop of any transportation by land. On top of the very poor road infrastructure, the insecurity drastically hinders aid transports. Trucks have to stop at road blocks, pay illegal taxes, and at the same time all goods might get lost, sometimes even the driver (Voigt, 2016, min. 16-17). Staff movement of NGOs is usually conducted by the WFP organized UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). Food distributions throughout the country are airdropped by WFP after loading the aircrafts in Juba, Wau, Entebbe in Uganda, or neighboring Ethiopia. How this looks like is shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12: WFP food airdrops in South Sudan

At the PoC in Bentiu there is an airstrip big enough for big cargo planes to land. After unloading, the food is transported by trucks into the PoC (Voigt, 2016, min. 18-19). In those situations it is classified as an airlift of food, not as an airdrop. ‘In terms of logistics, South Sudan is a nightmare. It’s very time consuming, very expensive and a lot of work,’ reports Lena Voigt (2016, min. 18).

3.6 Type of protracted crisis

Getting back to the four types of protracted crises that OCHA (2015, p.5) outlines, as identified in Chapter 2.1 (p. 6), South Sudan can be classified as a combination of type one and three. It is a context affected by recurrent or cyclical slow-onset natural hazards, which are combined with medium-to-high-intensity conflict, chronic vulnerability and
elements of state fragility. In addition, with 1.6 million IDPs large amounts of internal displacement are observed and thereby the situation requires a political solution. Lena Voigt states: ‘This country has gone through all the worst parts of a conflict already’ (Voigt, 2016, min. 42).

3.7 Welthungerhilfe’s engagement in South Sudan

The German NGO Welthungerhilfe (WHH), also known as German Agro Action, has a longstanding history of delivering assistance in South Sudan. By early 2017, Welthungerhilfe was running two different operations in the country. The first operation in Unity was a pure emergency operation in the three areas of Ganyiel, Nyal and Bentiu. Measures taken in Unity were food distributions, including sorghum, millet, pulses, vegetable oil and salt; Non-Food Item (NFI) distributions, including mosquito nets, soap, pots and tarpaulins, and emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). Temporary school constructions were conducted in Southern Unity which are part of early recovery already, as well as the construction of latrines in schools and some communities (Voigt, 2016, min. 22; min 31). Vegetable gardening was carried out with women on the same project site. In the PoC in Bentiu WHH implemented food distribution on behalf of the WFP. Matthias Amling stresses how important coordination during food distributions among aid agencies is:

If you deliver the seeds before the general food distribution, then people eat the seeds. Of course, because they are hungry. If they ate the seeds, they don’t have any use for the tools and they will not harvest anything. So try to coordinate FAO and WFP that definitely general food distribution has to be there at the same time, or even a bit earlier, and then come the seeds. (Amling, 2016, min. 36-37)

Together with its Alliance 2015 partner Concern, WHH has assisted in the construction of shelters at the PoC in Bentiu (Amling, 2016, min. 31-32). Additionally, the NGO has been running grain mills. After receiving sorghum through the general food distributions, people can make use of those mills in order to produce flour.

The second operation that WHH was running in early 2017 was located in Nyamlel in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. This area has traditionally been calmer and thus offered more possibilities for recovery and development focused projects in line with the LRRD concept. Here WHH was focusing on food security, rural development and livelihoods through many agricultural activities in different steps. Measures taken were the distribution of seeds and tools, agricultural training on simple vegetable and crop production, pest management and irrigation schedules. Additionally, trainings on nutrition were provided on how to cook, how to prepare a healthy dish and what needs to be taken into account especially for children. In schools, WHH was conducting WASH clubs and hygiene training for students, parents and teachers. Projects with fuel-efficient stoves contributed to two improvements. First, less wood was cut and thus disaster risk reduction was enhanced. Second, people were more protected. Women who usually collected firewood did not have to leave their homes too far, which decreased the chances of getting sexually assaulted (Amling, 2016, min. 36-37). Besides, cash-for-work projects were used in order to construct dikes for flood protection or to build simple dirt roads in order to access hard to reach villages.
Lena Voigt, Program Coordinator at WHH in South Sudan, explained those projects: ‘Those are not development projects that you would roll-out in Latin America or India. They are still very basic and focus on livelihood recovery and a bit on market access. Still, they have traditional emergency components like cash-for-work or vouchers for assets’ (Voigt, 2016, min. 27). Cash-for-work, as part of Cash Transfer Programming (CTP), is a special type of money transfer which is gaining more and more prominence as part of preparedness, an emergency response or recovery. The idea is that cash is handed out to individuals or households in payment of labor provided, e.g. for road building, clearing debris or construction of dams to protect fields (Radtke, 2015, p.28). CTP is used as alternative or complementary to in-kind assistance. Two preconditions need to be fulfilled in order to make CTP work: there need to be existing markets with a functioning supply chain and stocks that can be filled in the future, and people need physical access to those markets (Welthungerhilfe, 2016). In addition to stimulating local economies and business for growth, CTP focuses on self-reliance for vulnerable populations (Cash Learning Partnership, 2016). It is thus a great measure for LRRD as it first and foremost assists people to survive, but also boosts local markets, increases demand and thus can initiate longer term rehabilitation and development. Towards the question how WHH includes parts in their projects that would enable the NGO to react to uncertain events as sudden violent outbreaks, Voigt (2016, min.27-29) answered that cash-for-work allows for great flexibility. Besides, she underlined that donors, mainly the German government, have been very flexible. ‘When we asked the donors to adapt a project and include a component to distribute fishing kits, for example, which is a good measure in the rainy season as people like to fish and it gives them immediate access to food, we always got those adjustments of ongoing projects approved’ (Voigt, 2016, min. 29).

In the Equatorias in the country’s south, WHH provided literacy training through a partner, gave courses on business skills such as basic accounting and saving, and loan associations were established in earlier projects. Besides, a lead-farmer approach was introduced for which the best performing farmer in the area was identified. The farmer would teach his fellows on why and how he is doing better, and in return would receive benefits as a fence around his farm or chickens from WHH. The big advantage of this approach is that the farmer does better in this context knowing the seasons, the parasites etc. Thus, local expertise is used instead of bringing in external knowledge (Amling, 2016, min. 37-38). Amling (2016, min. 38) remembers that it was difficult to defend such a project towards donors: ‘You have to explain well to the donors why you do this project in a country where actually people are starving. So you actually have to defend implementing LRRD projects’. Yet, the project periods in the Equatorias ran out and were not extended due to current insecurity (Voigt, 2016, min.31-35).

3.8 Learning from South Sudan: What works in a protracted crisis?

To sum up on the experience of Welthungerhilfe employees Lena Voigt and Matthias Amling in South Sudan, both interviewees were asked what they think works in a protracted crisis. For Matthias Amling the complimentarity between different actors, the humanitarian system, human rights and political actors, and the UN including the Security Council, as well as donor governments is crucial. He stressed the importance of a mutual understanding between actors and to keep in mind that all actors are valuable
in trying to tackle the same problems in a protracted crisis (Amling, 2016, min. 43-45). For Lena Voigt South Sudan is somehow a special protracted crisis, ‘because any part of the country can turn into an actual warzone again at any time’ (Voigt, 2016, min. 43). Projects that worked quite successfully for a while might be destroyed in just a bit of time, leaving their sustainable impacts equal to zero. In South Sudan the humanitarian needs are so severe that even the more stable parts have turned into emergency operations by today. Nevertheless, from their point of view, what really works in a protracted crisis are cash-for-work and vouchers. Cash interventions allow for flexibility in unpredictable events in a protracted crisis. Besides, it can be used as a tool in delivering humanitarian assistance, but also during rehabilitation and development phases. It is thus a great tool for making LRRD work in a protracted crisis. ‘It is a classic LRRD option. (Cash-for-work) rebuilds and at the same time allows people to build an income to somehow build a livelihood again’ (Voigt, 2016, min. 45-46).
4 Discussion: A changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises

In Chapters 2.1 and 2.2 the concept of LRRD and protracted crises are introduced. The case study of South Sudan is added in Chapter 3. In this chapter it is analyzed how the three previous chapters fit together. Before moving to the analysis, a short summary of the research results so far is provided. In Chapter 2.2.5 seven overarching challenges that the concept of LRRD faces in its implementation are outlined: The fundamental difference between the actors of humanitarian and development assistance, the lack of an internationally recognized definition of LRRD, separate budget lines for relief and development projects, earmarked funds, LRRD vs. humanitarian principles, capacity development for local people, the tendency of donors to prefer delivering aid in countries with a good policy record and carrying out LRRD from a donor’s, instead of a beneficiary’s perspective (Mosel & Levine, 2014, pp.6-7; Pérez de Armino, 2002; Macrae, 2012; Collinson and Elhawary, 2012; Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2009, p.16; Christopoulos, 2006). Next to those challenges, three main prerequisites for a successful implementation of LRRD are outlined in Chapter 2.2.6: First, LRRD is viewed as providing holistic support across a broad spectrum of circumstances and needs, instead of linking different kinds of aid. Second, the goal of LRRD needs to be to discover a different way of thinking about development assistance in protracted crises, instead of finding a new mechanism. The third prerequisite is that development instruments are more flexible and able to adapt to function in situations of unpredictability and crises, as well as changing needs of beneficiaries (Mosel & Levine, 2014 p.1; p.8).

In Chapter 2.1.4 it is outlined that protracted crises are among the most difficult contexts to intervene in for the international aid community. Protracted crises are marked by two fundamental problems. The first problem is that the project design in protracted crises is often inadequate. Interventions are planned for short crises followed by a return to a certain degree of long-term improvement, failing to pay attention to the reoccurring crisis peaks in protracted crises (FAO, 2010, p.17). The second problem is that development assistance is commonly weak in protracted crises. This is linked to the perception of development as being a linear process, gradually improving the quality of life. Besides, five actions are identified in Chapter 2.1.4 which can work in protracted crises: i) working with two simultaneous timelines, namely one planning week to week, the other two to five years ahead (ICRC, 2016), ii) multi-year programming and financing instead of one-year planning (OCHA, 2015), iii) development interventions focusing on basic needs are complementary to humanitarian action in rather peaceful areas of the country and during calmer periods (ICRC, 2016, p.21; Amling, 2016, min. 22), iv) three types of interventions to guarantee food security are livelihood provision, protection or promotion (FAO, 2010, p.20) and v) the re-examination of approaches by donors in order to create a common space for humanitarian and development actors to exist and tackle the whole range of problems (Bennett, 2015, p.5). Additionally, Lena Voigt (2016) outlined that cash-for-work and vouchers work well in settings of protracted crises (Voigt, 2016, min. 45-46). In the end this adds up to six actions that work in a protracted crisis.
Those results lead to the following statement. On the LRRD side it needs to be the goal to discover a different way of thinking about development assistance in protracted crises, while on the protracted crises side a fundamental problem is the weakness of development assistance. From this point the paper’s research question can be deducted: How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? LRRD can become a practical tool for assistance in multi-layered problematic contexts, if the concept succeeds in delivering developed assistance in protracted crises. But how to make it work? In the following, practical instructions are given on how LRRD becomes a successful tool in multi-layered problematic contexts.

4.1 Changing perspective on LRRD

To begin with, a changed perspective on the concept of LRRD is needed, if LRRD should be able to tackle the two fundamental problems of protracted crises. Throughout this chapter a general understanding of LRRD in protracted crises is developed and finalized in Figure 13. Point of origin for the analysis is Figure 5 as introduced in Chapter 2.2.1.

Figure 13: Definitions of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development co-operation

![Figure 13: Definitions of emergency aid, rehabilitation and development co-operation](image)

Source: Welthungerhilfe, 2009, p.6

Yet, this presentation of the LRRD components is not adequate for protracted crises. Why? Because clear-cut categorizations are inapplicable in contexts that are characterized by reoccurring periods of crises and disasters, while also living through
calmer periods and in more stable areas. The red circles highlight those parts of Figure 5 which are not applicable as such in protracted crises. Within this chapter each red circle is addressed and a suggestion is made on what to do differently in protracted crises. The selection of the red circles is based on results from Chapter 2.1 underlining what works in a protracted crisis, and Chapter 3 contributing practical examples from Welthungerhilfe’s engagement in South Sudan. The parts within the rehabilitation and development co-operation columns that are not encircled in red are not further regarded within the development of a changed perspective on the LRRD concept. Reasons for that are that some are too political such as the restoration of political and social stability as an objective of the rehabilitation phase and thus hardly combinable with the humanitarian principles guiding the emergency phase. Another reason is that certain aspects, such as the rule of law as precondition for development co-operation, were not focused on within Chapters 2.1, 2.2 or 3. As such, a lack of evidence resulting from those chapters leads to the exclusion of the aspects not encircled.

Starting with the preconditions mentioned in Figure 5 a question of threshold arises. When are the preconditions of cease-fire in the rehabilitation phase and stable economic-political conditions for development co-operation as identified in Figure 5 reached? Even if this threshold is clarified, another problem would arise. If rehabilitation and development projects are only initiated once the theoretical threshold is met, those projects would likely not be implemented in a protracted crisis due to its unstable nature. Consequently, it would contribute to the fundamental problem of development assistance being weak, or even completely absent. Furthermore, a point of criticism is that the humanitarian principles mentioned under Precondition in Figure 5 are a way of working during a project, but not a precondition. Thus, the category Precondition is changed into the category Definition in the following table. For that purpose, the definitions of a protracted crisis as established by FAO (2010, pp.12-13) and the Humanitarian Coalition (2016) outlined in Chapter 2.1 are used. Additionally, four types of protracted crises identified by OCHA (2015, p.5) are added to the table. Regarding the timeframes, often, and in many locations, in a protracted crisis the emergency phase is not short-term, but permanent, or at least reoccurring with high frequency. On the other hand, the timeframes for rehabilitation and development co-operation might be only short-or medium-term in a protracted crisis, depending on the timing of a new crisis peak. It is thus more applicable to speak of a mixed timeframe of certain permanent emergency parts, and short- and medium-term rehabilitation and development co-operation phases. FAO (2010, pp. 12-13) defines the timeframe of a protracted crisis as covering at least eight years. The first part of a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises based on Figure 5 thus looks like this:
As the timeframe changes, the objectives of all three phases are mixed. Ensuring survival and saving of human life as mentioned in Figure 5 under emergency aid are accompanied by the security of the population’s livelihood as mentioned under the rehabilitation phase, and tentative development processes, strengthened capacity for self-help and an improvement of living conditions usually affiliated with the development co-operation phase. Examples of Welthungerhilfe’s work in South Sudan demonstrate this mixture of objectives in the NGO’s interventions. Food and NFI distributions, as well as emergency WASH projects of WHH in Unity State are focusing on ensuring survival and saving of human life (Voigt, 2016, min. 22; min. 31). Vegetable gardening and the distribution of seeds and tools aim at securing the population’s livelihood. The lead-farmer approach implemented in the Equatorias in southern South Sudan focuses on developing local capacity and multiplying local expertise, which is an approach to strengthen capacity for self-help (Amling, 2016, min. 36-37). Even though the shelter construction, as well as the provision of grain mills in the PoC in Bentiu is conducted in an emergency setting, it aims at improving the living conditions within the PoC.

Considering the mixture of objectives from the emergency, rehabilitation and development phase, the two parallel timelines recommend by the ICRC (2016, p.6) become important. Timeline 1 covers activities from week to week being able to react quickly to unpredictable changes on the ground, while Timeline 2 allows for planning of activities two to five years ahead aiming to work more focused on various health, water, livelihood and protection systems. Crucially, both timelines are implemented simultaneously. Thus, the second part of a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises would look like this:
With regards to the measures taken in each phase, those regularly deployed in the emergency aid phase are extended in protracted crises by the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and distribution of means of production, like seeds and tools, as mentioned in the rehabilitation phase in Figure 5. Besides, training and supply for work materials in calmer areas, as well as the issuing of loans or grants commonly used in development co-operation are added to measures taken in a protracted crisis aiming at meeting the objectives outlined above. Examples from Welthungerhilfe’s engagement in South Sudan underline the validity of this extension of measures. In Southern Unity WHH has constructed temporary school buildings, as well as latrines for schools and some communities (Voigt, 2016, min. 23; min. 31). Part of the reconstruction of basic infrastructure in South Sudan is the construction of dikes for flood protection and the building of simple dirt roads (Amling, 2016, min. 36). Means of production such as seeds and tools have been distributed in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. In the same WHH project site, agricultural trainings focused on crop and vegetable production, pest management and irrigation schedules were conducted. Additionally, trainings focused on nutrition, literacy and basic business skills in both Northern Bahr el Ghazal and the Equatorias are implemented as measures in South Sudan. WASH clubs and hygiene trainings for students, teachers and parents are carried out in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Loans and grants were issued in WHH’s projects in the southern part of the country.

Even though implementing projects purely focused on the protection of civilians is not the main focus of WHH’s work, the introduction of fuel-efficient stoves in Northern Bahr el Ghazal contributed to the protection of civilians, mainly girls and women. Firewood had not to be collected from far away, thus reducing the risk of sexual assault on the way. Figure 5 lists education and protection as one measure. However, each of them has such a substantial, own role to play in emergency assistance that they are mentioned as two separate measures in the following table. With regards to the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons within the rehabilitation phase it is crucial to link back to Chapter 2.1.2 on Forced Displacement. As the average length of displacement period is 17 years, repatriation of displaced people is not an appropriate measure in protracted crises. As learned from South Sudan, interventions with cash-for-work and vouchers work well in protracted crises. They allow for flexibility in unpredictable events, focus on the stimulation of local economies and business growth, and aim to enhance self-reliance of beneficiaries. Cash-for-work and vouchers are thus added to the measures taken in a protracted crisis.

Last but not least, the related terms for each phase also need to be adapted as emergency relief aid, immediate aid, disaster response, survival aid, food aid,
reconstruction, development aid and development co-operation take place simultaneously and can thus not be divided into three phases. Adding the last parts on measures and related terms, a changed perspective of LRRD in protracted crises as based on ideas of Figure 5 is demonstrated in Figure 16. It enables a look at protracted crises through different LRRD lenses.

**Figure 16: Changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises**

| Definition | A country reporting a food crisis for eight years or more, receiving more than 10% of foreign assistance as humanitarian relief, and being on FAO’s list of Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries. Besides, a significant portion of the population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods. |
| Four Types | a) Recurrent or cyclical slow-onset natural hazards + low-intensity conflict, chronic vulnerability and elements of state-fragility. Example: Horn of Africa<br>b) Low-frequency but high-intensity natural hazards + pre-existing chronic vulnerabilities + environmental degradation, epidemics and displacement. Example: Haiti<br>c) Medium-to-high intensity conflict + large amounts of displacement + need for political solution. Examples: Syria, Iraq, Yemen<br>d) Middle-income states hosting large influxes of refugees from neighboring countries, who possess a strong capacity and substantial domestic resources to manage the crisis. Examples: Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon |
| Timeframe | Minimum of eight years with permanent emergency parts and short to medium term rehabilitation and development co-operation phases |
| Objectives | • Ensuring survival (Timeline 1)<br>• Saving of human life (Timeline 1)<br>• Security of population’s livelihood (Timeline 1+2)<br>• Tentative development processes (Timeline 2)<br>• Improvement of living conditions (Timeline 2)<br>Note: Timeline 1 and 2 happen simultaneously |
| Measures | • Distribution of food, blankets and tents<br>• Provision of drinking water<br>• Medical provision<br>• Basic education<br>• Protection<br>• Reconstruction of basic infrastructure<br>• Distribution of means of production (seeds, tools)<br>• Training and supply of work materials<br>• Issuing loans or grants<br>• Cash-for-work and vouchers |
| Related Terms | Emergency relief aid, immediate aid, disaster response, survival aid, food aid, reconstruction, development aid, development co-operation |

Source: Own composition, based on Welthungerhilfe model, 2016
This table demonstrates a generalization of a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises. As every context is individual, there are individual exceptions and differences. Nevertheless, Figure 16 helps in changing perspective on the LRRD concept in order to make it work in protracted crises. When applying Figure 16 three things need to be taken into account. First, in order to be able to work with the changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises, an implementing organization needs to be multi-mandated, thus focusing on relief, rehabilitation and development. For other organizations, this mixture of objectives and measures is not implementable - or only in very close cooperation with other organizations.

Second, the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality are guiding humanitarian assistance. Relief organizations often work around the local government. In contrast, development assistance is focusing on working through and with local governments, with an ultimate goal of strengthening these institutions. When mixing relief, rehabilitation and development measures and objectives as in Figure 16 the challenge of complying with humanitarian principles and simultaneously working on rehabilitation and development cooperation needs to be acknowledged. Matthias Amling supports the difficulty inherent in this mixture. However, he also sees a possibility how humanitarian assistance, if done well, can also be about supporting structures.

It's not about supporting structures that are part of the conflict, but it's more about civil society structures. Practically, it makes a lot of sense to do both (humanitarian and development assistance) at the same time. Yet, there is some relevance to separating humanitarian assistance [...] from development. (Amling, 2016, min. 39-41)

For Amling the key to work well in a protracted crisis, while recognizing the difficult circumstances, is the complimentarity between different actors. Multi-mandated organizations should be the implementers of the changed perspective on LRRD. Amling (2016, min.42-43) underlines that ‘sometimes it is also good to have very clear and nearly dogmatic humanitarian agencies as MSF, and at the same time multi-mandated organizations working with the new humanitarianism’ (see Figure 6). This complimentarity of actors allows for a separation of tasks within the humanitarian community. Besides, a main dilemma of speaking out against crimes and inequalities observed vs. loosing access to people in need can be tackled through this complimentarity. Even though some organizations might lose access, others can usually stay (Amling, 2016, min.43).

Third, when evaluating a project Mosel & Levine (2014, p.16) argue that the ‘LRRD-ness’ of a project cannot be evaluated as such. Rather they suggest that the approach must be about evaluating a project for being a good development project, e.g. being closely targeted at preventing the most vulnerable people from falling into crisis. They suggest eight key aspects that evaluators of LRRD programs should keep in mind: How suitable was the program for a situation where crises are the norm? How well was the program able to meet the changing needs of the most vulnerable? How appropriate was its design for insecure environments with a constantly changing context? How well did the program consider the politicization of aid and resources? How has long-term work helped in crises, e.g. by reducing risks or strengthening coping mechanisms?
well has the program encouraged links on the ground between people and institutions that support them on the long run? In case there was only short-term aid given, could support have been more effective if given in a longer-term way? How adequate were the strategy processes, the level of context and political analysis, the appropriateness of the models employed, current impact and likely future impact? Those eight key questions could be used for evaluating the usefulness and applicability of Figure 16. As such an evaluation would exceed the limits of this paper; it is suggested to focus on this topic during another research project.

4.2 How the changed perspective on LRRD can benefit in protracted crises

Having established a changed perspective on LRRD within Figure 16, the first step is taken towards answering this paper’s research question: How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? This can mainly be done through a combination of measures and objectives of the relief, rehabilitation and development phases where possible. In a next step, guidance is given on how to operationalize the concept developed in Figure 16. The operationalization is crucial so that the changed perspective on LRRD can actually work and fulfill the goal of benefitting in protracted crises. The starting point of analysis is protracted crises. Their most important parts are summarized again in Figure 17.

**Figure 17: Key knowledge on protracted crises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two fundamental problems</th>
<th>Six actions that can work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Inadequate project design aiming to tackle a short crises followed by a return to development processes</td>
<td>• Working with two timelines:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weakness of development assistance and notion of development being a linear process</td>
<td>a) Week to week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Two to five years ahead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Multi-year programming and financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development activities in rather calm areas and during calmer periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Livelihood provision, protection or promotion to guarantee food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Re-examination of donor approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cash-for-work and vouchers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own composition

The LRRD concept needs to provide an answer towards those two fundamental problems. Besides, LRRD measures that support the six actions that can work in protracted crises have to be taken. Figure 18 revises the main issues regarding LRRD as identified in Chapter 2.2.
Figure 18: Key knowledge on LRRD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticism</th>
<th>Challenges for the implementation</th>
<th>Prerequisites for success</th>
<th>Key principles for success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• One-directional focus from one aid phase to the next</td>
<td>• Provision of development assistance in protracted crises</td>
<td>• Providing holistic support across a broad spectrum of circumstances and needs</td>
<td>• Flexibility: ability to react to uncertain and unpredictable change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development assistance is inapplicable in complex emergencies</td>
<td>• Fundamental differences between humanitarian and development assistance</td>
<td>• Different way of thinking about development assistance in protracted crises</td>
<td>• Take risks and be open to learning through real-time monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of institutional capacities leads to a failure of LRRD in fragile states</td>
<td>• Lack of definition. LRRD can be:</td>
<td>• Development instruments that are more flexible and able to adapt to unpredictability and changing needs</td>
<td>• Program is based on and accompanied by an extensive context and political analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hard to implement LRRD when NGOs are increasingly controlled by governments</td>
<td>o bureaucratic/structural issue</td>
<td>• Separate budget lines for humanitarian and development projects</td>
<td>• Joint analysis and planning of assistance by beneficiaries, academics, and government bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development as (neo)liberal model</td>
<td>o programmatic mechanism</td>
<td>• Earmarked funds (location and activity)</td>
<td>• Cooperation with local institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Donor fail to respond to complex contexts</td>
<td>o modality</td>
<td>• Lacking resources for disaster warning systems</td>
<td>• Realistic programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lost humanitarian principles through politicization of aid</td>
<td>• Separate budget lines for humanitarian and development projects</td>
<td>• LRRD vs. humanitarian principles</td>
<td>• Expert staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aid as instrument for peace</td>
<td>• Earmarked funds (location and activity)</td>
<td>• Lacking capacity development</td>
<td>• Aid allocation not needs based, but based on donors’ interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Too high expectations towards aid (e.g. rebuild societies)</td>
<td>• Lacking resources for disaster warning systems</td>
<td>• Provision of development assistance in protracted crises</td>
<td>• Flexibility: ability to react to uncertain and unpredictable change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own composition
A prerequisite for success of the changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises as demonstrated in Figure 16 is that criticism towards LRRD, challenges it faces in its implementation, perquisites and key principles for its success are taken into account. With this knowledge in mind, Figure 16 can be put into practice. It is tested towards the key knowledge on LRRD as demonstrated in Figure 18 in the following. Regarding the nine points of criticism it has to be clear that also the changed perspective on LRRD will not be able to satisfy all critics of the traditional LRRD approach. Nevertheless, some might become more convinced of the usability of LRRD. The nine points of criticism can be addressed in three different degrees by Figure 16. First, the points lack of institutional capacities leads to a failure of LRRD in fragile states, hard to implement LRRD when NGOs are controlled increasingly by governments, and development as (neo) liberal model will probably not be enhanced by a changed perspective on LRRD. The lack of institutional capacities in fragile states and the control of NGOs by governments are linked to the political context, which cannot be changed by humanitarian actors. Development actors might have some possibilities to work on both, yet only to a very limited extent when realistically accepting the limits of providing assistance. Seeing development as a (neo) liberal model links to a broader discussion on the purpose of development and does not just lie within the scope of a changed perspective on LRRD.

Second, two points of criticism might be addressed by making sure that expectations towards the impact that humanitarian and development assistance can have, are lowered. Those two are aid as instrument for peace, and too high expectations towards aid. As the changed perspective on LRRD regards the emergency phase as being permanent, and development activities only being possible occasionally in less crises affected areas and times, the concept acknowledges the rather limited role, e.g. in terms of changing society, that humanitarian and development assistance can have in protracted crises. A third point of criticism that could be tackled to some extent is the loss of humanitarian principles through the politicization of aid. It is acknowledged that the mix of relief, rehabilitation and development measures and objectives as demonstrated in Figure 16 poses a challenge to the compliance with humanitarian principles as they are meant to guide humanitarian assistance alone. However, as the emergency phase is regarded as a permanent one guided by the humanitarian principles, and development interventions are only possible to a limited extent, the danger of politicization of aid is lower. The humanitarian principles remain the guiding concept of action. Nevertheless, a certain risk probably always remains as soon as development activities are included in an emergency context, caused by the nature of development assistance being political.

Third, three points of criticism towards LRRD can be addressed by a changed perspective on LRRD. Those are donor fail to respond to complex contexts, one-directional focus from one aid phase to the next, and development assistance is inapplicable in complex emergencies. If objectives are acknowledged, and measures are implemented as outlined in Figure 16, interventions would be able to respond to complex contexts. Especially through recognizing the emergency phase as being of permanent nature with occasional possibilities for development interventions, the focus lies on both sectors of assistance. Besides, the idea of a linear process from one aid phase to another is rejected in Figure 16 and reoccurring peaks of crisis are taken into account. Furthermore, the mere point of criticism of development assistance being
inapplicable in complex emergencies might be valid if only regarded as single intervention line. However, if development assistance is closely coordinated with relief measures and implemented in areas affected less by crises, development assistance might actually be applicable in complex emergencies, at least serving as a window of opportunity in parts of the country.

Next to those points of criticism, Figure 18 displays three additional important issues of LRRD. Those three are the challenges for its implementation, as well as prerequisites and key principles for the success of LRRD. The following analysis sheds light on the degree to which the changed perspective of LRRD can tackle the challenges for the implementation of LRRD mentioned in Figure 18. Can all challenges towards the implementation of LRRD mentioned be solved by a changed perspective? Utopian! Nevertheless, some may be addressed. Tackling the main challenge of development assistance being weak in protracted crises is addressed in Figure 16. Objectives encompass tentative development processes and improvement of living conditions. Besides, suggested measures involve the distribution of means of production, reconstruction of basic infrastructure, training and supply of work materials, as well as issuing of loans or grants—measures that are usually taken in rehabilitation and development interventions. The challenge of separate budget lines between humanitarian and development assistance can be addressed as the objectives of LRRD in protracted crises involve parts from both assistance groups as demonstrated in Figure 16. Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that those separate budget lines are often deeply rooted in institutional divides and require an own change. However, the challenges of the fundamental differences between humanitarian and development assistance and the definitional lack of LRRD will not be addressed by a changed perspective on LRRD. Those challenges root from the past and require different and especially deeper changes to be managed.

The challenges of earmarked funds and lacking resources for disaster warning systems are both not explicitly mentioned in Figure 16, thus not addressed directly. The challenge of LRRD vs. humanitarian principles has been discussed above under the same point of criticism (see earlier paragraph). The lack of capacity development for the local population is a prominent challenge in humanitarian and development interventions, thus not only for LRRD. However, Figure 16 includes measures focusing on capacity development as training and supply of work materials, issuing loans or grants, and cash-for-work and vouchers. The challenge that aid allocation is not done based on needs, but on donors’ interest is part of general donor approaches. The need for a re-examination of donor approaches is also outlined as one out of six actions that might work in a protracted crisis. However, it is not addressed specifically in Figure 16, the same applies to the last challenge of having expert staff on the project side.

The three prerequisites of LRRD mentioned in Figure 18 are met by the changed perspective of LRRD in Figure 16. First, the changed perspective provides holistic support across a broad spectrum of circumstances and needs as it includes measures from the classical relief phase, but also rehabilitation and basic development co-operation components. Second, offering a different way of thinking about development assistance in protracted crisis is the main goal of Figure 16. Third, development instruments that are more flexible and able to adapt to unpredictability and changing needs are included in Figure 16 mainly due to the two timelines, as well as cash and vouchers interventions. The only
LRRD component left of Figure 18 are the six key principles for a successful LRRD concept. Those lead to the connection between LRRD and the six actions that might work in protracted crises on an operational level. Distracting the relevant sequences from Figures 17 and 18 it can be noticed that both are complementing each other in various points. The related points are placed next to each in Figure 19.

**Figure 19: Overlap between action points in protracted crises and LRRD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six actions that can work in protracted crises</th>
<th>Key principles for success in LRRD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working with two timelines:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Week to week</td>
<td>Flexibility: ability to react to uncertain and unpredictable change,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Two to five years ahead</td>
<td>Realistic programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-year programming and financing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-for-work and vouchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development activities in rather calm areas</td>
<td>Take risks and be open to learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood provision, protection or promotion to guarantee food security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-examination of donor approaches</td>
<td>Program is based on and accompanied by an extensive context and political analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint analysis and planning of assistance by beneficiaries, academics, government bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with local institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own composition

The two timelines, multi-year programming and financing, as well as cash-for-work and voucher interventions allow for flexibility. Thereby, they enable the implementing agency to react to uncertain and unpredictable change as required for a successful LRRD implementation. Furthermore, realistic programming is enhanced through the three actions. Development activities in calmer areas in a protracted crisis call for taking more risks and be open to learning through real-time monitoring as needed for a working LRRD concept. The two further points of action in protracted crises of livelihood provision, protection or promotion to guarantee food security and a re-examination of donor approaches might not be directly connected to one of the other three key principles for a successful LRRD intervention. Nevertheless, they do not contradict each other. Rather, they are indirectly connected as the re-examination of donor approaches requires cooperation with local institutions (see Chapter 2.1.4).

Putting Chapter 4 in a nutshell, an answer can be given to the paper’s research question: How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? It has been demonstrated in Figure 19 that with the six key principles to make LRRD a success, and the six actions that work in protracted crises both concepts complement each other and overlap in various points. Within Chapter 4 it was shown that making use of LRRD in protracted crises has several substantial merits.
In Figure 16 the LRRD concept was tailored to protracted crises. With the objectives and measures of a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises as outlined in Figure 16, LRRD has the potential to tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises.
5 Conclusion

Throughout this paper the focus was to find an answer to the research question: How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? Theoretical knowledge and the case study of South Sudan were introduced in Chapters 2 to 3, while the results from those chapters were discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 2.2 is dedicated to the concept of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. The concept was explained, as well as its development including the continuum vs. contiguum models. Besides, nine points of criticism, as well as ten challenges and three prerequisites for the implementation of LRRD were outlined. Last but not least, six key principles for a successful LRRD implementation were highlighted. Those are the flexibility of a project to react to uncertain and unpredictable events, the willingness to take risks and be open to learning, the program needs to be based on an extensive context and political analysis, a joint analysis and planning of assistance needs to be done by various actors, cooperation with local institutions needs to take place and overall realistic programming is crucial.

The main results from Chapter 2.1 are that there are various definitions of a protracted crisis, yet within this paper the two of FAO (2010, pp.12-13) and the Humanitarian Coalition (2016) are used. Besides, four types of protracted crises were outlined by OCHA (2015, p.5) and five common characteristics of protracted crises were identified by FAO (2010, p.12). Those are long duration, conflict, weak governance or public administration, unsustainable livelihood systems and poor food security outcomes, as well as the breakdown of local institutions. The levels of food insecurity are often extremely high. Compared to all developing countries, protracted crises report an undernourishment rate nearly three times higher (see Figure 1). Next to food insecurity, protracted displacement is a common feature of protracted crises. The average period of displacement is 17 years (UNDP, 2016). Development assistance in protracted crises is commonly weak. Those countries receive substantially higher proportions of humanitarian compared to development assistance, they receive lower amounts of aid in general and humanitarian activities in protracted crises expand to those usually provided by recovery or early development activities. This expansion of humanitarian work is causing major problems. Reasons for that are that humanitarian approaches are neither set up to handle deep-rooted structural problems, nor do they have the capacity, nor the funding to respond to fundamental problems. Besides, humanitarian organizations are under threat to be subsidizing the government, distancing themselves from their humanitarian mandate and contributing to the problems. Finally, five actions were identified that work in a protracted crisis: working with two timelines, one from week to week, the other two to five years ahead, multi-year programming and financing, development activities in rather calm areas and during calmer periods, livelihood provision, protection or promotion to guarantee food security, as well as a re-examination of donor approaches.

After those two rather theoretical chapters, the case study of South Sudan was introduced in Chapter 3. South Sudan is known as symbolizing a protracted crisis as people have suffered for decades from continuous circles of armed violence, as well as extreme annual weather conditions. The food insecurity situation in South Sudan is
extremely severe and a decade-long history of food distributions by humanitarian organizations has lead to a lack of responsibility by the government. South Sudan has been identified as a context affected by recurrent or cyclical slow-onset natural hazards, which are combined with medium-to-high-intensity conflict, chronic vulnerability and elements of state fragility. In addition, large numbers of internal displacement are observed and thereby the situation requires a political solution. Concrete examples of engagement in South Sudan were given through the work of the German NGO Welthungerhilfe. WHH is running one emergency operation and another one focused on recovery and tentative development co-operation. The two main lessons learnt from WHH’s engagement in South Sudan for what works in a protracted crisis are the complimentarity between various actors, and working with cash and voucher interventions.

The main results of this research paper are discussed in Chapter 4. Building on the previous results, the research question was identified: How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises? The first step towards answering the question was the development of a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises (see Figure 16). Working with the previously collected results the changed perspective of LRRD includes a definition of protracted crises, the four types identified by OCHA (2015, p.5), a timeframe, objectives, measures and related terms. In order to answer this paper’s research question, especially the objectives and measures as identified in Figure 16 are relevant. The objectives include the ensuring of survival, saving of human life, the security of the population’s livelihood, tentative development processes and an improvement of living conditions. Crucially those objectives are implemented during two parallel timelines. The first two objectives are only part of timeline one planning week to week, as they are relevant in an emergency phase. Securing the population’s livelihood can be done during timeline one, but also partly within timeline two which plans two to five years ahead. Tentative development processes and an improvement of living conditions are components followed exclusively during timeline two. The main organization advocating for those two timelines is the ICRC (2016). The proposed measures are important for putting the changed perspective of LRRD in protracted crises in place. Those encompass the distribution of food, blankets and tents, the provision of drinking water and medicine, basic education, protection, the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, distribution of means of production, training and supply of work materials, the issuing of loans or grants, as well as cash-for-work and voucher interventions. Even though it has been the goal of LRRD to tackle the weakness of development assistance for a long time, it has often failed to result in successful work on the ground. This mixture of measures proposed in Figure 16, which are compiled from the emergency, rehabilitation and early development co-operation phase, offers a different approach towards changing perspective on LRRD in protracted crises. Thereby, this paper contributes to the existing literature.

In order to prove this changed perspective against the general criticism towards and challenges of LRRD as introduced in Chapter 2.2 an analysis was conducted in Chapter 4.2. Furthermore, an objective of the analysis was to outline how exactly the suggested six actions in protracted crises are in line with the six key principles for a successful LRRD approach. The results are that the changed perspective on LRRD can
satisfy the nine points of criticism towards LRRD in general to three different degrees. Some cannot be addressed, others partly and again others can be satisfied. The same result can be drawn for the ability of the changed perspective on LRRD to meet the general challenges for the implementation of LRRD as mentioned in Chapter 2.2. Four out of ten challenges can be addressed by Figure 16, thus contributing to making LRRD work more successfully. Besides, three prerequisites are mentioned in Chapter 2.2 to make LRRD work at all. All three of them can be fulfilled with the changed perspective on LRRD.

When putting the six actions that work in a protracted crisis next to the key principles for success in LRRD (see Figure 19) it can be concluded that four actions in protracted crises overlap with two key principles for success in LRRD. Thereby reason is given for why LRRD should be applied exactly in contexts of protracted crises. Putting all results of this paper together, the research question ‘How can a changed perspective on LRRD tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises?’ can be answered. Figure 16 tailored the LRRD concept to protracted crises. With the objectives and measures of a changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises, LRRD has the potential to tackle the weakness of development assistance in protracted crises. The implications of this study are that first and foremost a changed perspective of the previously existing LRRD concept was developed. As this study builds on existing literature, current studies conducted by leading humanitarian, development and research organizations, as well as the case study of South Sudan, the analysis of this mixture of information adds an interesting contribution to existing research. A suggested future research topic is to evaluate the usefulness and the level of applicability of Figure 16 with the eight key questions suggested by Mosel & Levine (2014, p. 16; Chapter 6.1).

Coming back to the fire story from the introduction: Can the changed perspective on LRRD in protracted crises help in that scenario? Yes. It can help to generate a better coordinated, joint response of humanitarian and development actors towards ‘a fire’ and enhance the conditions for people possibly affected by ‘the fire’. Finally, through the changed perspective on LRRD the chances can be minimized, or even eradicated, that affected people return into the vicious cycle of harming effects of protracted crises.
Glossary

**Complex emergency**: A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program (IASC, 1994).

**Disaster Risk Reduction**: The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR, 2009).

**Early recovery**: A multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is an integrated and coordinated approach, using humanitarian mechanisms, to gradually turn the dividends of humanitarian action into sustainable crisis recovery, resilience building and development opportunities (UNDP, 2008). The term is mainly used within UN organizations. UNDP is the responsible UN organization for early recovery (Addis & Dijkzeul, 2013).

**Food (in)security**: WFP (2016) considers people being food secure when they have available access at all times to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. In contrast, food insecurity exists when people do not have adequate physical, social or economic access to food (FAO, 2003).

**Forgotten crisis**: Severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is no political commitment to solve the crisis, due in part to a lack of media interest (ECHO, 2016).

**Fragile states**: There is no standard international definition of fragile statehood. Fragile states are those in which state institutions are very weak or at risk of collapse, and whose populations suffer from widespread poverty, violence and arbitrary rule. Women, children and ethnic or religious minorities are especially affected, A state’s fragility may also correlate with a lack of legitimacy (BMZ, 2016).

**Humanitarian assistance**: Is generally accepted to mean the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003 a)).

**Humanitarian principles**: The four humanitarian principles are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These principles provide the foundations for humanitarian action. They are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people, whether in a natural disaster or a complex emergency, such as armed conflict. Promoting and ensuring compliance with the principles are essential elements of effective humanitarian coordination (OCHA, 2012a).
**Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings (OCHA, 2012a).

**Impartiality:** Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions (OCHA, 2012a).

**Independence:** Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented (OCHA, 2012a).

**LRRD:** Liking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. The concept aims to link relief and development agendas in temporal terms (Bennett, 2015, p.11).

**Neutrality:** Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature (OCHA, 2012a).

**Official Development Assistance:** Those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). (OECD, 2016).

**Protracted crisis:** Countries reporting a food crisis for eight years or more, receiving more than 10% of foreign assistance as humanitarian relief, and being on FAO’s list of Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (FAO, 2010, pp.12-13). Protracted crises are situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods (Humanitarian Coalition, 2016).

**Rehabilitation:** An overall, dynamic and intermediate strategy of institutional reform and reinforcement, of reconstruction and improvement of infrastructure and services, supporting the initiatives and actions of the populations concerned, in the political, economic and social domains, and aimed towards the resumption of sustainable development (European Commission, 1996).

**Resilience:** The ability of individuals, communities, organizations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from, the effects of adversity without compromising their long-term prospects (IFRC, 2012).

**Rights-based approach:** A human rights-based approach is a conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. It seeks to analyze inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress (UNICEF, 2016).
Vulnerability: The diminished capacity of an individual or group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard (IFRC, 2016).
References


Annex

Interview with Matthias Amling, member of the Humanitarian Assistance Team at Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. in Germany on 20. October 2016.

Interview with Lena Voigt, Program Coordinator at Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. in South Sudan on 21. October 2016.

Note: Interviews can be made available upon request.
### List of published IFHV Working Papers

| Vol. 1, No. 1 | Huseyn Aliyev | 03/2011 | Aid Efficiency in an Armed Conflict  
|--------------|---------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Vol. 1, No. 2 | Matteo Garavoglia | 08/2011 | Germany's Humanitarian Aid and Media Reporting on Natural Catastrophes  
| Vol. 2, No. 1 | Jan Wulf | 05/2012 | A Balanced Scorecard for the Humanitarian Sector?  
| Vol. 2, No. 2 | Johannes Beck | 08/2012 | Contested Land in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo  
| Vol. 3, No. 2 | Heiko Fabian Königstein | 10/2013 | The Influence of Mental Health on Reconciliation in Post-War Lebanon  
An Explorative Field Based Study Using Grounded Theory Research | http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp3_2.pdf |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>DOI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 4, No. 2</td>
<td>05/2014</td>
<td>Nazanin Bagherzadeh</td>
<td>Death in Disaster</td>
<td>Actions and Attitudes towards Dead Body Management after Disasters in Yogyakarta</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp4_2.pdf">Link</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 4, No. 3</td>
<td>05/2014</td>
<td>Steven Engler, Johannes Kösters and Anne Siebert</td>
<td>Farmers Food Insecurity Monitoring</td>
<td>Identifying Situations of Food Insecurity and Famine</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp4_3.pdf">Link</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 5, No. 1</td>
<td>07/2015</td>
<td>J.Lily Gardener</td>
<td>Under the Ash Cloud</td>
<td>Gender Distinctions in the Resilience of Kemiri Community towards Mount Merapi Volcanic Activity</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp5_1.pdf">Link</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 5 No. 2</td>
<td>09/2015</td>
<td>Benedikt Behlert</td>
<td>Die Unabhängigkeit der Krim</td>
<td>Annexion oder Sezession?</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp5_2.pdf">Link</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 5, No. 3</td>
<td>10/2015</td>
<td>Ronja Keweloh</td>
<td>Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaption in Theory and Practice</td>
<td>A Case Study of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in Asia</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp5_3.pdf">Link</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 6, No. 2</td>
<td>12/2016</td>
<td>Janina Bröhl</td>
<td>To Deliver and Stay Secure</td>
<td>Adhering to the Four Humanitarian Principles in the Face of Kidnapping Threats in Insecure Environments</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifhv.de/documents/workingpapers/wp6_2.pdf">Link</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Manuscripts can be submitted to the editors:
Prof. Dr. Pierre Thielbörger, ifhv@rub.de
Tobias Ackermann, ifhv@rub.de
Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV)

The Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (Institut für Friedenssicherungsrecht und Humanitäres Völkerrecht, IFHV) was established in 1988 by decision of the University Senate as a central research unit (‘Zentrale Wissenschaftliche Einrichtung’) of the Ruhr University Bochum. The IFHV is responsible directly to the Rector and the Senate of the Ruhr University Bochum, but works in close cooperation with the different faculties, in particular the faculties of law, social science, geosciences and medicine.

The IFHV carries out research and teaching on the problems of peace and armed conflict from an inter-disciplinary perspective. Based on its strong international humanitarian law tradition, the IFHV is the only institute in Germany, and one of very few in Europe and the world, which is dedicated to the discipline of humanitarian studies. The IFHV combines its strong emphasis on international humanitarian law, the law of peace and human rights law with sociological and political perspectives on humanitarian crises, actors and activities.

IFHV Working Paper Series

In 2011, the IFHV and the Ruhr University Bochum decided to set up an IFHV Working Paper Series in humanitarian studies. In line with the IFHV’s multidisciplinary profile, we intend to publish a broad range of papers in the field of humanitarian studies. Our Working Paper Series publishes ‘work in progress’. The Working Paper Series intends to stimulate the humanitarian discourse, contribute to the advancement of the knowledge and understanding of the practices, policies and norms of humanitarian action, and last but not least seeks to attract comments, which improve the content of the working paper for further publications.

The Working Paper Series allows IFHV staff and students, and like-minded researchers in the field of humanitarian studies to bring their work and ideas to the attention of a wider audience. In order to publish high level working papers, the papers offered for publication will be technically screened by the editors of the working paper series and subjected to an internal blind peer review process.

Contact:
Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV)
Ruhr University Bochum (RUB)
Bochumer Fenster, 4th floor
Massenbergstr. 9 B
44787 Bochum
Germany

Telephone: +49 234 32 27366
Fax: +49 234 32 14208
Email: ifhv@rub.de
Web: www.ifhv.de
Facebook: www.facebook.com/rub.ifhv